As Lebanon approaches national elections not all those recently pivotal remain so, writes Omayma Abdel-Latif from Beirut When former Lebanese premier Najib Miqati was asked why he struck an electoral alliance with majority leader Saad Al-Hariri, head of Al-Mustaqbal movement, his answer was straightforward: "You only make an alliance with the strong, not the weak, and Al-Mustaqbal is the Sunni political force on the ground today." Such a sweeping statement was undoubtedly true back in 2005 when Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal emerged as the sole representative of Lebanon's Sunnis following the killing of former prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. Saad Al-Hariri's leadership and representation of the country's Sunnis was neither questioned nor challenged for the four years that followed. An overwhelming sense of victimisation and the need to fill in the leadership vacuum handed Al-Hariri, the son, a parliamentary majority. Growing evidence, however, suggests that Al-Mustaqbal is losing support. The fact that Al-Hariri sought the alliance of Miqati and others to form the Tripoli list is telling of Al-Mustaqbal's declining influence. The painstaking negotiations between Al-Hariri and other Sunni forces, the concessions he had to make to include new actors on the scene while accommodating the discontent of old ones, are all signs that suggest the end of Al-Mustaqbal's monopoly over the Sunni voice. This is not to say that Al-Mustaqbal is going to disappear from the scene. The upcoming parliamentary elections, however, present the political movement with some of its hardest challenges since it was founded. Al-Hariri's electoral alliances and selection of candidates have been questioned; in some cases harshly criticised by the very constituency that pledged blind loyalty to him. Differences and discontent that for years remained buried under the banner of preserving the unity of the Sunni sect are now coming to the fore. In particular, powerful families are vying for political power. The cases of the Wadi Khaled tribes, whose supporters are nearly 13,000 registered voters, or Al-Meis family, one of the influential families in Zahle with almost 5,000 voters, are matched by other cases where Al-Hariri has been petitioned to include certain names on his electoral list and has not, breeding resentment. Supporters have threatened to vote for opposition forces. The case of Lebanon's Islamists (both Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya and Tripoli's Salafis) stands as yet another example of Al-Mustaqbal losing supporters. Al-Jamaa engaged in painstaking negotiation with Al-Hariri to have its candidates in Beirut, Denyia, Saida and Akkar included on Al-Hariri's list. Two months of negotiations resulted in Al-Mustaqbal giving Al-Jamaa one seat in Beirut's third constituency. Al-Jamaa's political bureau chief, Ali Al-Sheikh Ammar, who was promised a seat on Al-Mustaqbal's list in Saida is now running independently since Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora replaced him. Al-Jamaa's cadre will now likely lead a protest vote against Al-Hariri. Tripoli's Salafis, marginalised by Al-Mustaqbal, are also considering an alternative alliance. They consider Tripoli to be a conservative society; therefore, it makes no sense that Islamists are not represented on any electoral list. An alliance that could bring together pro-government Islamists and opposition Islamists is being floated. Al-Mustaqbal officials acknowledge the controversy created by the selection of runners. Nonetheless, they respond by saying the leadership selects candidates who can best serve the interests of the movement. Such examples suggest that the glue of sectarian bonds joining ranks in defence of the Sunni sect is no longer holding. It also reflects the changing fortunes of Al-Mustaqbal among the country's Sunnis. There may not be a stronger Sunni force, but the ways in which Al-Mustaqbal has evolved as a political movement and its relationship with different political actors on the scene has alienated part of its powerbase. Indeed, although the movement is still in its early stages in terms of hierarchy and structure, Al-Mustaqbal still lacks clarity over what type of entity is it -- a political party, a movement or a charity organisation. Its senior members insist it is not a political party. Yet, the initial structure of the movement has the exact hierarchical nature as that of a party. Most importantly, those officials dismiss any sectarian nature to the movement, saying that it will open its membership to all sects and all regions. But the largest powerbase remains Sunni. And movement leaders present themselves first and foremost as Sunni leaders regardless of what they say about combating sectarian fanaticism. Further, despite the launch of Al-Mustaqbal's political and economic programme two weeks ago, there is increasing realisation of Al-Hariri's failure to articulate a clear political vision around which to socially mobilise. The clearest manifestation of this failure has been Al-Hariri's frequent return to sectarian rhetoric that should have been abandoned for a proper political platform. Yet whipping up sectarian sentiment and playing on people's fears and insecurities is a comfort zone to which Al-Hariri, when the pressure is on, frequently reverts. In poor regions like Akkar and Denyia Al-Hariri relies on reminding the masses of his father's martyrdom, of the Syrian mandate, of those who have blood on their hands, of this or that group of corrupt officials, and of those who aggressed the dignity of Beirut (read Hizbullah and the Shia). Resorting to such a sectarian inspired invective only confirms the view that apart from financial handouts and a thirst for strife there is very little that Al-Hariri can offer his constituency.
