The dynamics of the southern Sudanese referendum have turned out to be too much about tribal politics and not enough about policies, warns Gamal Nkrumah With less than 100 days to go before the referendum in Sudan to determine whether southern Sudan should secede or remain an integral part of Sudan, the country finds itself with little to celebrate. The political rift over the referendum has sparked an unprecedented Sudanese soul-searching exercise. The referendum itself threatens to be a damp squib. The mood in the southern Sudanese capital Juba is anything but festive. The atmosphere in Khartoum is equally sullen. The Sudanese people await the results of the referendum with much trepidation. Battle-weary from Africa's longest civil war, few Sudanese -- northerners and southerners -- want a return to a state of war. Nowhere is the soul-searching more on display than among the two ruling coalition party partners -- the militant Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) and the secularist Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The former is northern based and the latter is southern based. The SPLM, however, claims to have a sizeable following in the north. The two parties have settled on their curious campaign strategy vis-à-vis the referendum. Neither is particularly interested in discussing the outcome of the referendum since it is regarded as a forgone conclusion by the SPLM. And, it is ominously viewed as a prelude to a bloodbath by the NCP. Both sides conveniently forget that most probably a majority of the Sudanese people, northerners and southerners, easterners and westerners, though disappointed with the NCP's performance are equally disgusted with the SPLM and the mainstream opposition parties. That is a bit surprising. Both rely on worn-out sloganeering and ad hoc attacks. The SPLM sees its strength in its tacit support for southern Sudanese national self-determination. The NCP spontaneously gives its support for reactive opposition to whatever the SPLM proposes. Today, many Sudanese appear disillusioned with the status quo. In a further sign of despondency, the NCP has threatened that secession of southern Sudan will lead to a return to the battlefield to decide the fate of the country. The SPLM counters that the NCP is killing the goose that lays the golden eggs, the south where the vast majority of Sudan's commercial oil reserves are located. The bulk of the southern Sudanese people seem to support the SPLM's stance, and the NCP's response is muddled. The NCP is not going to part easily with the country's newfound oil wealth. However, the resulting battle over whether the south should stay in Sudan or go its own way has also had the effect of unleashing a debate about whether the north has the right to expropriate the south's oil. The import and implication of southern Sudanese independence is looming larger as Sudan's regional presence is enhanced. As southern Sudanese and northern Sudanese relations become ever more fractious, so Arab-African relations deteriorate further. A weak or divided Sudan will inevitably produce a government that will be forced to make up policy on the hoof. Though deep historical antagonisms remain between northern and southern Sudan, there is a prevalent view that Sudan as a united and sovereign nation will better withstand the challenges that it faces. If anything, far from resenting a strong central government in Khartoum, there are indications that the southern Sudanese people are probably frustrated at doing business with a fractured opposition that heralds a here-today, gone-tomorrow government. The SPLM sees itself as playing a key role in nurturing multi-party democracy in Sudan. What the southern Sudanese populace wants is a secular state where their specific interests as ethnic and religious minorities are upheld and guaranteed. In the past few weeks, relations between the NCP and the SPLM have wobbled. First, the two parties got into a verbal jousting match over the referendum. Then SPLM leader Sudan's First Vice-President Silva Kiir mused on the injustice done his people both in the past and at present. Finally, and most seriously, he recently declared that southerners have no option but to secede. This is an ironic outcome for the SPLM which came to power promising better relations with Khartoum under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 between the SPLM and the Sudanese government of President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir. The CPA is now widely seen as a failure by a majority of the southern Sudanese. They believe they have been duped into believing that the Islamist NCP government was willing to accommodate the special interests of non-Muslims and non-Arabs in Sudan. The best thing Sudan's First Vice-President Kiir can do to mend fences with the NCP stalwarts in Khartoum is develop a firm, but consistent line concerning the referendum and stick around to implement it. There are ominous signs of bloody power struggles simmering in southern Sudan. There are clear signs of outside interference. Indeed, several senior officials of the administration of US President Barack Obama have indicated that the NCP and the SPLM must be prepared to make "difficult decisions". The Obama administration has invited both parties to meet in Washington next Saturday to discuss the political impasse in Sudan and the political future of the country. The CPA helped create a crisis that is now bound to kill it. A proper reincarnation of the CPA, an explicit and precise interpretation of its terms should help ease tensions. The correct response to the Sudanese political crisis is to address the reasons behind the failure of the CPA. That means fixing the root problems that force the southern Sudanese to opt for independence. There is a lesson here. The referendum on southern Sudanese secession will provide a key indication about the extent to which the Sudanese government has lost support as a consequence of failing to resolve the pressing problems facing southerners in Sudan. The southerners, after all, are not wrong to defend their interests. If they cannot, what hope is there for other marginalised groups in Sudan such as the westerners or the easterners for that matter? However, none of this matters to the Sudanese people as the stated reason for holding the referendum in the first place.
