After more than two decades of boycott, Sudan's renowned Islamist leader has visited Egypt, proposing lessons to learn from Sudan's mistakes, writes Asmaa Al-Husseini After an absence and boycott of 23 years, Hassan Al-, the leader of the opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP) and renowned Islamic thinker, headed a large PCP delegation to Egypt. At Cairo Airport, large crowds of Egyptians spontaneously gathered around him to welcome him and take souvenir pictures with him. The scene was enough to melt the ice that had built up over the past 23 years of animosity between Al- and the former regime in Egypt. In Cairo, the Sudanese opposition leader vigorously declared that Egypt and Sudan share common interests and a joint fate; that they must unite and complement each other. In this manner, he turned over a new leaf of reconciliation in relations between the two countries and emphasised that the departure of dictatorships in the region is the proper foundation for unity among the people. Al- came to Egypt with the intent of eliminating negative ideas about him that were propagated during the years of boycott. He also intends to build bridges with all segments of Egyptian society by drawing on his long experience in power, in order for Egyptians to avoid making the same mistakes as were made in Sudan. After 23 years, Al- came to a different Egypt from the one whose policies he had always criticised, while Egyptians met another Al-. Although Al- has been out of power for a decade, he is a major player in domestic Sudanese politics. The 78-year- old who holds no official post remains influential on all political and intellectual issues in Sudan. His disciples in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) who ousted him 10 years ago are still struggling to shed his shadow on many levels, or silence his voice, and restore the Islamic movement and regime that lost its mastermind when he left. They are also torn between the desire to reunite with him to face critical dangers that they cannot handle by themselves, and fears that history will repeat itself. Al- was ousted from political life on 6 May 2000 and is credited with building the first Islamic state in the Arab and Sunni Muslim world. He was the strategist behind the Revolutionary Salvation Council (RSC) that came to power in Sudan in 1989. Al-, who was labelled "The Sheikh" before the discord, remains engaged in all issues, including the issue of South Sudan. The peace treaty Khartoum signed in 2005 many believe is based in the memorandum of understanding signed by Al-'s party with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Geneva. Al-'s ideas remain a point of reference for his former followers on issues of philosophy, culture, art, women and other topics that cannot be debated in Islamic circles without strong argument. No one can present arguments as well as Al-, and many measures taken by the government or NCP now would be impossible without referencing Al- and his ideas. His ideas are based in pragmatism. Unlike many Islamic leaders in the region and beyond, Al- taught his disciples that religious texts are worthless unless they are implemented on the ground, and that achieving minimal interests is better than losing everything while maintaining the sacredness of texts. Ironically, Al-'s ideas are now shared by his disciples in power as well as those who want to overthrow these rulers. The rebel Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur is said to have ties with Al-'s party, or that it is the PCP's military wing -- which it always denied. But this movement cannot deny that its plan to resolve the problem of Darfur and bring about change is inspired by Al-'s ideas and vision. Among the Sudanese opposition, Al- remains the most effective and influential, and the opposition does not confidently take any steps unless Al- is involved. Even players on the international and regional scene understand the importance of the man and the role he played. Any foreign visitor or envoy who goes to Khartoum is keen on meeting with Al- and listening to his opinion, which they value greatly, not only because he is the leader of an opposition party but because there is a sense that the regime in Sudan is still influenced by the personality and philosophy of its founder. Also, because his disciples and former followers have not departed from his ideas, even though many of them have left him, preferring to join the opposing camp. At the same time, his ideas, especially his most recent and famous fatwa permitting the marriage of a Muslim woman to Christian or Jewish men, quickly travel beyond the borders of Sudan to trigger intense debate. Al- is very intelligent and cunning, and some believe he views himself as bigger than Sudan itself. He is hungry for power and nearly became ruler of Sudan, but his disciples let him down by issuing what is known as the "Memo of Ten" against him which resulted in his ouster. This made him bitter and angry towards them, and some view his actions towards the regime since as motivated by revenge. His supporters and sympathisers believe what distinguishes him is his integrity and immunity to the seduction of money or power. They also believe that Al-'s actions are not to seek revenge. He believes there is an immense distance between himself and his former entourage, and that international and regional ire towards Khartoum is enough to keep them occupied. They also describe Al-'s actions and ideas opposing his former disciples as an expression of his overall opinions and views. Despite all that is written and said about Al-'s personality and actions, he remains a mystery, controversial and complex; he is capable of anything, never surrenders, and is fearless. When establishing the Islamic movement in Sudan, as part of his political labour Al- relied on communist techniques such as covert activities, penetrating educated circles and the Sudanese army while avoiding a struggle with the regime (in fact, mostly forging an alliance with it) in confronting the influence of major powers. Some believe he is also influenced by the manner in which Ayatollah Khomeini reached power, and cite his speeches and statements in which he admires Khomeini's rise to power. When Al- was unable to recreate a similar revolution to bring him to absolute power as the Ayatollah of Sudan, he orchestrated a military coup as a means to reach power. He then enforced it the Iranian way, through an alliance between Al- and former Sudanese President Jaafar Al-Numeiri, which allowed his group to grow in Sudan. After the democratic experiment following the 1985 uprising, Al- became foreign minister in the coalition government led by Al-Mahdi, and appointed many of his supporters in the ministry. Later followed a coup by the Islamist front calling itself the National Salvation Revolution. Some propose that Al- had no chance of attaining his dream through parliament and that he was incapable of instigating a popular revolution to carry him to the presidency. Neither did he possess the patience to wait, so another military coup took place. Although Al- claims that he carried out his coup to pre- empt any move to remove them from political life, as was the case for the Islamists in Algeria, others purport that there was no cause for him to carry out a coup against a political system in