Georgia slides towards pax-Americana as the Arab world watches the repercussions, writes Mustafa El-Labbad The guns have fallen silent in Georgia but controversy continues to rage in the Arab press in response to the repercussions and ramifications of that battle which has transcended the Georgian borders to touch upon the structure and hierarchy of the current global order. The rapid and decisive Russian victory over Georgia unleashed a chorus consisting of such phrases as "the multipolar order" and "the resurgence of the Russian superpower" which echo hopes for a rapid change in the current world order. This latter term is an extremely complex concept. Ultimately it is the product of the relative weight between regions which is determined by the power balances within the regions, the interplay between the constituent parts of the region and the interplay between these individually and collectively with other parts of the world. Otherwise put, the diverse power relations in the world form the fabric of the global order. Since the end of World War II this has passed through two major phases. The superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the first, from 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 1990, with their respective blocs and alliances. Then in 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its system of alliances, there arose a monopolar order led by the US. The structure of this new order underwent some marked changes. Most notably it saw the rise of such countries as China, Japan and the major industrial powers in Western Europe to a position that offered some counterbalance to the centre of the monopolar order. However, not enough to warrant talk of the beginning of the end of the monopolar order or of the resurgence of the Russian superpower. Russia, in spite of its enormous potential in energy resources, vast geographical expanse, permanent membership in the Security Council and nuclear capacities, does not offer an inspiring political model and lacks an advanced technological economy as well as a standard of living approximating that in the West. Similarly, China has great technological potential, a booming economy, nuclear capabilities and permanent membership in the Security Council, but it, too, lacks an inspiring political model and a standard of living approaching that in the West. Moreover, it has an additional weakness: its heavy dependency on imported energy resources. Japan and Germany lack the military might necessary to support a global role as well as permanent membership in the Security Council. In addition, in spite of their attractive political models and their considerable economic and technological might, they are also heavily dependant on foreign energy resources. Both France and Britain are permanent members of the Security Council, equipped with considerable military and nuclear capacities and offer successful political models as well as a rich cultural heritage that has had a powerful influence around the world. Yet, they do not have the technological or economical potential of Germany, Japan and China, let alone the US. By all indicators, therefore, the US is still the number one economic and military power in the world. Its military forces are stationed around the world and its navy sails unchallenged in over every sea and ocean. Washington is also the only nation that is currently in the process of militarising outer space, in which regard it has made great strides. The American economy continues to outpace all its competitors and the dollar is still the basis of international currency exchanges. The US also meets the rest of the necessary prerequisites for playing the role of superpower: an attractive political model, cultural hegemony beyond its borders, nuclear capacities and UN Security Council membership. International relations have become so militarised in the wake of 11 September that, in 2001, the sole superpower was given an international mandate to invade Afghanistan. With the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the US deepened its military involvement in the Middle East, embroiling itself in a predicament that hampered its ability to respond to three issues at once. On the Afghani and Iraqi fronts, Washington managed, with partial success and at an extraordinary cost to replace the governments it overthrew upon occupying these countries with governments that met its approval, albeit these required direct American military support. Washington accomplished this in a relatively long period, however. In terms of its own predictions (seven years in the case of Afghanistan and five in the case of Iraq), a response to a third, simultaneous front remained out of reach for the superpower, to which the events in Georgia testified very clearly. But this does not mean that the US has begun to decline as a superpower or even that its status as the sole superpower has begun to cede way in order to allow a second superpower to emerge alongside it. Nevertheless, the flash war in Georgia has revealed some shift in the balances of international powers. Moreover, it has demonstrated that the US, in spite of all its ingredients of might, is not as capable of intervening on behalf of its allies as rapidly as it could before the events of 11 September and the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. The foregoing analysis leads to an extremely important conclusion from the strategic perspective. This is that there is a relatively stronger opportunity for regional and emerging powers to assert themselves against America's allies in their various regions. But even if these powers do take advantage of this opportunity, this will not affect immediately or even in the foreseeable future the current hierarchy in the international order. We can thus perceive that the fundamental dialectical law that holds that "quantitative changes bring qualitative transformations" will play its part in an analysis, but without offering optimists a glimpse of when their longed-for multipolar order will arrive. In view of this, the most frequently cited term one has read in Arab political literature over the past weeks -- "multipolarity" -- is little more than a prayer for the emergence of a Russian pole that will check American impetuosity in this region. The expression is grounded in hopes more than in substance. It emanates from an interpretation of the war in Georgia that has prematurely extrapolated a perception of Russia's re-emergence as a superpower from Moscow's deft handling of a regional situation within its immediate geographical proximity. The war in Georgia may ultimately prove to have produced some shift in the structure of the international order to the detriment of Washington's status. But whatever this shift is it is a far cry from the "setting of the American sun" and the "rising of the Russian star" in the international firmament that the Arabs are seeing out of their dismay at US policies. Surely it would be wiser for the Arabs to summon the resolve to take advantage of the relative opening that may be available in the current weft and warp of the international order than to bank on wishful thinking.
