Washington doesn't seem to know what it is doing, or what direction it is going in, writes Abdel-Moneim Said It can't be easy being a superpower at a loss on how to act. It must be even harder when that superpower is the only one in the world. The problem is that terms such as "the sole superpower", "the two superpowers" from the days when the Soviet Union still existed, and "the multipolar order" from the interwar period reflect a hierarchical perspective on relations of power and influence in the world. In a way, that is how international relations really work, while international organisations and even international law and international courts are arenas for the exercise of power relations that have been given a legal cover and even a moral gloss. For most of its two and quarter centuries the US knew very well where it was headed. Throughout the 19th century, it opted for isolationism behind the Atlantic and Pacific oceans when the Pax Britannica ruled over land and sea. When it decided to break out of its isolation during World War I it staked out the beginning of the path for preventing any power whatsoever from dominating Europe. It was in the interwar period that Washington realised that it was a great power; however, it waited until World War II to declare this openly and clearly. After that war, Washington and Moscow grew serious about international relations. Occasionally they saw eye-to-eye, as occurred over the establishment of Israel and halting the tripartite invasion against Egypt. More frequently they differed, precipitating crises in which the two giants butted their political and ideological horns, or triggering conflicts in which third parties paid the price. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, American intellectuals pronounced "the end of history" and, almost in the same breath, they hit upon "the clash of civilisations", adding a new profundity to the history that had passed and the history that was yet to come. Throughout this time, the US, in one way or another, chose its course with confidence. It was helped by its gigantic brain machines, these being its universities, research centres, and by the lobbies and special interest groups that wrangled and clashed in writing and in the corridors of power until they set the compass for the entire nation, leaving the two big parties -- the Democrats and Republicans -- to spar over details and questions of pragmatics. However, after two terms of George W Bush, the US discovered that it was on the wrong path, or that if it were on the right path it was extremely costly and, more importantly, that the US could either not afford it or was unwilling to pay it. That was when confusion set in; the way ahead was clouded with haze and doubt. Obama's election raised hopes that he would steer the country on the right road. However, as elegant and inspiring as he was, he turned out to be too complicated and complexed to set policy. Without policy countries stand at a crossroads scratching their heads, uncertain which road will lead to safety or perdition. In practical terms, this means that no one knows whether the US should have used more military might or less. Everyone knows that there is no military solution to the pending problems in Afghanistan, Iraq and all the other hotspots of violence teeming with various forms of fundamentalism in Northern Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere. However, when you reduce the level of military force or withdraw, you get might without teeth, which equals no might at all. As the famous poet, Nazar Qabbani, put it -- albeit with a different issue in mind -- there is no middle ground beneath heaven and hell. But one of the greatest sources of the US's confusion must be the behaviour of its allies or partners, of which it has so many in the East and West. Most of these had suffered immensely in the Bush era, in which prevailed that neoconservative tenet that holds that the US leads and everyone else in the world must follow, and that Washington never has to ask permission from anyone since it foots the bill and since those who don't pay should spare themselves the trouble of giving advice. Those were the days when America's friends and allies, as well as those situated somewhere in between, or who were not even sure whether they stood in America's good books or bad books, had ample opportunity to decry America's brutal aggressiveness and its overbearing arrogance in the pursuit of an empire on which neither the sun nor moon would set. Not that anyone could actually ascertain whether all those critics had feasible solutions to the world's problems and the dilemmas in international relations or whether Washington's go-it-alone attitude merely gave them cover for their ignorance. In all events, those days passed and Obama's day came, to the accompaniment of cheers resounding around the world and a degree of universal admiration unattained by a US president since Kennedy. Yet, all that good will and esteem did not give the new president a winning hand, even after he explicitly stated that the US would no longer act on its own and that no one could lead the world without cooperating with others. So when Obama decided that the Afghanistan war effort needed more troops and that the US would volunteer 30,000 of them, the entire NATO bunch -- every last one of the other 28 members -- dug into their pockets and came up with a grand total of a mere 7,000, and then stipulated the return date for these forces before even arranging for their departure. If the US is perplexed by its friends, allies and partners, what must it make of its adversaries and enemies? Keen to diffuse tensions with Moscow, Washington cancelled the antiballistic missile shield and offered huge concessions in an attempt to reduce strategic arms. Yet, the Russian auctioneer keeps raising his prices while giving no clear indication that Moscow can be depended upon to cooperate on the Iranian question or any other issue. Not a vastly different situation applies to China, which is acting grumpy because it had set much stock on the Americans when it held huge reserves of US currency, reportedly around $1.8 trillion worth, but now that its dollar holdings are declining in value by the day, Beijing is fretting over whether or not the US economy will ever recuperate. American bewilderment must be acute when facing adversaries who are equally at a loss over which course to take and which policy to apply. However, it is at its most extreme when it comes to determining the fate of the war against assorted jihadists. This became apparent when Obama was presented with a $600 billion military allocations bill and found that the amount it would cost to develop the new generation F-22 fighter plane would be sufficient to set the American economy back on track. Yet it was uncertain whether that awesomely powerful and efficient weapon could hunt down a bunch of mujahideen in the Tora Bora caves let alone capture Bin Laden alive or dead. America's befuddlement at itself, its allies and its enemies is a mind boggling, dazing phenomenon. During my recent visit to the US I found few who felt any kind of certainty -- apart from the neoconservatives who are making a comeback, brandishing their ideological torches with which they hope to lead the way. To people elsewhere this indicates that America is clutching at straws. Turning back to a way of thinking that has just proven a total failure means that either the American thought apparatus has malfunctioned, or that it has fallen asleep, or that it is taking a rest until it gathers its strength again. At least there's still time to make a more conclusive assessment, since it has only been a year since Obama entered the White House.
