Kofi Anan's peace plan for Syria hangs by a thread, writes Graham Usher at the UN On 12 April the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution endorsing UN-Arab League special envoy Kofi Anan's six point peace plan for ending the crisis in Syria, the "last opportunity (said one UN ambassador) to put an end to the bloodshed" of the Arabs' longest, most lethal and most dangerous uprising. A small advance team of UN observers is in Damascus to nail down what remains a very fluid ceasefire and prepare the ground for a larger mission. If they prevail, Secretary-General Ban Ki- Moon will ask the council to authorise 250 unarmed UN observers to deploy throughout Syria to help nurture the truce into a political process between regime and resistance. Many doubt the plan will reach that stage, including members of the council. Since the ceasefire began on the 12th, violence has dropped. Syrians are being killed in their dozens, compared to in their hundreds as in the first week of April, say Syrian opposition groups. But the rebel held areas of Homs, Hama, Idlib and Deraa are still being bombarded at pre-truce levels of ferocity. Nor has Damascus withdrawn troops and heavy weaponry from either these or other cities, as it is bound to do under the Anan plan. The armed opposition has mounted ambushes on army patrols and executed soldiers captured in combat, note UN human rights monitors. Both sides seem to see the truce as flares before a fire. The task of the UN observer mission is to smother the fire. "It's not going to be easy. This mission will be one of the toughest ever undertaken by the United Nations," said Colonel Ahmed Himmiche, the Moroccan head of the advance mission. According to the resolution the Syrian government must ensure "full, unimpeded and immediate freedom of movement and access" for both UN missions, permitting the observers to "freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria". But according to Syrian spokeswoman Buthaina Shaaban, Damascus would have to be involved in deciding "the duration of the work of the observers and priorities of their movement", because otherwise it could not be responsible for their security. That might be a reef that sinks the mission before it floats. So might a possible request by Ban Ki-Moon for European Union planes and helicopters to ferry UN troops unhindered across Syria. There is also a deeper rift: the lack of a real international consensus or conviction behind the Anan plan, despite the apparent unanimity it enjoys. The Syrian regime has no truck with a ceasefire. Not only would a truce enable rebel fighters to retrench. With 250 UN observers in place it would embolden the unarmed opposition to protest in cities like Damascus and Aleppo, as they did briefly on 12 April. Both outcomes would threaten the regime. The rebel Free Syrian Army may also not want a ceasefire, particularly those groups that seek cash and arms from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These states see regime change less as an option than a priority, and may view an armed civil war as the only means to achieve it. On 16 April the emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani said the chances for a successful ceasefire "are no higher than three per cent". Instead he called for supporting the Syrian people "with arms". Saudi Arabia has said much the same. Even those Western states on the Security Council that support the Anan plan (the United States, Britain, France and Germany etc) do so less out of conviction than from the lack of an alternative. None believe the Syrian government is doing anything except playing for time. All would back crippling sanctions on the regime -- and some would support Syria's referral to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity -- were not both moves certain to incur a Russian and Chinese veto on the Council. But none seek a Libya-like intervention amidst the turmoil of civil war or against an apparently loyalist 300,000 strong army. Those who think a ceasefire would help are of course the great mass of the Syrian people, granting reprieve to a society that has been torn apart. It would also help the internal political opposition or those parts of it ready to engage with the regime. The withdrawal of the army to barracks would help shift the dynamics of the conflict from a military confrontation to a political transition, backed by the UN. This would almost certainly strengthen the opposition in any negotiation with the regime. Those countries that currently most favour this denouement are the Syrian government's closest allies: Russia, China and Iran. Unlike the Western and some Arab states, all three still see the regime as an integral part of the solution. Moscow was key not just in getting Syria to accept the Anan plan but in forcing it to drop what were clearly wrecking amendments (like the demand that the opposition disarm as a condition for talks). It has also been proactive in getting the UN observers into Syria quickly. Why? Russia understands that President Bashar Al-Assad's "solutions" of crushing the revolt by brute force laced with cosmetic reform is a recipe for catastrophe. It will lead either to full blown regional war or the emergence of a Muslim Brotherhood regime, warm to the pro-US Gulf States but cold to Russia and its multiple interests in Syria. Moscow instead seeks a controlled, Syrian-led political transition in Damascus unencumbered by outside forces. So do Iran and China, and for the same reasons.
