In the wake of the 11 September attacks, US strategy has been to extend its hegemony in formerly Soviet Central Asia, with a view to controlling the region's vast petroleum reserves, writes Galal Nassar "Without economic power we will not be able to lead the world, even if we remain a superpower" -- Paul Kennedy The US did not create a New World Order in the wake of the Gulf War, but it took a large step in that direction. However, securing control over the Gulf required a supplementary measure in Central Asia, which US foreign policy architects regard as of crucial importance. It is no conspiracy theory to suggest that the events of 11 September served as a pretext to enter this region, though this would, in any case, have happened sooner or later. This becomes apparent from an examination of US actions since the end of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order, the US began to rally international organisations in the service of a new interventionism. Democratisation, the free market, human rights and prohibiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction were among the catchwords used for eliminating regional threats to Washington's growing global hegemony. The US set its sights, in particular, on the Gulf and Central Asia. In addition to their geopolitical and strategic importance, these two regions are also of vital economic importance to the West in view of their enormous reserves of oil and natural gas. The US has been seeking to station forces in these areas in order to assert its leadership over its economic, political and military rivals. Towards this end, it must seize the "imperial moment", which does not offer itself that frequently in history. The US is convinced that the end of the Cold War period has offered it the unprecedented opportunity to prevail in a unipolar world order. It also realises that such conditions are ephemeral, and that it must so order the global arena in order to safeguard its power and prestige against the eventual advent of other powers. One is reminded of an earlier phase in history that also played a major role in the development of the world order. In the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbour during the Second World War, the Japanese commander who led the assault said, "This powerful surprise strike has woken the giant from his slumbers. American territory and installations are no longer completely safe from attack by adversaries and enemies in this war." By any standards, the attacks on New York and Washington last year represented an enormous failure in the US government's fulfillment of its primary foreign-policy objective: "To protect US territory from the danger of foreign assault and destruction." Nevertheless, the attacks had the positive result of permitting the next step forward in creating the new international order in Central Asia. Washington's declaration of war on terrorism, and specifically on the "axis of evil", serves a multiplicity of objectives. It fulfils the US dream of securing its presence in the Caspian Sea region with its enormous petroleum wealth. It allows for the gradual eclipse of Russian influence over these republics, which were formerly a part of the Soviet Union and are now part of the Russian Commonwealth. It tightens the circle around Iran as a result of the presence of US forces on Iran's northern and eastern borders, and it will serve to redraw the map of south and central Asia. In short, it is Washington's key to asserting America as the world's sole superpower, an attempt to affirm Clinton's famous claim that the 21st century will also be "an American century". Throughout the Cold War, the US could not so much as contemplate setting foot in this region, let alone flying over it. Before 11 September, too, US national security and intelligence agencies desperately wanted an entrance into the region under any pretext. But they also knew that four adjacent nuclear powers -- China, Russia, India and Pakistan -- and, perhaps soon a fifth -- Iran -- had strategic and material interests there that conflicted with US strategic objectives. It is significant that during its war in Afghanistan, the US never alluded to the enormous reserves of oil and natural resources in Afghanistan and in its five neighbours bordering on the Caspian Sea. According to the Petroleum Economist of May 2001, experts estimate a petroleum reserve of five billion barrels of crude. Terry Adams of the Institute for Energy Research at the University of Cambridge, UK, remarked that this enormous quantity will transform this region into major- league area in oil and politics. Just one day before 11 September, Oil and Gas Journal reported that the northern Caspian Sea area was the site of the most extensive geological survey and test drilling operations in history, preparatory to commencing drilling operations and attracting billions of dollars to a region thirsting for wealth and prosperity. How fortuitous that President Bush and Vice President Cheney are the foremost champions of the powerful oil lobby in the US. In order to achieve its goal of imposing a New World Order, or more accurately, its extraordinary hegemony, the US has engaged in a thorough revision of its military strategy. The result has been a radical transformation of the strategic and tactical aspects of its combat readiness and of the logistics of its military machine. The events of 11 September were instrumental in the shaping of this transformation in vision, which is as comprehensive as that which followed WWII and, subsequently, that which emerged with the commencement of the Cold War and the "balance of nuclear terror" with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this was not the first time since the end of the Cold War that the US has modified its military strategy. In the early and mid- 90s, as an immediate result of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the