The remarkable mass uprising in Egypt is a harbinger of a renewed pioneering role for Egypt in the region, if the revolution ends in true democracy, writes Mohamed Anis Salem* In the past, waves of change across the Arab region reflected various combinations of external influences (eg colonialism, the drive for oil, globalisation) and/or centrifugal forces (eg Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel-Nasser's socialism, labour movements, media). One of the best examples of this second group of regionally based influencers was the "Egyptian model" which, for decades in the 20th century, represented a benchmark for the people of the region, in terms of ideas, legislation and methods of social organisation. With the pomp and ceremony of the Royal Court at the centre of its soft power, together with the grand boulevards and Parisian and Italianesque architecture, Cairo's appeal reached out through cinema, singers and radio. Literary salons, opera houses, theatres, clubs, cafes, universities and elite schools attracted the offspring of other Arab ruling families, aspiring actors and honeymooners. Alexandria was the embodiment of a cosmopolitan seaside port, with a large multinational population immortalised by Cavafi, Durrell and Mahfouz. The 1952 coup with its manifestations of anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism and, later, socialism drove a second wave of turmoil and change in the region as a new "model" rolled off the Egyptian assembly line. A shift in technology, with the arrival of the transistor radio on Arab streets, gave Cairo unprecedented outreach. Every first Thursday of the month, the region held its breath as Um Kolthoum chanted her anguished love songs; every Friday, Arabs listened carefully to Radio Cairo's rendition of the weekly article by Al-Ahram 's editor Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. And lo and behold if Nasser gave a speech. Even today, 40 years after his death, the magnetic appeal of the rais remains. In Morocco's Anti-Atlas one can see his fading picture hanging on a shopkeeper's wall. In Deir Elzour, in northeast Syria, a health official remembered accompanying his father in the 1950s to listen to Nasser giving a speech when Egypt and Syria were united. No Syrian president bothered to visit for the next four decades. Egypt's 1967 defeat drew a curtain on that world as the country withdrew inwards to focus on seven difficult years of military confrontation with Israel. As the economy stagnated, Egypt's infrastructure collapsed, freedoms shrunk and Cairo largely withdrew from seeking to influence the direction of social change in the region. Over the following years, as it struggled to rid itself from Israeli occupation, Egypt's cities, economy, infrastructure and services were left to deteriorate. Then, and whatever the historians and conspiracy theorists had to say about the boxing-in of Egypt, changes in deeper structural factors overwhelmed the inherited wisdom of Egypt's advantage: history, culture, location and population size. This phenomenon, the dethroning of Egypt as the leading force in the region was traumatic, albeit it had been happening gradually, subtly, over many years. Until today, Egyptian writers and journalists refer back to 1967 as a threshold (for the complex phenomena of the regression of Egypt's regional role was often reduced to this single event), considered to be Nasser's nadir; some with nostalgia others with satisfaction, always with a tinge of pain. But the truth is that the forces pitted against Egypt's leadership were too strong. Several Egyptian analysts have long argued that this is a lesson repeated in history; that every time that Egyptian influence extended beyond its borders in the 19th century, it was hemmed in by European powers. When Nasser's influence in the Arab world and Africa became too much, so this argument goes, Washington unleashed Israel to confine him within his borders. Thus the rapid rise in the fortunes of oil producing countries in the neighbourhood, and the revival of Islam as a force in society and politics, swept away the remains of Egypt's special status. In fact, history does not turn a page so easily. The 1973 war, regained much of Egypt's allure in the eyes of the people of the region. Although much of that was lost when Anwar El-Sadat launched his peace initiative, some have argued that Egypt's weight helped to mainstream the concept of a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner no other Arab state could have done. Here, once again, holds this view, was a reassertion of Cairo's primacy. Yet the march of history was not arrested for long. A new Arab order had commenced in the region as of the 1970s, more so in the 1980s, with a group of oil countries breaking away into a world of affluence and global influence, with another group, at the other extreme, descending into failed states or countries in conflict (eg Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and Yemen). In between, there were those who managed to make do, achieving reasonable health and education standards, despite serious challenges (eg Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia -- yes, Tunisia). Then there were those countries that had resources but couldn't get their act