On the last day of 2005, Al-Ahram Weekly brought together an esteemed group of policy-makers, strategists and analysts for an intense brainstorming session. The main item on the agenda was Egypt in 2006. How would the dynamic events of the past year play out in an increasingly complex world? Is the political arena ripe for transformation, or will any momentum generated by the changes that have already taken place be curbed once again? And how does all of this fit within Egypt's regional interests? The seminar may not have provided all the answers to these questions, but it certainly generated a healthy debate. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REFORM AL-AHRAM WEEKLY: What challenges will Egypt face in 2006? AHMED MAHER: In 2005, we saw signs of reform. A new government, with a liberal new economic policy, made some achievements, and needs to take other steps in the future as well. We saw political mobility in the recent parliamentary elections, which had its positives and negatives. The negative aspects [and] irregularities undermined the positive aspects. The question is: will optimism or pessimism prevail in 2006? There will be major competition between elements pushing the balance in either direction. Despite negative signs like the low turnout for the elections, the fact that politics has returned to the Egyptian street makes me optimistic. Even though a great many people did not go to the polls, those who did not vote cannot be considered apathetic. It's hard not to notice the debate about political development and reform that's going on everywhere around the country. Even those who did not cast their ballots are interested in [that talk]. There were also the public movements taking to the streets, in the name of Kifaya and Shayfeencom. In 2006, I hope political parties, which are the pillar of political action in any democratic system, find a way to develop themselves into true vehicles for the public's democratic ambitions. The government also has a role. There is no doubt that its control over these parties has tightened. MOHAMED EL-SAYED SAID: 2005 ended with a contradiction. On the one hand, there was a state of mental and political activism Egypt has not seen for three decades. On the other hand, reality was "fixed", so to speak. All that political "labour" ended with the "fixing" of reality, putting a frame of legitimacy on it. The result: the same People's Assembly line-up, and President [Hosni] Mubarak in office for a fifth term with no defined presidential term limits, even though this is a central issue. That has opened a "constitutional trap" that oversteps President Mubarak's achievements. In my view, Mubarak has achieved a lot. But what really matters is redefining the presidency and its role in the Egyptian political system, along with restructuring that role by restricting the absolute authority [of the president], and setting a timeframe for his rule -- all of which make up a basic feature of modern political regimes, including totalitarian or even despotic regimes. It is no longer acceptable for one person to rule forever. The aforementioned contradiction cannot go on for long: science says contradictions dissolve themselves, either via the kind of activism that began in the second part of 2004, or more brutally, as activists become desperate and their morale collapses. I think we will see key political and constitutional reforms in 2006. Mubarak has talked about limited presidential powers, and the transfer of some of these powers to the cabinet. We have to keep in mind that Egypt has no government, just a cabinet. Mubarak also spoke of parliament having better control of the cabinet, enacting a new local governance law, abolishing the emergency law and putting an anti-terrorism law in place, and abolishing a group of more punitive laws that lead to restrictions on freedoms. These are the main features. However, the real issue is whether these reforms are so small that they would only "fix" reality, or big enough to transform the country onto a democratic framework that suits its image and international reputation. Small steps mean manoeuvring, going around the issues, and using different linguistic formulas, all for the sake of "fixing" reality in order to keep the "matrix of control" as it is. That matrix includes specific bodies, and involves one person monopolising power and using bureaucratic and administrative bodies whose leaders he has appointed. Retaining this kind of system will only further affect Egypt's status. The question remains: will developments in 2006 be small and "trivial", or "major"? I imagine a middle solution. Since political forces are unable to impose an ambitious vision of Egypt's political future, and since the government is unable to "fix" reality, let's aim for a middle way via dialogue and continuous pressures that may bring Egypt's political and constitutional systems closer to France, which adopts a duality of executive powers. The French model is controlled by better democratic and parliamentary systems, which means transferring larger powers from the president into the hands of the cabinet, with the cabinet picked by the majority party, with no interference from the president into that process. In that way, the parliament can appoint and seriously hold people to account, a factor [that is missing] in this country. That duality could give us a push and fix the "matrix of control" at the same time. It would soothe the