US adopted a new set of combat concepts considered commensurate with the political and military demands of the so- called New World Order. "Two wars in two theatres", as the strategy was termed, was based on several combat and operational principles intended to reduce dependence on the heavy artillery formations once considered essential to stop a potential Soviet invasion of Europe. Instead, the focus shifted to arms and units possessing a high degree of rapid mobility. It also shifted to rapid long-distance intervention, with a consequent concentration on transport and logistical support, as well as control over supply lines, waterways and air space, and electronic operations. It was assumed that these elements combined would form an integrated operational and tactical system capable of achieving the US's political and strategic goals in remote parts of the world and in anticipation of further regional conflicts similar to that provoked by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the ethnic wars in the Balkans. The primary objective of this strategy was to enable the US military machine to engage in two major regional wars in two separate parts of the world simultaneously. In practical terms, however, it has become clear that this strategy, including the partial modifications to it, has not been sufficient to place the US military in a position to handle contemporary challenges and threats. This has led to the conviction within the current Bush administration and the US military establishment that the strategy must therefore change in order to contend with recent developments and in order to impose the American global order. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed the shift in strategic thinking in an recent article, "Transforming the Military", which appeared in the US journal Foreign Affairs. The events of 11 September and over the following months furnished practical proof that the "two wars in two theatres" strategy was no longer feasible, and that it had become necessary to formulate a new strategy that conformed to the circumstances and demands of the present century. Rumsfeld felt that the two wars strategy had been appropriate to the situation in the immediate wake of the Cold War and that it had served its purpose adequately at the time. However, the problem now was that US forces were prepared -- excessively so -- to engage in two specific conflicts, but were not sufficiently equipped and prepared to meet the unexpected challenges of the 21st century. Rumsfeld was alluding to a fundamental factor in American strategic thinking: international terrorism in its various forms and diverse theatres of operation. He therefore said that US forces must henceforth be prepared to operate in four separate theatres simultaneously, and against an anonymous, invisible and unpredictable enemy. Although such a goal seems unattainable, the US secretary of defense continued, "We must adopt new modes of thinking, new methods of planning and new and bold ways of working, so that it will be in our power to deter our enemies and defeat them, even before they are capable of threatening us." The new American strategic vision therefore places heavy emphasis on intelligence gathering on potential enemies and threats to American interests. It stresses the development of new technologies for waging computer wars against communications networks and IT systems, as well as a greater reliance on Special Forces. However, the core of the new modus operandi is its focus on an unconventional enemy similar to that which confronted US forces in Afghanistan. As the US readies itself to confront similar enemies in Iraq, North Korea and China, this new vision calls for expenditure in five defense areas: counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, intelligence, computer warfare and military aeronautics technology. The fundamental shift in US strategic thinking can be understood in terms of its primary strategic goals, which are: providing a defense shield for US territory and its bases and interests abroad; ensuring the reach and sustainability of US military might in the international arena, even in areas remote from the US; depriving the enemies of the US of refuge and shelter and preventing them from acting against US targets; safeguarding US communications and information networks from enemy infiltration and sabotage using IT and communications technology to coordinate the operations of US forces, and safeguarding US control over space and safeguarding US satellite technology against attack. The US has enormous military capacity at its disposal, but, just as importantly, it also possesses a formidable propaganda machine. During recent years, this machine has turned Islamic fundamentalist groups around the world into enemies of Western culture, using an array of international relations theories to do so. Samuel Huntington's book The Clash of Civilizations, for example, and Francis Fukuyama's End of History posited an inevitable conflict between Islam and the West. It should be noted that Fukuyama worked in the US State Department's Centre for Strategic Planning and that Huntington is closely connected to the agencies planning US propaganda campaigns. It is thus not unlikely that they were called into the service of US policy architects who felt it necessary to create a moral enemy -- Islamic fundamentalist terrorism -- that could be used as a pretext to enter territories that would otherwise have remained out of reach of US intervention. In addition to Central Asia, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and Syria are areas where the fundamentalist key would furnish easier access for the US than any other pretext. This is not to suggest that such grand theories have not been criticised in the West. Many scholars in the UK, for example, have contended that Huntington's "clash of