Iran's revolution continues to fascinate and surprise the world, Mustafa El-Labbad reports As the dramatic events in Iran continue to unfold, political analysts around the world are puzzling over what turn the reformist protest will take next. Many of their predictions indicate both how difficult it is and at the same time how important it is to rise above one's personal emotions and biases. Perhaps, the fairest assessment of what is happening in the streets of Tehran is that protesters have persisted in their demonstrations, in spite of Supreme Guide's Ali Khamenei's insistence last Friday that the election results were untainted and final, and his warnings of the consequences in the event of further unrest. Still, demonstrators' numbers appear to be incrementally dwindling in the face of the security crackdown and the fact that the uprising has been unable to gather additional force from other segments of society. It is one thing to acknowledge that the demonstrations were extremely embarrassing to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and entirely another to conclude that these events are a prelude to a deeper and more sweeping change in Iran. Nevertheless, the hint that the Revolutionary Guard might be brought into play was telling. It suggested that the regime had begun to sense danger and would be willing to play its trump. So far, the Revolutionary Guard has not yet intervened, largely because the demonstrations have remained at a relatively low level of intensity, even if tensions have reached an unprecedented height. One sometimes pictures the Iranian regime as a unique mythical bird. If other regimes fall into the normal avian order, with two wings and with fairly predictable flight trajectories -- always moving smoothly forward whether swooping up or down -- the Iranian roc defies such laws. Not only are its wings in constant mutation, transforming and even changing in number, this is a bird that can soar vertically, flutter in fits and starts, and even fly backwards. Iran seems to face two possible scenarios. The most likely is that the regime will succeed in suppressing the demonstrations, but that the cracks in the regime will be exposed so sharply and visibly that Ahmadinejad will ultimately emerge with his moral and popular standing severely damaged. The second is that the demonstrations will continue. If they manage to sustain momentum, the movement may undergo a qualitative shift from a mere expression of outrage against alleged electoral rigging to an outright opposition to the very nature of the regime. If the former would cause the roc to shudder, the second could imperil its existence. Some have likened the events in Iran today with Tiananmen Square. The regime survived after brutally repressing the demonstrations in that famous Beijing capital, but only after undergoing some silent convulsions as some officials rose in the ranks and others were axed. The same scenario, though less brutal, seems to apply to Iran. As the smoke lifts a new configuration in the ruling elite will come into view. The history of protest movements tells us that certain conditions must be in place for them to gain enough momentum to change the form of government. The first is an organised grassroots movement. The second is its ability to attract a massive following across a broad spectrum of social classes. The third is the ability to withstand the onslaught of government repression. The fourth is its ability to drive rifts in the security agencies or to inspire an influential segment of them to shift loyalties and overthrow the regime. The foregoing describes precisely the phases of the revolution against the Shah in 1979. Conversely, if the protest movement fails to pass beyond step one, it will meet a fate akin to the protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989. There the student uprising failed to build a mass following, leaving the students fairly isolated and relatively easy to crush. Events today in Iran, two weeks after the initial outburst of fury among the youth and segments of middle class Tehran, seem quite similar. The protest movement fell far short of a revolutionary tide, although it has shaken the regime, in which we will undoubtedly see the fortunes of a number of figures and forces either rise or fall. Reactions abroad grew sharper in tenor as the demonstrations continued and the security clampdown intensified. One also observes significant differences or tacks in international capitals. Whereas Moscow, which has maintained close relations with Tehran, congratulated Ahmadinejad on his victory immediately after the election results were announced, Washington held off comment as soon as the demonstration erupted. Then, the Obama administration refrained from expressing more than concern, until escalating events in Iran and an almost unanimously approved Congressional resolution compelled him to notch up his rhetoric. Even so, the feeling in Washington appears to be that the Ahmadinejad camp has regained full control over the situation in Iran. European capitals were the most vociferous in their support for the demonstrators, although reactions there were also initially muted. After all, they were guided less by sympathies with or hopes for the demonstrators than by considerations of balance of power on the ground. The rules of the game were not arbitrary. No government wanted to lag too far behind its rivals for fear of forfeiting a possible leverage against the regime in Tehran. On the other hand, the governments feared being too precipitous and pre-empting events, thereby jettisoning the opportunity to engage in talks with the regime, if it ultimately gained the upper hand against the demonstrators. Tehran, for its part, readily fell back on the strategy of accusing its opponents of acting as proxies for outside powers. With regard to those, London proved the most convenient target. In view of the history of mutual mistrust and a record of "historic mistakes" that, in Tehran's eyes, Britain perpetrated against Iran, it was easy for Tehran to lash out at London for meddling in its internal affairs, much easier than lashing out at, say, Paris, Berlin or Washington at this point. Ahmadinejad will remain at the presidential helm, and opposition forces will align behind Rafsanjani and Mousavi. Conventional wisdom is that this renders the president weaker in his second term, but it also means that Iranian society is more polarised. As the forces coalesce behind the scenes, the newly mutated Iranian roc will readjust the trajectory of its flight.
