It is time for the Arabs to put an ultimatum to Obama: pressure Israel into peace or veto a resolution in the Security Council demanding respect for international law, writes Hassan Nafaa* Listening to the statements made by some Arab officials, and reading the media commentary that followed, one gets the impression that a significant portion of the Arab audience was shocked by Israel's rejection of Obama's demand that settlements be halted ahead of peace talks. It seems to me that the Arab world hasn't fully grasped the manner in which Israel is managing this conflict. Also, the Arab world seems to lack an alternative way of managing that same conflict. Even at a time when attempts to reach a settlement seem doomed, the Arabs don't seem capable of coming up with a clear position. Many seem to entertain the hope that the US would keep piling more pressure on Israel until the latter succumbs. We all assume that Obama will fire off another initiative for Middle East peace at the UN General Assembly later this month. This may explain the hectic diplomatic talks going on in the region. But there is no sign that this initiative will be more auspicious than earlier ones. The conflict is now at a crucial stage, and one that may end up in a final liquidation of the Palestinian issue. This is why I would like to mention a few facts that may help the Arab world move forward on this particular matter. Fact one: The Israeli position on settlements is fairly uncompromising. Neither ideological considerations nor the composition of the ruling coalition seem to change that position. In other words, Israel intends to hold on to the settlements for reasons deemed to be of utmost priority to overall Zionist schemes. This is why the building of settlements started right after the 1967 war and proceeded without interruption since then. Rightwing, leftwing, and centrist governments have all built settlements. The only difference is in the way rival political currents in Israel may compromise on settlements for the sake of negotiations or security. Israeli political parties do not, however, differ on the need for settlements or on their significance for the Zionist ideal. Some Israeli parties may be willing to give and take. They may offer to trade certain types of settlements for security guarantees or political gain. Others may take a harder stance. But everyone in Israel seems convinced that the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is a liberated land, not an occupied one. This is why all governments in Israel, and not just the rightwing ones, interpret Resolution 242 in a manner that excludes the possibility of returning to 1967 borders. Israel has consistently highlighted the resolution's reference to "safe borders" while ignoring the equally crucial reference to the "inadmissibility of seizing land by force". This may also explain the immense concentration of settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, where 400,000 Israelis now reside. The whole thing is a fait accompli that Israel will maintain unless forced to change its mind through military means or immense diplomatic pressure -- preferably the kind of pressure that involves sanctions. Fact two: Following the 1967 war, Israel adopted a negotiations strategy based on the rejection of comprehensive peace achieved through an international conference, especially when the UN is running the show. Israel did everything it could to foil attempts to hold a conference in Geneva following the 1973 War. It first tried to block the 1991 Madrid Conference and then to corrupt its goals. Israel turned the Madrid Conference into a gateway for bilateral talks. Then it proceeded to conduct bilateral negotiations under a timetable that suits its purpose, and it manipulates the whole thing right to the end. Likewise, Israel used the 2007 Annapolis Conference for propaganda purposes, and then milked it for purely tactical gains. In short, Israel has succeeded to push the Arabs around at every turn. Since it lured president Anwar Al-Sadat into a separate peace deal in 1979 it never looked back. It was only after some hesitation that Israel agreed to sign the 1993 Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Then it concluded the 1994 Wadi Araba deal with Jordan. You may notice that not in one of those agreements did Israel pledge to return to the 1967 borders, nor did it promise to recognise an independent Palestinian state, and the settlements were not really discussed. Israel negotiated with Egypt on "self-rule" that included the population and not the land. It negotiated with the PLO on "redeployment" rather than full "withdrawal" from the occupied Palestinian territories. Fact three: Israel has never relied on negotiations alone as a way of managing the conflict. It has never called the 1973 War, as others have done, "the last of wars". Israel has used negotiations as a means of dividing the Arabs and pushing some of them out of the military arena. Then it waged wars to terrorise and intimidate those who refused to negotiate on its own terms. Israel had no qualms bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor. And it invaded Lebanon repeatedly. At one point, it occupied Beirut and forced Lebanon to sign a peace treaty. Israel's bellicose policies were not as successful as it had hoped for. To this day, Israel has failed to impose a final settlement on the Arab world on its own terms. Still, Israel feels that it has accomplished a lot and that time is in its favour. It doesn't feel impelled by any local or regional or international pressures to change its mind. Fact four: Several Arab parties and nations have so far prevented Israel from imposing its terms on them. Some have achieved remarkable feats in confronting Israel. For example, Israel hasn't been able to defeat Hizbullah in Lebanon, or even Hamas in Gaza. But Israel senses that its use of military might has been beneficial. It has succeeded in at least neutralising Hizbullah in South Lebanon. It has silenced the missiles of Hamas in Gaza. And it has divided the Palestinians to the point where the feasibility of a unified Palestinian state within 1967 borders is now in doubt. Israel is now trying to push the Palestinians into recognising it as a purely Jewish state. And it wants the Arabs to normalise relations ahead of withdrawal and ahead of a peace deal. Fact five: When it comes to the Arab peace initiative of 2002, there is an unbridgeable gap between the Israelis and the Arabs. The latter believe that the initiative conjures up the minimum requisites for peace, but Israel wants more. And it believes that it can take more from the Arabs. Israel feels that the position of Arab countries is subject to change, open to negotiations, and prone to concessions. This is why Israel is calling on Arab countries to normalise their ties with it in return for a partial and temporary halt of settlements. It is clear that the weakness of the Arab position is driving Israel to extremes. With the Palestinians divided and Iraq out of the picture, Israel is getting greedy. This is to be expected. What with Sudan and Yemen coming apart; what with ethnic and religious conflicts on the rise across the Arab world; Israel must also be pleased to see tensions escalating between the Arabs and Iran. Israel is determined to resist pressure by the Americans, especially the current administration. It recognises the fact that the Obama administration is facing substantial problems, at home and abroad, and that may exceed the resourcefulness and communicative skills of the US president. Besides, Israel may have concluded that international pressure would ultimately target the weaker side, ie the Arabs and Palestinians. If anything, these facts make it necessary for all Arabs, especially the Palestinians, to reassess their position and review their negotiating strategies, so as to avoid making more historic mistakes at this crucial juncture of the conflict. Any mistakes, however minor, can deepen the conflict rather than bring it close to a solution. Arab parties, especially the Palestinians, need to shoulder their responsibilities. Mahmoud Abbas and his Palestinian Authority need to take a firm stand on the two vital questions of national reconciliation and Israeli settlements. Concerning the settlements, they should refrain from negotiating before the Israeli government makes a firm commitment to halting all settlement activities. As for the matter of national reconciliation, all Palestinian parties must make any concessions necessary for keeping the integrity of their cause. Arab parties, too, must take a clear stand on two crucial issues: normalisation with Israel and relations with the US. Concerning normalisation, Arab countries that haven't signed peace treaties with Israel should refrain from considering any normalisation with Israel before a comprehensive deal is reached. As for Arab countries that have peace agreements with Israel, they should keep their relations with this country to a minimum. Israel must be made to understand that its relations with Arab countries are jeopardised by its reluctance to halt settlements and negotiate in earnest. Furthermore, Arab countries should reject US pressures for normalisation with Israel and make it clear to Washington that Israel's intransigence is partly the US's fault. If the US comes up with a peace plan that is biased to Israel, or if Israel rejects an even-handed plan, Arab countries should go to the UN Security Council with a draft resolution calling on Israel to halt all settlement activities, or else face sanctions under Chapter VII. It is time the Arabs find out where the new US administration stands on the matter of achieving comprehensive and just peace in the region. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
