The roots of the splitting up of Sudan go deep, says Ismail Kushkush One year has passed since South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for separation and independence from north Sudan. Ever since, Sudanese elites (northerners that is) have exchanged blame for "losing the south". Many in the opposition point fingers to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and its policies and what they believe were the shortcomings of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the civil war in 2005 and gave South Sudanese the right of self-determination. NCP supporters on the other hand, blame regional and international forces that have long sought to "weaken" and "divide" Sudan and an opposition they argue places its interests above collective national ones. But marginalised it seems are recognition of the long historical process that led to South Sudanese's decisive vote and the heavy and tough questions to be asked as a result. The modern nation-state of Sudan, like many African and Arab states, was a creation of a foreign colonial endeavour. Egypt's nineteenth century Albanian ruler, Mohamed Ali Pasha, sought to create an empire that rivaled European ones, secure the sources of the Nile River and find sources of gold and slave soldiers. He and his descendants did so by conquering the lands and kingdoms along the southern parts of the Nile Valley. The new entity that came into being was collectively named "The Egyptian Sudan". Later, the British along with the Egyptians, followed by Sudanese national governments, were to inherit and rule "Sudan". Since its inception, the governance of the vast territory of modern Sudan was a challenge, often marred by mismanagement and exploitation. In the nineteenth century, during Turkish-Egyptian rule, and the brief period of independence following the Mahdi's revolt, South Sudan became a major source of slaves, mostly for domestic and military purposes. While the majority of northern Sudanese also suffered from the polices of Turkish rule, the involvement of northern merchants, with others, in the slave-trade, left a scar in the psyche of Southern Sudanese and a deep sense of mistrust to what came from the north. South Sudan's separation and independence therefore brings forward a serious question: are African colonial borders to continue to be unchallenged, as the fathers of African independence once advised? One thing at least is for sure: Sudanese and African political elites cannot take their citizens' sense of "nationhood" for granted. The British colonial administration that followed was to initiate a "Southern Policy" that administered north and south Sudan separately. The policy barred northern Sudanese from entering the south and vice versa, to "protect" and "develop" South Sudan's distinctiveness, but also to prevent modern nationalism from creeping from the north. The policy would further contribute to the alienation between north and south. Just before independence in 1956, negotiations on the future of the south between British colonial administrators and Sudanese nationalists did not consider Southern Sudanese political views seriously that ranged from the establishment of a federation with the north, to secession. This led to the first civil war of 1955-1973. While the decades that followed independence were to witness a brief period of peace between 1973-1983 in which self-rule was granted to the south, the eventual abandonment of the 1973 peace agreement ignited the second civil war in 1983, leading many Southern Sudanese to believe that agreements with the north were always broken. Unequal development between the capital Khartoum and the peripheral provinces, which intersected with ethnic divisions, along with the decades long debate over the nature of the Sudanese constitution and the role of Islam in the state, further polarised sides. The civil war reached its zenith in the 1990s when "ideology" became part of the political rhetoric of the government and rebels; the Islamist led government of Sudan with its "Civilisational Project" and the southern-led and Marxist-inspired Sudanese People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its project of a "New Sudan". Simultaneously, Sudan's internal contradictions were intensified when they became part of larger global and regional conflicts including the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the War on Terror. International and regional interests, the rise of NGOs and grassroots movements as significant actors in international affairs and the advancements in communication and media technologies made sure that knowledge of what happened in Sudan did not stay in Sudan. South Sudan's separation was also a product of widespread negative inherited social attitudes marred by tribalism, racism, arrogant parentalism and a seeming ambivalence to the civil war's large human costs; social attitudes and ills that mostly stem from the legacy of slavery which were not sufficiently addressed. But above all, South Sudan's independence was the political choice of Southern Sudanese. Many analysts argue that separation and independence from the north was always the preferred choice of the majority of South Sudanese despite the pro-unity vision of the South Sudanese leader John Garang whose untimely death shortly after the signing of the CPA may have very well been the practical nail in the coffin of Sudanese unity. South Sudan has become independent, but many of the same reasons that led to its separation remain a part of and a challenge to Sudan's stability. Was the lesson learned? With unrest in other parts of Sudan such as Blue Nile state, South Kordofan and Darfur, perhaps Sudanese elites in government, opposition and civil society could all take a good look in their mirrors and show greater efforts reflecting on and tackling "what" led to South Sudan's separation rather than debating "who" was responsible.