civilisations" theory is fallacious, as it is founded upon specious premises, "civilisations" not being actors in international relations. However, this would not be the first time that the US propaganda machine has been brought to bear against the country's opponents. This machine proved its usefulness in bringing down the Berlin Wall and communism in the former Soviet Union, for example, and in fragmenting the Communist Eastern Block. The US movie industry through spy thrillers, as well as the US advertising industry, promoting products such as Coca Cola and MacDonalds' fast food, and US overseas television and radio stations, all blared out a continuous subtext, which was that citizens in the "free world" enjoyed far greater happiness and prosperity than those living under totalitarian regimes in the East. "Democracy" was also the catchword that allowed the US to intervene in Haiti to restore Washington's "democratically elected" ally, just as "humanitarian intervention" was the slogan used for moving US forces into Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Indeed, the creation of an "enemy" is a deeply rooted tactic of US foreign policy. What other use does the "axis of evil" serve but as justification for the US to intervene in any conflict, or even in the absence of any conflict, in order to change the regime in another country? However, how can the US wage war on such a nebulous, tentacle-like enemy as terrorism? The answer is not as elusive as one might expect. Exploiting the aftermath of 11 September, the US administration has brought into being a coalition against terrorism, centring on three axes. The first of these is the US-European axis, led by the US in coordination with the UK and in which NATO, as its Secretary-General George Robinson has announced, will furnish facilities and other means of support. The second is the Arab- Islamic axis, consisting of Pakistan, Turkey and some Gulf countries, which supplies a vital cover of legitimacy in view of the potential targets in the war against terrorism. The third is the Asian axis, which includes such Central Asian republics as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan ( both bordering on Afghanistan) and Kazakhstan, and which is supported by Russia. Donald Rumsfeld elucidated the mechanisms of the coalition further when he said that some countries would act openly in its support, while others would act in the same way, but in secret. Now that the US has laid the cornerstones of its new international order by establishing a military foothold in Central Asia, its primary task will be to consolidate its economic and military hegemony. The contest of the future will be economic backed by a powerful military cover, which is why the US is determined to augment its power in both domains. If the US perceives that regional powers and economic rivals present the two most probable destabilising factors, it will take advantage of threats emanating from the former to gain advantage over the latter. From Washington's perspective, it is not through a balance of power that it will sustain the safety and stability of its international order, but rather through creating a form of disequilibrium. Such disequilibrium, however, must be managed in such a way as not to upset the global economic stability the US hopes to generate as the key to securing its control over the energy sources of the Gulf and Central Asia. The question that remains is whether the US will actually be able to bring its plans to fruition. Will Europe, Japan, Russia and China stand idly by as the US continues to put the pieces into place? Or, will they prove problematic and undertake actions in the manner of the German-French army that was formed outside of the NATO framework and that is certain to provoke US resentment? The realities of the new American order indicate that Washington will do its utmost to eliminate any rising powers that pose as much as a temporary threat to its hegemony. At present there are two possible threats to US interests: the emergence of other superpowers and instability in areas surrounding regions that the US deems vital to its strategic interests. The emergence of other superpowers would be catastrophic for US strategists, as they would present two new factors. The first is that, from the historical perspective, newly emerging superpowers are inherently destabilising geopolitical phenomena, as proved to be the case at the global level with the emergence of the US, Germany and Japan as world powers in the late 19th century. The second factor is that as newly emerging powers seek to augment their power they could pose a direct threat to the US. It is therefore possible to conclude that the US's war will continue, but not against terrorism as the US media would have us believe. Rather, this war is really being waged against potential rivals, such as Europe, Japan and China. Hence, the powerful US military and economic presence along their borders, and hence the recourse to the most powerful weapons in the US arsenal: the catchwords of terrorism, fundamentalism, human rights, democracy, and aid. munications technology to coordinate the operations of US forces, and safeguarding US control over space and safeguarding US satellite technology against attack. The US has enormous military capacity at its disposal, but, just as importantly, it also possesses a formidable propaganda machine. During recent years, this machine has turned Islamic fundamentalist groups around the world into enemies of Western culture, using an array of international relations theories to do so. Samuel Huntington's book The Clash of Civilizations, for example, and Francis Fukuyama's End of History posited an inevitable conflict between Islam and the West. It should be noted that Fukuyama worked in the US State Department's Centre for Strategic Planning and that Huntington is closely connected to the