fears of those who feel the country would slide into chaos if key changes took place. AHMED ABDEL-HALIM: There are signs that point to the directions being taken by Egypt's political scene. When Ahmed Nazif formed his new cabinet, he underlined the need for "harmony" amongst the ministers. Since most of them have dealt with the liberal, capital world, that "harmony" means new changes, in the form of the nation moving towards a more liberal society and market, democratic development, freedom and civil society. In parliament, there are other signs. The number of Muslim Brotherhood MPs, for example, has triggered a political controversy, even though they don't even hold a third of seats, and thus cannot push for amendments or ask for a vote of no confidence in the government. There are also external factors. Britain has said that Islam does not stand as an obstacle to the development of democracy. And yet the Islamic trend has been around for a long time. Their sudden visibility in 2005 points to guarantees and regulations set at home, and supported from abroad, to "allow" that number of Muslim Brotherhood members to be MPs. The irreversible mobility we saw via recent developments is a positive step. We might soon see other internal political developments, including the cancellation of the prosecutor-general's office. The balance between the [powers of the cabinet], and those of the presidency, is also on decision-makers' minds. Although the NDP still controls parliament, that does not mean the country's future will remain as is. The future of countries cannot be measured in the framework of a few years. If people are capable of developing democracy, there will be [tangible] results. Finding the required balance will be the work of the future. SAMIR MORCOS: 2005 was a significant year, when a lot of pending questions were addressed; questions about the formation of parties on a religious basis, and about market economies and liberalism. The main question was whether economic development could move faster than political development, a situation that could lead to economic liberalisation along with continued restrictions on the creation of parties. What we realised in 2005 was that there is a lot of issues that needed to be reviewed 50 years ago. For that reason, I think 2006 will be a year of more revisions and answering questions. We cannot go on without revising or answering these questions. Does Egypt's party system need re-formulation? Can a party be established to include the 75 per cent (the so- called silent majority) that did not go to the polls in the recent parliamentary elections? AHMED ABDEL-HALIM: The low turnout problem could be resolved by providing a citizen with the minimum of basic services so that he is able to freely express his point of view. If he has his point of view, he can go to the polls to express it. If not, he doesn't have the time to waste. This situation has created a new phenomenon in Egypt: vote-buying. We blame citizens and candidates without acknowledging that development and reform issues really do matter. The low turnout is also related to the dismal percentage of women MPs in parliament. We blame women for not participating, forgetting that society does not welcome the presence of women [on the political scene] in the first place. Any solutions would remain ineffective as long as elections continue to be held on an individual candidacy basis. A solution might be a "slate system", with parties putting women and Copts at the head of the lists of candidates running for elections. We have to dig into the root causes of the problem. It used to be the middle class who controlled political movements, when a civil servant made enough to cover his expenses and even had enough disposal income to spend his or her summer holiday in Alexandria. Today, the situation is different. Even a minister could not survive if he only depended on his salary. He would have to become a beggar. These are the issues we should concentrate on from now on. AHMED MAHER: I beg to differ. People will not go to the polls unless they think their votes have a value, and could help them meet their needs. I think the turnout was low due to administrative hurdles, like voter lists. Also, people were not convinced that their votes could translate into candidates that do represent them in the legislature. We can encourage a citizen to vote by facilitating the voting process; giving him or her the feeling that his or her vote does count, and could be translated into their favoured candidate winning in the polls. Unfortunately, there was a lot of confusion in some constituencies, a situation that did not encourage citizens to go to the polls. Citizens need more awareness. There has been a recent increase in that awareness, in the public movements that defeated parties, for instance, which proved unable to represent the people, who took to the streets to represent themselves. However, the public has not reached a level where they are convinced of the need to translate that representation into higher turnout. HASSAN NAFAA: In the end, the government's behaviour and actions towards its citizens is what matters. The presidential elections made clear that political parties are weak, and yet Article 76 limits presidential nominees to those picked by political parties. If the article was amended in a way that allowed the so-called silent majority [those who did not go to the polls] to represent people, that