With peace now off the Israeli agenda, the best thing for the Arabs is to put their house in order and construct an alliance of the global South, writes Hassan Nafaa* The US-Israeli relationship is in no need for proof of how deep and solid it is. For 60 years, since the creation of the state of Israel, it has withstood all the reverses and upheavals in the international order. With the exception of a brief rift during the tripartite invasion of Egypt, which proved more akin to the exception that proves the rule, the US-Israeli connection grew continually stronger until it forged a bond that I believe is unique in the history of international relations -- so incomparably unique as to be unclassifiable. Yet as intensely cooperative a relationship it is, it has not been entirely free of moments of suppressed tension that has even surfaced into the open in the form of military operations or espionage activities, although these have always originated from one side: Israel. There was, for example, the deliberate and unprovoked bombardment of the US warship, SS Liberty, which had been located in the theatre of operations during the 1967 war. Dozens of US soldiers lost their lives in this attack. Among the numerous instances of Israeli espionage against the US the most notorious was the case of Pollard who has been held in US jails for years despite all the efforts of the Zionist lobby and successive Israeli governments to secure his release. It is difficult to understand this perverse form of behaviour unless we take into account the intense complexity in the social and psychological makeup of a state and society that no longer have the luxury to place their trust in any party of "others". Yet, this peculiar bilateral relationship seems unsustainable, for three interrelated reasons. First, the US has changed or is in the midst of change. Second, Israel has changed considerably and is going to change more. Third, the changes in both countries are moving in opposite directions and their outlooks may become too diametrically opposed to reconcile them. The changes that we see taking place stem from the growing realisation on the part of decision-makers and the broader circle of political elites that the US might has not only failed to achieve a form of sole universal hegemony but also appears unable to sustain US leadership of the global order for much longer. Among the many reasons for this is the failure of the US military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. US strategy in the post- Cold War era was built on the assumption that US armed forces could engage effectively in two simultaneous wars in two different regions. The assumption has been clearly proven false after it has become clear that there are wars in which military might alone is insufficient to achieve a decisive victory. A second reason is the collapse of the US's moral leadership with the plummeting appeal of the "American way of life" as a model to be emulated worldwide. The US had succeeded by means of various sources of "soft strength" in creating a system of values and lifestyles that for decades held a powerful lure around the world; however, the neoconservative administration, which behaved with such contempt for the values of democracy, justice and human rights, squandered this invaluable asset. More recently, the economic and fiscal crisis added a third reason. Such is the magnitude of this crisis that the new US administration feels compelled to reassess the very foundations of the capitalist order, especially in its extreme American version, which Washington had championed and attempted to impose internationally for decades. The growing awareness of the limits of US might at these three levels has coincided with a growing awareness of the impossibility of preventing the rise of other international powers that have set their sights on sharing in the leadership of the international order. As the US's status and prestige in the international order eroded, the stars of other international powers rose. Russia succeeded in reversing the deterioration and decay that had afflicted it after the collapse of the Soviet Union and began to reassert itself as a global power. With its economic growth racing forward at rapid rates, China is now poised to become the world's leading economic power within the space of a quarter of a century. India, Brazil and other emerging powers have begun to demand permanent seats on the UN Security Council. So profound is the potential impact of such changes on the US that it must re-evaluate its map of international alliances, which will probably lead it to reformulating its relationship with Israel on a new basis in which its own interests come first. The change in Israel is taking place against the backdrop of the declining role of the left in shaping the future of the Zionist project. The Israeli left, which has special traits determined by the very nature of the Zionist project, played the most instrumental role in the establishment of the state of Israel and in creating the necessary components and conditions to enable that state to forge an independent, and often daring, foreign policy. The left tended to be pragmatic; it operated within the framework of the possible, which smoothed the way for Israel's allies, the US above all, to follow a flexible policy that allowed them to furnish the highest levels of material and political support to Israel while averting confrontations with Arab countries. However, with the transition from the construction of a viable and sustainable state to the drive to expand