What's new in Washington's relationship with the international organisation? Hassan Nafaa* seeks some answers The opening of the annual session of the UN General Assembly no longer stirs much interest. Were it not for the meetings held on the fringes by controversial leaders, or the behind-the-scenes mediation undertaken by heads of state seeking a solution to some crisis or other, the occasion would probably pass unnoticed by the general public. This year's inaugural session was an exception. What lent it a unique flavour was the presence of US President Barack Obama. Less than a year ago Obama was voted into power as the US's 44th president on the basis of a campaign that championed change. The international community is now keen to learn what type of change he will bring to US foreign policy and, in particular, to Washington's relations with the UN which had reached an all-time low under his predecessor. The inauguration of the UN's new session witnessed two events that reflected some of the nature of this change. The first was Obama's address to the General Assembly, very different in tone and substance from what that international gathering is used to hearing from US presidents. The second was the Security Council session, headed personally by Obama, dedicated to the discussion of a draft resolution on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, envisioned as a first step towards creating a world free of nuclear weapons. As this was the first time a US president had ever chaired a Security Council session, the event was of undeniable symbolic and material significance. Many felt that the US had truly turned a new page in the history of its relations with the UN. But what does Obama intend to write on this page? Perhaps the best approach to answering this question is to examine Washington's changing relationship with the international organisation in a kind of historical flashback: The first scene opens in the aftermath of World War I, which the US was compelled to enter in spite of the isolationist policy it had adhered to since the outset of the 19th century. The protagonist, here, is president Woodrow Wilson who, at the Versailles peace conference, personally spearheaded the creation of the first international organisation concerned with the preservation of international peace and security. Wilson was not only the most enthusiastic cheerleader for the League of Nations, he was also the most instrumental in shaping the nascent organisation's charter. Wilson headed the committee responsible for drafting it. However, this scene closes on a sad note. Wilson soon discovered that his vision was beyond the comprehension of the general run of American opinion. Congress refused to ratify the treaty, preventing the US from joining the League of Nations, which was one of the primary causes for that organisation's frailty and eventual collapse. Scene two opens during World War II with President Franklin Roosevelt seeking to persuade the US public to enter the war and, subsequently, approve US participation in the construction of an institutionalised international framework for the post- war period. In the hope of creating a climate that would avert a repetition of the events that had followed World War I, America's allies were keen to offer incentives to the US to ensure its wholehearted participation. It was no coincidence that the United Nations Declaration was issued in Washington in January 1942, that the most important preparatory negotiating phases for the creation of the UN took place on the outskirts of Washington in 1944, that the organisation's founding conference was held in San Francisco in 1945, and that New York was selected as its permanent headquarters. This time the Senate approved the UN Charter with an overwhelming majority of 89 votes, with only two opposed, making the US the first country to ratify the charter. Scene three begins with the US sitting fairly comfortably in the UN during the opening phases of the Cold War. It could feel assured of an almost automatic majority of votes in favour of its positions in the General Assembly and never had to avail itself of its veto in the Security Council. It was the Soviet Union, by contrast, that was perpetually wielding its veto and, hence, appearing as the party responsible for obstructing the will of the international community and undermining the efficacy of the UN. Washington's success in securing the passage of the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, which transferred some of the Security Council's powers to the General Assembly, to which Washington resorted frequently in order to deepen Moscow's international isolation, strengthened Washington's position, which lasted until the early 1970s. Scene four brings a complete reversal for the US. In the second phase of the Cold War period its position in the UN began to grow shaky. It saw its automatic majority in the General Assembly gradually dwindle away because of its stances against the interests of the Third World, which with the succession of newly independent states admitted into the UN came to constitute a clear majority in the General Assembly. Now the US became the country that wielded its veto in the Security Assembly regularly. An increasingly isolated US began to view the UN, and many of its subsidiary organisations, as bastions of Soviet influence. This attitude became especially prevalent after the Republicans reached power under Reagan in 1980, after which Washington began to apply mounting pressure on the UN which peaked in 1984. The US withdrew from UNESCO, threatened to withdraw from other UN agencies, and withheld or delayed payment of its dues to the UN. The fall of the Soviet Union marks the beginning of scene three, which would last until the end of the younger Bush's second term as president. The most salient trait of this phase was Washington's attempt to turn the Security Council into an arm of American foreign policy. Washington seemed to be seeking a monopoly on the right to veto, which it used to advance its interests and those of its allies, Israel in particular. When Washington failed to secure the votes it needed to approve the resolutions it wanted the Security Council to pass it no longer baulked at acting independently, in defiance of the opinion of the international community, even if that entailed illegitimate recourse to force, as was the case with its invasion of Iraq in 2003. As the Bush administration's strategy for attaining global hegemony met a dead end in a series of wars that failed to achieve their objectives and that sapped the US materially, politically and morally, US opinion began to rally around Obama's calls for change in the 2008 presidential elections. A man of Muslim African origins was swept into the White House for the first time in US history, ushering in a new and desperately needed wave of hope around the world. Indeed, Obama's speech to the General Assembly this year not only exuded a fresh and welcome tone of political rhetoric, it reflected understanding of the urgent need for a change in policy outlook to conform with new balances of power in the international order. There are many indications that the new US administration is aware that Washington can no longer take decisions unilaterally, let alone force upon the international community actions intended to attain exclusive US interests. Washington has been forced to acknowledge the limits of its power, its military power, above all, which has been put to a gruelling test in Iraq, Afghanistan and the "global war on terrorism". This awareness of the limits of power and the restrictions it imposes does not necessarily mean that Washington is aware of the nature of the foreign policy changes it should introduce to rectify the mistakes of the past and to avoid their repetition in the future. Changing policies entails considerably more than a new tone in political rhetoric. It requires the energetic mobilisation of forces, at home and abroad, to bring into effect the envisioned changes, a process that demands very particular skills and mechanisms. So far President Obama has proven adept at inspiring change through his oratorical flare. He has yet to demonstrate similar proficiency when it comes to translating the rhetoric of change into effective policies and programmes. Obama's short address to the UN General Assembly might call to mind his lengthier address from Cairo University. Both were elegantly worded and carefully pitched. Given that the Cairo speech raised hopes for a solution to the Middle East conflict that Obama has proved unable to deliver many felt that they had no choice but to restrain their expectations with regard to the future of US-UN relations following his address in New York. Netanyahu has amply demonstrated his ability to derail Obama's dreams for achieving a just settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict. It will not be long before Netanyahu begins to obstruct the reforms needed to reinvigorate the UN. By the time Obama realises that a reinvigorated UN is the shortest route to a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict it may well be too late. Netanyahu has long operated on the premise that an empowered UN is the shortest route to the end of Israel's freedom to flout international law. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