which his party was a fundamental player. His party held 52 out of 301 seats in the parliament of 1986- 1989, and it was a partner in several coalition cabinets and held principal ministerial posts. Al- himself -- although he did not win a parliamentary seat -- was the minister of foreign affairs and justice. Members of his party were also appointed regional rulers and governors. In a nutshell, Islamists in Sudan had more influence than their peers in any other Arab or Muslim countries, and that they had benefited from democracy and were not oppressed or marginalised. At the beginning of the coup, the role of the Front was ambiguous and Al- was arrested among other party leaders, in order to make the plot more convincing. Al- admitted as much later, when he famously said: "I told Bashir to go to the presidential palace, and I will go to jail." Under the rule of the RSC, Al-'s project of establishing a modern Islamic state in Sudan was launched. It faced many stumbling blocks, including the very complex nature of Sudan because of a multitude of cultures, religions, creeds, tribes, its immense size, strategic location, political and economic conditions, as well as regional and international interests. After the ranks of the Islamic movement became divided and Al- established another party under the name the Popular Congress, he was arrested several times after he abandoned his ideas and raised the banners of freedom, democracy and human rights in confrontation with the Islamist regime that he had founded. He became irate and bitter towards his former followers and disciples, and began opposing the regime without any concern about what this could mean for the future of the regime he established or Sudan as a whole. Despite the arrests, pressure and mediation to revise his positions, Al- remained stubborn and resilient and sometimes even used satire and ridicule. He faced a barrage of accusations and claims of disloyalty when he signed a memorandum of understanding with the SPLM led by John Garang in Geneva in 2001. He was accused of igniting the war in Darfur through his disciples in the rebel Justice and Equality Movement, which invaded Khartoum in May 2008. He is now a leading member of the opposition alliance that includes the Umma Party led by Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi, the communist party headed by Mohamed Ibrahim Naqd, and other political parties hostile to the ruling regime. His most controversial and surprising stance has been his reaction to the verdict by the International Criminal Court to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir. He fervently supported the ruling, unlike any other Sudanese leader, even those whom Al-Bashir turned against or battled with in the past. The most these leaders had suggested was the need to find a compromise between justice and peace, but Al- insisted that Al-Bashir should be tried and justice should be served for crimes committed. The relationship between Al- and his former disciples has not been entirely severed and there has always remained a thin thread between them, even in the darkest moments between both camps. This is for many reasons, including that in the end these Islamist cadres are ammunition for the Islamic movement and Al- does not want to destroy them. Also, among his former disciples are elements that want to apply his ideas, especially those relating to openness, freedom and other notions Al- has championed since his ouster. Discontent with Al- varies within the NCP. There are many connections and open channels -- some overt, many covert -- between the NCP and the PCP. Leaders in both camps are torn between the two sides. Meanwhile, the NCP has not designated Al- persona non grata, and even if it wanted to the ruling party knows that it would be difficult if not impossible. The government released him even after his statements supporting Al-Bashir's arrest because it realised that incarceration is futile, and in fact makes him more powerful and prominent. Today, Al- is most concerned about the future of the Islamic movement in Sudan, which on the eve of 30 June 1989 was a promising political movement forging ahead in all fields. Two decades after taking over power, it is peppered with the mistakes of the era and their repercussions. Threats surround the movement at its core, not only enemies abroad or political rivals but Salafi ideas that are spreading. These are almost pulling the rug out from underneath the Islamic movement that Al- created, and is viewed as one of the most liberal and progressive Islamic doctrines in the Arab world despite errors in practical application. The Salafi current has gained momentum for two reasons. First, the ouster of Al-, who had the ability to confront this trend; second, the fact that his disciples became distracted with power and politics instead of doctrine and proselytisation. These Salafi ideas have even reached many younger generations affiliated with the Islamic movement and its party. Once in a while there are rumours of uniting Islamist ranks in Sudan, usually proposed during times of crisis. There were also reports that Islamist youth were working to reinstate the influence of the Islamic movement and unify it, perhaps out of fear of a repeat of what happened to Al-, especially in light of rumours that there is a power struggle within the NCP. Perhaps these youth realise now more than ever that Sudan is facing immense problems that the NCP is unable to resolve alone, and that if they do not revive the Islamic movement, the Islamist project will fail and the country will collapse. These rumours -- or aspirations of the Islamists -- are further fuelled by what they view as the failure so far by their rulers to resolve problems in the country. Also, the despair of a weak opposition that is incapable of forming a successful alternative. Most important are the very difficult conditions facing Sudan as a whole and critical developments which jeopardise the entire country. Al-, who views himself as the leader of Islamists around the world and the first Islamist politician to reach power in the Arab world, is reaping the outcome of the mistakes of a bitter Islamist experience in Sudan. He is revising his experiment now, which could be an indirect apology for his role in it, as he tries to distance himself from many of the mistakes made, claiming that he was not in control of the regime. At the same time, he is giving advice to his Islamists brothers in the Arab world so they learn the lessons of the Sudanese experience and avoid the mistakes that he now realises were made. These include that a coup against a democratic system is unjustifiable irrespective of the reasons, and that it is better for any mature Islamist movement to participate in a civic state. His message after a long and bitter struggle to build an Islamic movement in Sudan and his experience in Sudanese politics is that the people of Sudan -- and Islam itself -- need more democracy and more justice; also a system that fights corruption, nepotism, oppression and the stifling of freedoms. If Al- had realised this earlier perhaps he would have been able to propel his strong, organised Islamic movement, with its human and financial resources, to follow another path and handle relations differently with Sudanese powers, neighbouring countries and the entire world.