its boundaries to cover the whole of the "promised land", the left began to crumble, leaving the field increasingly open to right-wing forces that were more ideologically committed and perhaps better equipped to fulfil the territorial ambitions of the Zionist project. Thus, the balance of political forces in Israel gradually tipped ever more to the right, until eventually the ultra right took over the centre and the left receded to the fringe, as was so tangibly evidenced in the recent parliamentary elections. In fact, even the heart of the Labour Party has changed, to which testifies its readiness to take part in a government led by Binyamin Netanyahu and in which Avigdor Lieberman now serves as foreign minister. It is very difficult to envision a government of this sort capable of adopting policies conducive to the needs and temperament of the current administration in Washington. The Netanyahu-Lieberman government is committed to the destruction of the Iranian nuclear project, Hizbullah and Hamas. These are its priorities, while it has nothing to offer Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas apart from a meaningless "economic peace". Towards the advancement of its goals, it is determined to pursue a strategy of "pushing the envelop" with Israel's neighbours, the aim of which is to heighten sectarian and other tensions within and between Arab countries so as to embroil them in internal and internecine squabbles and conflicts, thereby distracting them from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Naturally, such a strategy is completely at odds with the new conciliatory and peacemaking premises of American policy, which aims to withdraw from Iraq, engage in dialogue with Syria and Iran, forge a closer alliance with Turkey and more actively promote a two-state solution to the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. It will be very difficult to reach a compromise of any sort between such antithetical American and Israeli aims and approaches. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine Netanyahu plunging headlong into a direct and open butting of heads with the Obama administration. We can expect, therefore, that he will try to avert confrontation through recourse to Israel's customary tactics. Clearly then, the question is not whether US policy towards Israel will change, but when and how? Of course, Obama most certainly has no wish to lock horns with the Israeli government at this stage either, but tensions seem inevitable. He has a perilous economic crisis to remedy, thousands of troops to withdraw from Iraq, and difficult situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan that need to be resolved. Remedies for all of these questions are contingent upon a relative degree of calm and stability in the immediate environments, and diplomacy must prevail over military methods for this to be obtained. Obama, therefore, has no other choice but to build new international alliances that are not necessarily centred on Israeli interests. Therefore, it will probably not be issues directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict that spark the initial tensions between Obama and Netanyahu, but rather issues related to the abovementioned aspects. These, in turn, are connected to changes Obama has pledged to bring about and which require a certain degree of openness towards Iran, Syria and, perhaps, Hizbullah and Hamas, which Israel does not want at all. In light of the foregoing, the opportunity is available to the Arab world, theoretically at least, to build a qualitatively new type of Arab-US relationship, one that can capitalise on and deepen the contradictions between Washington and Israel and promote effective international mechanisms for exerting pressure on Israel. But, if the Arabs are to seize this chance, certain conditions must be met on the ground. These include, first, achieving Palestinian reconciliation on the basis of a unified national vision for managing the struggle with Israel; second, achieving a true inter-Arab reconciliation that will form the foundations of a new Arab order equipped with the necessary institutions for effective inter-Arab collaboration; and, third, the construction of a network of relations with nations of the South, through more intensive coordinated efforts within the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the African Union and other such regional organisations, and with one of their common aims being reform of the UN. However, such conditions are still far from seeing the light of day. Meanwhile, Netanyahu seems confident of his ability to accomplish two major objectives. One is to counter the dynamism of change that brought Obama to the White House (or, if that fails, to conspire to assassinate the president). The second is to ignite new fires in Palestine, Sudan, Lebanon and elsewhere in order to forestall Palestinian and inter-Arab reconciliation processes and to prevent solidarity drives with countries of the South. It seems, therefore, that the ball is now in the US and Arab courts. Confronting Israeli extremism will ultimately depend on the ability of the Obama administration to fulfil its pledge to the American people to produce change and the ability of the Arab League to fulfil its pledge to the Arab people to foster inter-Arab reconciliation. The failure of either of these pledges will come as a boon to the Israeli ultra right and fuel the trends to war and destruction in the region. Sadly, this is the most likely possibility. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