majority could have offered up individuals who could compete with Mubarak in a genuine electoral process. The amendment, however, has limited the competition to candidates that people do not believe in. It is a one-sided game that did not inspire citizens to go to the polls. To get out of this, Article 76 should be amended again. Or we have to wait until new parties are created. But that will not happen as long as the NDP maintains its dominance over the Parties Committee, and the law that places restrictions on parties is still in force. What clues does Ayman Nour's story hold in this regard? HASSAN NAFAA: The licence for the creation of Nour's Ghad Party came after direct American pressures. The Wasat Party, for instance, applied for its licence before the Ghad, but has still not gotten it. It is not a healthy multi-party pluralistic atmosphere at all when getting a licence involves a political party taking on 10 years of court battles. The same goes with parliamentary elections. If the law stipulates a slate list system, and independents were allowed to form their own independent lists of candidates, people would have gone to the polls. Has pluralism died out? The answer is definitely yes. When [Anwar] El-Sadat was assassinated, President Mubarak inherited a "disfigured" experience full of restrictions. However, Mubarak did not change or develop that inheritance. We should not forget how Sadat played a direct role in inflating the religious element. Sadat believed that leftists were the main enemy at the time. What he did not understand was that the religious trend, which he wanted to use to crack down on the leftists, had their own agenda. Civil parties were killed off within that framework. There needs to be a reconsideration of all legislation controlling Egypt's political life, in order to unleash potential energies and the possible movement of civil society groups. With the rise of the religious trend, we are in a context that could lead to an explosive new situation. The public does not want the government, nor does it want the Muslim Brotherhood, to control things. AHMED MAHER: In Sadat's era, the Islamists rose with the government's support. Today's rise is a result of the political vacancy that parties failed to fill. In Latin America, Indonesia and other African countries with older democracies than Egypt, there is a dilemma over whether democracy leads to social and economic welfare. People want democracy, but are beginning to feel like democracy does not necessarily bring them basic services. Will Egypt face the same dilemma? SAMIR MORCOS: In some democracies, interest groups or new liberals do not want any sort of accountability. They want a sort of "uncontrolled democracy" permitting them a foothold in parliament so that they hold themselves to account or oversee their own actions. HASSAN NAFAA: The comparison is not valid on many fronts for many different reasons. Oil and the Palestinian- Israeli conflict make the relationship with the US totally different than in any other area of the world. Plus, the 9/11 attacks have affected US foreign policy, and we should not forget that the perpetrators were all Arabs and Muslims hailing from friendly countries. American policy is now dominated by the concept that there are despotic regimes in the Arab region that pave the ground for terrorism hitting the US. Washington further argues that there is a despotic culture that led to that. For those reasons, Washington concentrates on education, media and religion [as fields that need change in the Middle East]. At the same time, the Americans are facing a dilemma in the oil- rich Middle East. On the one hand, they want regimes that guard oil for the US. At the same time, they feel a full democratic liberalisation could bring in political regimes that could harm oil supplies or have a different agenda that clashes with US interests. Furthermore, the close and special links between the US and Israel makes the American agenda an Israeli agenda. That pushes America's foreign policy -- which wants democracy that does not harm oil supplies -- into an impasse. Israel drags Washington into a different specific way. What is the outcome? The US is making attempts to blackmail Arab regimes into making concessions serving Israel. Threatening the regimes with the "phantom of democracy" does this. Are there any scenarios in place if, for any reason, President Mubarak did not wish to complete his term? There has been talk of a potential political vacancy. AHMED ABDEL-HALIM: The constitution stipulates that the People's Assembly speaker takes over until a referendum is held on a candidate within 60 days. If that happens now [given the amendment of Article 76], the parliament speaker would call for new elections in which those parties that fit the amendment's criteria could field candidates. With weak parties, groups like Kifaya that seem to have drifted, and a rising Muslim Brotherhood, who will lead the drive for change in 2005? MOHAMED EL-SAYED SAID: I have no clear idea as to who should lead the change. There is a common belief that no major change can take place prior to a large socio-economic development. This fact is historically misused by the political regime. The current regime was given 24 years, during which it tragically and ridiculously "fixed" the political state, all for the economic file's sake. For a quarter of a century, the regime sacrificed human rights and the rule of law and personalised