While street protest may have decreased, Iran's presidential election crisis is not over yet, writes Mustafa El-Labbad Rafsanjani couldn't have timed his move better. Speaking from the pulpit in Tehran University last Friday, addressing a congregation including two of the candidates who lost in the recent elections, Mir-Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi, he must have been acutely aware of the symbolism. Tehran University, where Friday prayers have been held since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, is the top forum for sending political messages at home and abroad. It was in this place that the Iranian revolutionary regime has made its voice heard. It is a tradition that began with the crisis of the American hostages 30 years ago and continued through the Iraq-Iran war, through the Khomeini leadership, and through Ali Khamenei's time. And Rafsanjani was always around, always a key player. In Iran, and unlike other Muslim countries, Friday prayers are political and not just a religious occasion. The venue was fraught with symbolism, but the timing was no less crucial. This was Rafsanjani's first public appearance since the 10th presidential elections were held -- the elections that left the country divided between two camps, one supporting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the other supporting his reformist critics, mainly Mousavi, Mohamed Khatami and Karrubi. The man, the venue, and the timing gave last Friday's address a certain place in Iran's fluid political scene, and the messages that followed were addressed to all Iranians. Breaking with tradition, official television refrained from relaying the sermon live. But hundreds of thousands gathered to attend the service inside and outside the university -- the massive attendance testifying to the importance of the sermon and the popularity of the reformist current in Iran. The main thrust of Rafsanjani's sermon was that a "crisis of trust" pitted citizens against the regime. He rebutted all accusations against the reformists, especially those levelled by Ahmadinejad supporters. He rejected allegations that reformists were "involved in a global war" against Ahmadinejad, or were "stooges" for outsiders. Rafsanjani not only called for the "crisis of trust" to be addressed, but also for the release of those arrested in protests held immediately after the elections. Undoubtedly, Rafsanjani put Ahmadinejad on the spot. He didn't even mention him by name, referring always to those who may be backing the president. And he didn't spare the supreme guide of the revolution. He reminded the congregation of an incident in which Prophet Mohamed, before he died, asked his disciples if he was ever unfair to them. His reference can only be interpreted as a form of criticism of the supreme guide, who failed to protect Rafsanjani against accusations of corruption Ahmadinejad -- a close friend of the supreme guide -- has been levelling upon him and his family. Rafsanjani is a major figure in Iran, a man whose name is closely connected with the Iranian Revolution. Many in the Iranian elite see him as the country's number two, second only to the supreme guide, and maybe not by much, some would say. Having served as parliamentary speaker and then president (twice between 1989 and 1997), Rafsanjani is now head of the Council of Experts, a body appointed by the supreme guide. He is also the head of the Council for Identifying the Interests of the Regime. As such, he rules on disputes among various Iranian constitutional institutions. He is usually trusted to sort out Iran's convoluted constitutional framework, a role he has played since Khomeini's time. Rafsanjani is credited for having managed the war with Iraq. And after Khomeini's death, he was instrumental in choosing his successor, the current supreme guide, although older and more experienced mullahs were present. Rafsanjani and Khamenei, the current supreme guide, have both been close to Khomeini. Both men have been accused by Montazeri of having ousted him from his position as acting supreme guide two months before Khomeini passed away. Rafsanjani and Khamenei have a similar education, and it is safe to say that they ran the country together from Khomeini's death in 1989 until 2005. They are the architects of the "reconstruction" phase that followed the Iraq-Iran war and have made serious efforts to improve Iran's regional and international relations. But since Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, having swept past his rivals, including Rafsanjani, things have changed. Rafsanjani fell out of favour and at one point was pronounced politically dead. But he made a comeback when he was elected for the chairmanship of the Council of Experts in the spring of 2009. Rafsanjani's critics claim that he is more interested in personal gains than in the good of the country, but many admit that he is a seasoned politician who has never been fond of sensational rhetoric. His likes to manage from behind the scenes and is generally praised for his ability to keep Iran's tenuous web of alliances from breaking at the seams. Rafsanjani has chastised Ahmadinejad and his supporters. Like a surgeon wielding a sharp scalpel, his words were cutting and to the point. Far from moving into the ranks of the opposition, Rafsanjani is working from inside the regime, cruising through a maze of invisible interests. Like a surgeon, Rafsanjani delivered a sermon that kept everyone on edge, causing just as much consternation as he meant it to. He has blamed the supreme guide for supporting Ahmadinejad, but refrained from being overly haughty about it. He has supported Mousavi and Karrubi, but refrained from joining the front that they are forming with Khatami. At the end of the day, he made it clear that any attempt to do deals with the regime should go through him personally. This was the main aim of Rafsanjani's sermon. He was drawing the lines while stepping in between the two rival camps. He knows that by acting so he would be undermining Ahmadinejad, who would be left with three camps, one for him, one against him, and a third led by Rafsanjani. The sermon was an intentional blow to the moral power of the presidency, one directed against the only president in Iranian history to have protesters challenging his election victory. Rafsanjani also knows that the reformists, for all their popularity, are unlikely to change the shape of the regime. And he knows that the importance of Ahmadinejad for Iranian politics at present is not that he is popular, but that he has international and local backing. Popularity is not a measure of power in Iran, for the presidency's power is not unlimited. Rafsanjani wanted Ahmadinejad to pay a political price for having the current crisis defused. He wanted the president to release detainees and to hold talks, thus chipping away at his presidential victory. Releasing the detainees seems like a simple request, but this is not how things go in Iran. This is the thin edge of the wedge, and other demands are to follow. Rafsanjani is trying to portray Ahmadinejad as part of the problem. As far as Rafsanjani is concerned, the president is just another follower that needs help. But first he has to go under the scalpel.