agencies planning US propaganda campaigns. It is thus not unlikely that they were called into the service of US policy architects who felt it necessary to create a moral enemy -- Islamic fundamentalist terrorism -- that could be used as a pretext to enter territories that would otherwise have remained out of reach of US intervention. In addition to Central Asia, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and Syria are areas where the fundamentalist key would furnish easier access for the US than any other pretext. This is not to suggest that such grand theories have not been criticised in the West. Many scholars in the UK, for example, have contended that Huntington's "clash of civilisations" theory is fallacious, as it is founded upon specious premises, "civilisations" not being actors in international relations. However, this would not be the first time that the US propaganda machine has been brought to bear against the country's opponents. This machine proved its usefulness in bringing down the Berlin Wall and communism in the former Soviet Union, for example, and in fragmenting the Communist Eastern Block. The US movie industry through spy thrillers, as well as the US advertising industry, promoting products such as Coca Cola and MacDonalds' fast food, and US overseas television and radio stations, all blared out a continuous subtext, which was that citizens in the "free world" enjoyed far greater happiness and prosperity than those living under totalitarian regimes in the East. "Democracy" was also the catchword that allowed the US to intervene in Haiti to restore Washington's "democratically elected" ally, just as "humanitarian intervention" was the slogan used for moving US forces into Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Indeed, the creation of an "enemy" is a deeply rooted tactic of US foreign policy. What other use does the "axis of evil" serve but as justification for the US to intervene in any conflict, or even in the absence of any conflict, in order to change the regime in another country? However, how can the US wage war on such a nebulous, tentacle-like enemy as terrorism? The answer is not as elusive as one might expect. Exploiting the aftermath of 11 September, the US administration has brought into being a coalition against terrorism, centring on three axes. The first of these is the US-European axis, led by the US in coordination with the UK and in which NATO, as its Secretary-General George Robinson has announced, will furnish facilities and other means of support. The second is the Arab- Islamic axis, consisting of Pakistan, Turkey and some Gulf countries, which supplies a vital cover of legitimacy in view of the potential targets in the war against terrorism. The third is the Asian axis, which includes such Central Asian republics as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan ( both bordering on Afghanistan) and Kazakhstan, and which is supported by Russia. Donald Rumsfeld elucidated the mechanisms of the coalition further when he said that some countries would act openly in its support, while others would act in the same way, but in secret. Now that the US has laid the cornerstones of its new international order by establishing a military foothold in Central Asia, its primary task will be to consolidate its economic and military hegemony. The contest of the future will be economic backed by a powerful military cover, which is why the US is determined to augment its power in both domains. If the US perceives that regional powers and economic rivals present the two most probable destabilising factors, it will take advantage of threats emanating from the former to gain advantage over the latter. From Washington's perspective, it is not through a balance of power that it will sustain the safety and stability of its international order, but rather through creating a form of disequilibrium. Such disequilibrium, however, must be managed in such a way as not to upset the global economic stability the US hopes to generate as the key to securing its control over the energy sources of the Gulf and Central Asia. The question that remains is whether the US will actually be able to bring its plans to fruition. Will Europe, Japan, Russia and China stand idly by as the US continues to put the pieces into place? Or, will they prove problematic and undertake actions in the manner of the German-French army that was formed outside of the NATO framework and that is certain to provoke US resentment? The realities of the new American order indicate that Washington will do its utmost to eliminate any rising powers that pose as much as a temporary threat to its hegemony. At present there are two possible threats to US interests: the emergence of other superpowers and instability in areas surrounding regions that the US deems vital to its strategic interests. The emergence of other superpowers would be catastrophic for US strategists, as they would present two new factors. The first is that, from the historical perspective, newly emerging superpowers are inherently destabilising geopolitical phenomena, as proved to be the case at the global level with the emergence of the US, Germany and Japan as world powers in the late 19th century. The second factor is that as newly emerging powers seek to augment their power they could pose a direct threat to the US. It is therefore possible to conclude that the US's war will continue, but not against terrorism as the US media would have us believe. Rather, this war is really being waged against potential rivals, such as Europe, Japan and China. Hence, the powerful US military and economic presence along their borders, and hence the recourse to the most powerful weapons in the US arsenal: the catchwords of terrorism, fundamentalism, human rights, democracy, and aid. Related articles: 9/11 Supplement -- 12 - 18 September 2002 9-11 - WAR COVERAGE -- Archives