power, all allegedly for the sake of economic development. The comparison between Latin America and Egypt can be considered in this context. Despite his regime's ferocious [brutality], Chilean leader Pinochet turned his country, which is a small state in Latin America, into one of the world's largest industrial states within the time frame in which Mubarak has ruled. The case is the same with Brazil. The essence of the problem is that the "political architecture" -- with all its details -- was built on a key scenario that allows a "top-down" method of expression. For example, a trade union speaks in the name of labourers. This type of system does not allow for public movement of expression. We have that problem because of a horrifying political and cultural backwardness. Take the parties for example: all of them speak of social justice and democracy to the extent that we are unable to differentiate between them. A deeper problem is the lack of diversity or pluralism concerning the approaches to address key questions. Any new regime in Egypt -- whether Muslim Brotherhood or leftists if they take over -- would move within the same "totalitarian" context. Indeed, totalitarianism is a mental state. If a regime wants to move to capitalism, socialism, or democratic capitalism, they should do so seriously. The problem with the current regime, or other ensuing regimes, is that it seeks to satisfy all classes and meet all choices. That's why there's an enormous backwardness at the cultural level when it comes to finding solutions to problems. Egyptian society wants good results without sacrifices. It wants to have all things at the same time -- social justice, national independence, a tough stance against Israel, criticising the US and getting aid from it, all at the same time. It's no wonder our achievements in all these fields are nearly nil. Take the economy. According to the current economic situation, growth rate cannot move beyond four per cent by any means. The regime is based on satisfying everyone, because this is the price for staying in power in an aggressive way. The regime, including the government and the cabinet, was not elected [in the first place]. It's as simple as that. If Egypt wants to address unemployment, the investment rate has to go up to 25 per cent. As such, fuel should not be subsidised. The low price of fuel means the government finances its consumption by LE25 billion, an amount that could otherwise be pumped into development plans and thus re-fresh the economy and reduce unemployment rates. However, if that subsidy was cut off, the middle and upper class -- who use cars and have the most investments -- would be upset. So there is a bias towards the upper class at the expense of the poorer classes, who cannot find jobs because they have no connections. The issue is that we always want happy solutions, which always become sad ones. We have to admit that our society is pluralistic. Before making that admission, we will have no real pluralism. I do not see the Muslim Brotherhood as more dangerous than the current regime. Once the Muslim Brotherhood comes closer to power, all the intelligentsia will easily and quickly switch to the Muslim Brotherhood's side. All capitalists, with the exception of Copts, would do that as well. Again, we would have one party with the same totalitarian make-up of members. The government has to change its political theories. It wants to stay in power, even against God's will, and that's all. They want their descendants to take over. The government does not have the least desire for change. It does not even let us elect the umda, or village mayor, who is appointed by the Interior ministry because they want him to be a spy. We are all in a dilemma. We need a compromise to build a respectable constitutional structure towards which we can gradually move. We definitely have to integrate the Muslim Brotherhood, but we have to have constitutional guarantees in this regard that take the Turkish model into consideration. HASSAN NAFAA: We can say that the regimes of [Gamal] Abdel-Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak were totalitarian. But there were substantial differences. One pursued a renaissance project. Another had a different project. The third inherited a regime with a lot of problems. Mubarak was a respectable army officer. He hails from a village. He joined the army as a member of the middle class leading the country at the time. The problem is that his son Gamal, whom many are suggesting is being groomed to lead, was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. He was an employee in a bank, and he mostly meets with businessmen. Who leads change? The government could have catalysed true multi-party change, if it allowed itself to think freely. The state, however, is now [more occupied] with grooming the son for presidency. If the interest in succession was not there, Article 76 would not have been amended that way. The government would have allowed independents to run for president, and let more parties be formed. FOREIGN POLICY AND EGYPT'S REGIONAL ROLE How should Egypt run its foreign policy? AHMED MAHER: I think Egypt should gradually do without American economic and military aid, so as to be capable of making reforms. An effective foreign policy always leans on a strong domestic position. The principle of "Egypt first" defies the basic principles of foreign policy, for everything happening in Palestine, Lebanon or