Israel knows Arab democracy would unleash anti-Israeli sentiment, while it cannot be seen to be against it having spent so many years deriding the Arabs for lacking it, writes Abdel-Moneim Said "Arab Spring" is the expression now commonly used in the international media to refer to the wave of uprisings that swept the Arab world from Bouazizi's desperate protest that flared into Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution", through the turmoil that now grips Syria, and Libya, Yemen and Bahrain before that, and to the disturbances that portend the inevitable, although tardier, advent of revolution in other countries of the region. The term is modelled on the "Prague Spring" of 1968, when the Czechoslovakian people's rebellion against communist government and soviet occupation offered a rare glimmer of the possibility of the collapse of totalitarian rule in Eastern Europe. That possibility eventually did come to fruition in another spring, in the 1990s, when the governments of Eastern Europe began to teeter and fall, one after the other, as it rapidly became clear that the Soviet Union and the whole communist ideology were little more than paper tigers that proved incapable of sustaining a couple of knocks on the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989. But spring did not just arrive to Eastern Europe. Whether they occurred in the depth of winter or under the scorching summer sun, uprisings across Asia and Latin America against despotism, authoritarianism and tyranny gave rise to an onrush of springs of one form or another. But while change rippled across the rest of the world in the 1990s, not a whiff of a democratic breeze fluttered across the Arab world. Politicians and political scientists were stumped by this immobility against a global backdrop of flux. Eventually they simply resigned themselves to this persistent stagnation, or to what some boasted of as an immutable stability, and converged upon what they called the "Arab anomaly". Once again, the Arabs had become the exception that defied explanation and the international grasp. But then, hadn't it always been this way? The Arabs and Arab issues had to be handled in the way one deals with exceptions, which are not subject to the laws and rules that apply elsewhere in human societies. Or so it seemed. For now the situation has changed entirely. The Arab Spring has finally come, although it still seems in its initial phase. In some countries revolution has succeeded -- in the sense of overthrowing the pillars of the old regime -- and they are now feeling their way towards democracy and development. In others, the democratic battle is still raging violently. Contrary to the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the birth of democracy in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain is being accompanied by inestimable bloodshed. Other Arab countries, meanwhile, are in a state of anxious anticipation. Governments there are scrambling to avert revolution by implementing hasty economic reforms. However, both those in power and those outside of power know that the demand for democracy and political participation is too great to be appeased by financial means. So, the Arab world is changing, and the change is ongoing. It will not be long before there is a new Arab order and -- inevitably -- a new regional system. It is still difficult at this stage to make precise predictions, because of the Islamist factor that has entered the political path of Arab revolutions. As we know, Islamists are the best-organised and most influential political forces in the Arab political arena. Nevertheless, so far it appears that we will either see the rise of democratic governments in which it will be impossible to ignore the special weight of Islamist forces, or the rise of Islamist governments in which it will be impossible to ignore democratic methods and instruments in which liberals and secularists will have a role to play. Regardless of which type of government ultimately emerges, Israel is extremely nervous at the changes taking place in the Arab world. The majority of Israeli political elites, regardless of their position in government or on the political spectrum, believe that democracy, by its very nature, responds to popular feelings and moods, which politicians exploit in order to gain support. Therefore, their reasoning goes, it will be impossible to prevent the latent popular hatred for Israel from being translated into anti-Israeli policies, even in countries that have peace treaties with the Hebrew state. They further fear that if the nascent democracies assume an Islamist character, Israel will not only be facing Hizbullah and Hamas, but a plethora of new versions of these organisations spread across the Arab world. The Israeli right does not blame itself or admit to error in failing to seize the opportunity to reach a just peace with the Palestinian Authority. In fact, it maintains that it was right to hold on to the occupied territories because this would give it strategic depth at the time of the confrontation, which it claims has always been inevitable. The Israeli left differs. It proceeds from the premise that democratic nations do not make war on each other and that the domestic responsibilities of democratic governments require them to avoid costly military engagements abroad, especially against countries that are heavily armed and can boast a nuclear capacity, such as Israel. Therefore, it argues, "democratic" Arab governments will be more inclined to seek peace with Israel than their authoritarian predecessors, which either exploited war with Israel as a means to secure the legitimacy of their regimes or played on peace with Israel to draw closer to Western powers and obtain their political and financial support, while sustaining a state of cold war that kept the notion of peace as glacial as a polar icecap, as was frequently the custom of the Egyptian regime, or so the thinking goes in many Israeli circles. But regardless of their differing opinions, the Israeli left and right, and those in between, are very worried, all the more so because the change in the Arab world is still in progress and at such a pace and with such an impetus that it is impossible to influence. Also, while the change appears to be taking several different directions at once, Israel cannot possibly object to its democratic course, even though it knows that it will yield situations and conditions far removed from the familiar equations it had grown accustomed to. Tel Aviv is clearly in an awkward position, as it cannot be perceived to be the obstacle to the historic transformation of an entire region that is now poised to merge with the global process of democratisation that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Otherwise put, Israel can not stand alone, urging the perpetuation of the "Arab anomaly" that had garnered two-decades of international derision and that must now end. Israel has few alternatives at this stage. It can either insist on perpetuating the conflict with Arab countries that are now democratic and that will have little problem in securing support for their just and democratic demand for an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab land, or it can take the initiative to declare a halt to all settlement construction and structural changes in Jerusalem and then to engage Arab governments in talks over a formula for a political settlement that would offer peace and security to all parties on the basis of the two-state solution that would fulfil Palestinian aspirations for an independent and democratic state. It will be difficult for Israel to choose. It could take advantage of the opportunity to prove that its democracy is capable of dealing with other free and democratic countries. Unfortunately, those familiar with the workings of the Israeli political system and how its various parties interact know that this will not be that country's preferred choice, in which case we will all have to wait and see what other options history holds in store.
