Attiya Issawi takes a hard look at the conundrum there and how to solve it The Somali problem has reached levels of complexity that boggle the mind. No longer is it a matter of civil war where warlords fight for personal gain. Neighbouring countries are once again getting involved in local hostilities to protect their national interests. Foreign politicians are keeping a close eye on Mogadishu in case an extremist Islamic regime takes over. They fear infiltration by Al-Qaeda which is said to have sent dozens of its members to Somalia to support what they label as like-minded groups, such as the Islamic Party and the Shabab Movement. Regional powers, such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, are now fighting a proxy war in Somalia. Meanwhile, major countries worried by increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden cannot afford to see Somalia turn into a safe haven for Al-Qaeda operatives escaping Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda's involvement in the twin bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 is not something that the Americans can easily forget. Fighting over power and wealth in Somalia is not a new phenomenon. Even before tribal troops overthrew Siad Barre's government in 1991, claiming that he was giving all top posts to members of his own tribe, things were already bad. And in the 18-year tribal war that ensued since then, no single party has been able to score a convincing victory. As regional players schemed and as outsiders manipulated local warlords, one peace deal after another collapsed. So far, more than 14 peace deals have been signed, and more than 14 interim governments have been formed, none of which survived. As things stand, no group can trust another and no warlord is willing to give up his petty gains. In the absence of a strong central government, warlords got rich on arms trafficking, drug dealing, and all-purpose profiteering. Each one controls a strategic area and runs an army of mostly child soldiers, youngsters working for little more than shelter and food. Some warlords have their own harbours on the coast. Some have airstrips that are little more than gravel roads with storehouses on the side, but they are good enough to service a small plane and keep an army in business. According to some estimates, Somalia has nearly 200 ports and airports operated by rival groups. The warlords can keep on doing this forever. So the fighting is likely to go on until one party, with substantial foreign help, can form a strong army and suppress rival groups. Even then, scattered skirmishes would continue to happen, and bombings are not likely to end overnight. The only hope for the country is free and fair elections that would bring to power a man acceptable to the country's 100 or so tribes. Neighbouring countries cannot ignore what goes on in Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya in particular fear that Islamic extremists may once again take control of the government and call for the annexation of the Ogaden province that was carved off by Britain from the Italian-occupied Somalia and handed over to Ethiopia. There is also a northeast region in Kenya that used to be a part of Somalia. The two countries are also afraid that an extremist Islamic regime in Mogadishu may support the Ogaden National Liberation Front or the Oromo Liberation Front, both opposed to Addis Ababa. Likewise, they fear that Mogadishu may incite the Kenyans in the areas formerly belonging to Somalia to rebel and perhaps secede. Besides, should an extremist Islamic regime harbour members of Al-Qaeda, the latter may start using Somalia as a springboard for attacking pro-American regimes in east Africa. Therefore, Ethiopia and Kenya are doing all they can to prevent the extremists from taking power in Mogadishu. Eritrea is currently helping rebels trying to bring down the legitimate government led by Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed. The Eritreans claim that the Somali president has become a stooge of Ethiopia and the US, and want to replace him with a regime independent of Addis Ababa. Asmara aims to pressure Ethiopia into implementing a ruling by an international tribune granting Eritrea the disputed town of Badme. The issue has already caused a war between the two countries which lasted two years, from 1998 to 2000, and claimed 70,000 lives. Ethiopia has refused to implement the decision until all other border issues are resolved. But Asmara wants to have Badme back first and then talk. One way to start addressing the Somali crisis would be for the US and the UN to step in and sort out the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As for Al-Qaeda, its role can be curbed through military cooperation between the major countries and their neighbours. Measures must be taken to control the 3,700km of Somali coast. And the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti will need to be monitored closely to prevent Al-Qaeda personnel and weapons from moving across. There is a need to finance and train Somali government troops, policemen, and intelligence services. There is also a need to start talks among various tribes under international sponsorship. Those who abide by the final deal must be rewarded with assistance and those who oppose the deal must be treated harshly. Otherwise, peace would remain a distant dream.