Sudan directly influences Egypt. So, Egypt has to play a key role in these regions. But to what extent is Egypt successful in playing a role in these regional issues? Is it doing well? Or is this role dwindling? AHMED ABDEL-HALIM: There are certain international and regional conditions and issues governing Egypt's strategies. The unprecedented American hegemony is influencing every part of the world. Israel is benefiting from this hegemonic status, given that the stretching American empire is in need of regional forces to impose its policies on these regions. Israel, therefore, is acting like a proxy in implementing American strategies in the Middle East. This status enormously influences the pressing regional issues Egypt has been facing. These are: the Israeli-Palestinian issue; the Lebanese-Syrian issue; and the Syrian issue itself and the interaction between the two countries; the Iraqi issue and lastly the Iranian issue. Egypt has a set of "strategic interest circles" -- the Mediterranean-European, the Middle Eastern, the African, the Arab and the Islamic circles. Egypt moves within these circles according to its capacities and its ability to pay the costs. Egypt has changed its strategy towards certain issues because of its inability to bear the costs. When a problem arose between Eritrea and Yemen, Egypt was supposed to take the Yemeni side. But it couldn't do so because the major powers had interests in this region. Therefore, Egypt took another stance that ended up in Yemen's interest. Is this considered a failure in the country's foreign and defence policies? Of course not. Egypt adopted this stance by taking the limits of its military power into consideration. If you read the specific details of certain military, strategic and political treaties concluded between the United States and Israel, you will find out that any Egyptian military move outside its regional frame will make such treaties come into force, which involves putting America's military forces under the disposal of the Israeli leadership to counter-act Egypt's move. The Egyptian military forces' task is to protect the country's security. But what if a military operation began in the area surrounding Israel? Will Egypt be able to move its military forces? No country can fully achieve its "strategic goal". The more resources we have, the more likely we are to achieve our strategic goals. Egypt must have enough resources to support its foreign and defence policies. What Egypt can do now is, first, do its best to minimise its losses, and second, achieve comprehensive development on the domestic front, i.e. build a strong economy. AL-AHRAM WEEKLY: Does foreign policy still top Egypt's agenda? Is the state diverting its attention to domestic issues at the expense of foreign ones? HASSAN NAFAA: Ever since we adopted the "Egypt first" slogan, interest in foreign policy issues has gone down. First, there's the River Nile, which runs through many African countries, and is vital to every single Egyptian. As such, Egypt must pay special attention to these countries, since it's a crucial national security issue. Second, any time Egypt was invaded, it happened via the Mediterranean Sea or the eastern borders. The presence of any foreign forces in eastern Arab countries constitutes a great danger to Egyptian national security. We already have Israel, a danger that existed in the past, and will remain in the future. When President Anwar El-Sadat went to Jerusalem in 1977, he thought that this way he could reach a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that would give each regional force a role commensurate with its regional weight. But it didn't work. While Egypt has been working for conflict resolution, Israel has been implementing conflict management. Thus, Israel has the upper hand in our region -- it determines the rhythm of events and settlement. Israel is involved in what's happening in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, etc. Egypt should review the sources of its foreign threats, and its ability to deal with them, and draw a new foreign policy on those bases. Alas, Egypt moves without any clear vision in this regard. And so the only thing the country can do is survive. Six years ago, I asked the then foreign minister Amr Moussa whether Egypt was ready for the possibility of a failure in the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. "When this happens, we will decide what to do," Moussa answered. And as it happened, the settlement efforts came to a stalemate, and Egypt didn't have a vision for this possibility. Egypt still suffers from this lack of vision in our foreign policy. It has to re-build its international alliances so as to face such challenges and threats. We now see the Syrian regime, one of our allies, about to collapse. The eastern Arab countries -- Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan -- are controlled by America and Israel. Why are some of Egyptian foreign policy's most pressing issues managed by intelligence bodies? AHMED MAHER: No foreign policy issue has been completely given to the General Intelligence services. But some issues, like the Palestinian one, require holding talks with certain parties that the Foreign Ministry cannot contact or deal with. For example, conducting talks with the Palestinian factions calls for certain intelligence experience, as well as training the police forces in Iraq, holding talks with certain Iraqi organisations, etc. Like