Kofi Anan's peace plan may be the most recent victim of the Syria crisis, writes Graham Usher at the UN Under the peace plan of UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Anan, by 10 April the Syrian government was supposed to have withdrawn troops and heavy weapons from all residential areas. This was to have led to a ceasefire within 48 hours and the first lull in violence between regime and people in over a year. But the only thing the deadline actually claimed was the near death of the Anan plan. Not only did Damascus slap impossible new conditions on the plan. It also created an upsurge in violence that left hundreds dead and spiked tensions on Syria's volatile borders with Lebanon and Turkey: on 9 April Syrian soldiers shot dead two of their kin and wounded others (including at least one Turk) trying to flee to a refugee camp in Turkey. And they killed a cameraman inside the Lebanese border. The Syrian crisis has long had the potential to spread beyond its borders. This incursion will not lead to war, Turkish officials assured third countries. "But the likelihood of Turkish military action is not as dim as it was a week ago," a Turkish analyst admitted to the New York Times. Anan was in Turkey the following day, visiting camps that now host 25,000 Syrian refugees. He had to face down angry protests that he and the organisations he represents had utterly failed to protect them from their own government. With little evidence, Anan told a press conference, "we still have time between now and 12 April to stop the violence." It was also "too early to say the [peace] plan had failed". And, in any case, "if you want to take it off the table, what would you replace it with?" he asked, with just a little anguish. He further admitted that where the Syrian army had withdrawn from certain localities, it had repositioned itself in new ones, a "rolling military action we believe should be stopped." It's easy to sympathise with Anan. He knows most of the world sees his plan as a last gasp to prevent Syria's full slide into civil war. He also knows declaring failure may be just what the Syrian regime wants. It is difficult to interpret its sabotage of the plan in any other way. Having said its military withdrawal was unconditional, it then demanded "written guarantees" not only that the opposition fighters disarm but that Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey cease supplying them with cash and weapons. As Anan himself has said, these "preconditions" were never part of the deal. They have also been dismissed by the opposition -- and by everyone else. And having agreed to use the first 10 days in April to institute the withdrawal, the regime actually used the time to wage a savage war on its people. Testimony from survivors, refugees and ordinary civilians tell the same story. Intense bombardment of rebel-held areas, followed by expulsions of entire villages and then killings, including of families as they try to reach the border. The pattern appears from north to south but is particularly so in the rebel territories of Homs, Hama and Idlib. Why? The only explanation, say analysts, is that the regime really does view the Anan plan as a mortal threat. No matter how much territory it claws back from rebels it is convinced that that land will revert to them once a ceasefire is called. Coupled with a functioning political process -- and especially if UN monitors are in place -- these territories could become liberated and the ground of mass protests against the regime. These fears may be exaggerated. They probably are. But they would explain why Damascus prefers war to peace. Which suggests the regime will not be serious about any ceasefire, even if it agrees to one. If so, what are Anan's options? In the short term, he will want the government to implement on the 12th the withdrawal it was supposed to carry out on the 10th. Failing that he will want a strong and united response from the Security Council. And for that he will need China and Russia on side. Both countries have vetoed Council resolutions critical of Syria. But both support the Anan plan. At his press conference with the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim on 10 April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Damascus could have been "more active" and "decisive" in supporting the plan. But he also called on all the opposition groups -- and the states that back them -- to commit to a comprehensive ceasefire, mirroring regime charges. In closed rooms he was apparently tougher with Al-Muallim, said the Russian media. It is anyone's guess how these tussles will play out on the Security Council. In any case Moscow's sway over the Syrian government can be overstated. The regime has been prepared to kill its own people and alienate large parts of the Arab world to preserve its grip on power. It may also be prepared to forsake Russia and China. For now only one thing seems clear: 13 months after it began, the endpoint of the Syrian revolution looks likelier to be civil war than a Tunis like transformation -- nor will the war be confined to Syria. (see p.9 & Editorial p.12)