together (Algeria and Iraq). Finally, there were the relatively large countries, like Egypt and Morocco, searching for formulas to break through. A mix of economic and political reforms was introduced in both countries, but the centre of power remained firmly in the hands of the rulers. In the 1990s, Saddam Hussein's tragic attempt to annex Kuwait removed Iraq from the regional equation as one Egypt's main competitors. Egypt's debts were forgiven; new flows of capital came into the country and tourism flourished as never before. Yet, this respite, like the one in 1973, was to be short lived as the hard facts of economics and a wave of terrorist attacks pushed Egypt inwards. It is in this context that Mubarak is blamed for Cairo's diminished influence in the neighbourhood as its leverage shrunk over a range of critical issues: Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts; the question of South Sudan; relations with Nile riparian states. In contrast, the ascendancy of other states in the neighbourhood became more dramatic. Turkey, projecting an attractive model of economic and political progress, and using its soft power, including popular TV soap operas, became a much more active player in the region. Qatar staked its claim on mediating conflicts, Al-Jazeera TV and massive amounts of disposable funds. Even Israel's intransigence and Iran's defiance underlined the regression in Egypt's status. Taken together, there was not much left in Mubarak's model that would attract public admiration let alone emulation. Then there was 25 January. Suddenly, dramatically, Egypt was back. Here was the dream of the masses coming alive on their TV stations 24/7, braving batons and bullets, mastering technology and mass organisation and, ultimately, overturning a dictatorship. Surely, here was "our Egypt", the country that would lead the region to freedom, social justice and reclaiming lost rights. Yes, the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution had preceded and inspired Tahrir Square, but the model projected by Egypt was of a different order of magnitude and influence. The horizon was soon clouded with divergent views of experts describing the Egypt they wanted to reclaim or projecting changes in the regional balance of power. Some Sudanese spoke of an emerging Islamic Nile Valley; from Iran came a prophecy of an Islamic Middle East; a Palestinian writer predicted stronger opposition to Israeli policies; an Amnesty International staffer called for a more activist approach in defence of human rights. In contrast to a New York Times article predicting a rise in Iran's status at the expense of Saudi Arabia (Michael Slackman, "Arab Unrest Propels Iran as Saudi Influence Declines", The New York Times, 23 February 2011), Rami Khoury of the American University in Beirut wrote: "(Egypt) is likely to regain a regional role as the spearhead of a new pan-Arab identity anchored in the twin processes of genuine self-determination and a collective commitment to democratic governance that's deeply desired across the region. Critical will be the role played by rule-of- law institutions that Egypt pioneered nearly a century ago, including a free press, an independent judiciary, credible rather than sham constitutionalism, and dynamic institutions of civil society, human rights activism, lawyers and other professional associations" (Rami Khoury, "Eighteen Days that Shook the Middle East -- Part II," Yale Global Online, 16 February 2011). The rapid replication of elements of Tahrir in protests in Yemen, Bahrain and Libya was only one manifestation of the influence of the Egyptian model on the neighbourhood. More important were the changes in the standards of rights and politics in the region, the culture of power, as the Lotus Revolution terminated lifelong presidencies, the role of presidential sons, particularly inheriting political office, and prima donna first ladies. The marriage of money and power, the excesses of security forces, the manipulation of state media have become relics of the past. And Egypt's media, its literature, its art, released from the shackles of old fashioned rigid leaderships, may lead a new Arab renaissance. One can imagine an energised regional role, supporting reforms, engaging like-minded governments, renovating the language and actions of the Arab League. Further afield, one can see a louder critical voice raised against Israeli violations, more energy to the defence of democracy in Africa, and more courage in calling the West to account for applying double standards on human rights, nuclear proliferation and, more particularly, handling Tel Aviv. Much of the future impact of the Egyptian model will depend on the ability to turn revolution into a strong, working democracy. But the clock will not turn back. Power has become more diffuse in the region with other states playing active roles that need to be recognised and reconciled. The costs of a Nasserite type of activism are beyond Egypt's current and foreseeable means. Indeed, a healthier, pluralistic and inclusive regional system, allowing space for all actors, will help stabilise the region and, perhaps, move it towards more integration. Meanwhile, expert predictions abound. * The writer is director of Development Works (www.dev- works.org).