any country's foreign policy, there is coordination between foreign ministries and intelligence agencies as well as defence ministries. AHMED ABDEL-HALIM: Intelligence agencies' involvement in foreign policy is not limited to Egypt. For example, George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, has managed some American foreign policy files. The CIA puts the final touches on any agreement in the Middle East. At some points in time, Egyptian General Intelligence managed the whole Sudanese, Libyan and Serbian files. There is no conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence services. WHAT WILL 2006 BRING? To what extent will the events of 2005 affect the pace of Egypt's political development in 2006? HASSAN NAFAA: The most important point of 2005 was the intermingling of internal and external affairs on an unprecedented scale in the history of the region, and perhaps the world. I think the political mobility that took place in Egypt could not have happened in that way unless there were external circumstances, especially after Bush's re-election and his speech in front of Congress. The American president told congressmen that the problem with the Middle East is despotism, and that democratic transformation in the region is high on his agenda. Regardless of the concept of democracy as envisaged by the US administration, or the intentions behind that concept, the American agenda imposed itself on the region in a very significant way. That comes within the context that the US has become the world's only superpower, and has a presence everywhere across the world. No wonder then, that when Bush said the American agenda is one of democratic transformation in the Middle East, the pledge left a direct impact on local Egyptian affairs. I believe that mingling between internal and external elements is hard to ignore. For example, the momentum given to political life in Egypt could not have been realised if there had been no American agenda moving on the same road. However, it will do injustice to the national movement if we said that the momentum was only catalysed by direct influence from the American administration. In any case, the outcome made certain that Egyptians do not want the NDP or its government; and that the NDP wants reform at a "formal" -- rather than a "substantial" -- level. If the interaction between internal and external pressures for democracy had come naturally, the government would have made a democratic transformation that was gradual and less dangerous. What happened, however, was that the NDP adopted a superficial form of democracy to contain democratic demands at home. That led to the "dangerous polarisation" we see now. That polarisation is between the power of the state, on the one hand, and the power of religion on the other. The NDP represents the first, and the Muslim Brotherhood the other. Between the two there is an enormous political vacancy, which civil parties fail to close. Another question remains. Who is to lead democratic reform in the future? If we leave leadership to the NDP, to the way Mubarak presented it in his political programme ahead of the presidential elections, the country would slide further into crisis and the current polarisation would increase. It is noteworthy to say the reforms mentioned by Mubarak are by no means substantial. We want, and the crisis calls for, substantial reform. Activist forces are unable to impose an agenda for change. Do we have to wait for the explosion? Will social powers pay attention to the pending tension and pool their efforts into adopting a different agenda that they can try to impose one way or another through different mechanisms? I see civil society forces trying to coordinate their efforts and meeting to see whether they could form a new party or end the tension between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood. I am not sure if they can succeed. If not, the problem will continue to linger. Will US pressures regarding reform continue in 2006? AHMED MAHER: The international atmosphere is moving towards more democracy, regardless of what America says. In any case, America does not provide the best example. Political regimes have realised that they have reached an impasse, and they need to reform, not from top to bottom but with the people's participation. However, at the same time, there are no real efforts to get people to participate. There should be an interest in creating new parties. The Wafd, for example, is currently in a conflict between the central leadership and reformists who are unable to dissent. Since the procedures to form a party are very difficult, the conflict has turned into civil war, so to speak. It's the same case with other parties. If procedures to form parties were facilitated, liberal and democratic elements in different parties could have cooperated to form a new party. We should not concentrate on an American agenda; we should concentrate on an Egyptian one. The Egyptians have expressed their desire for reform. The government responded to that desire. I believe if every element of President Mubarak's platform is implemented all at once, it would have an impact. On the other hand, if the platform is implemented in stages, bit by bit, it would lose that impact. For that reason, all the aforementioned points should be addressed openly and at the same time. Prepared for publication by Tarek Atia, Sahar El-Bahr, Mustafa El-Menshawy and Mohamed El-Sayed
