On the 50th anniversary of the March 1954 crisis, Khaled Mohieddin told Galal Nassar that democracy has always been the weak point of post-revolutionary Egypt The Middle East is abuzz with political reform initiatives -- conferences and seminars, locally and regionally, are envisioning the way to democracy -- as if the region has never before thought of introducing a proper democratic system. But 50 years ago, Khaled Mohieddin, one of the key figures of the July 1952 Revolution and a member of the Free Officers, took a historic stand on the matter. Mohieddin, representing a group of officers, tried to persuade his colleagues at the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to take serious steps towards democracy, pluralism, the restoration of parliamentary life and the return of the army to the barracks. In the ensuing struggle, Mohieddin's faction was defeated and his supporters, including former President Mohamed Naguib, were excluded from power. What historians later dubbed "the March crisis" set the scene for Gamal Abdel-Nasser to take uncontested control of the country. Mohieddin, the former leader of the leftist Tagammu Party, stuck to his guns, insisting that the Free Officers fulfil the promises they made on the morning of 23 July 1952. Supported by the Cavalry (artillery) Corps, he took action. But the pro- parliamentary forces were defeated and Mohieddin was removed from office and exiled for two years. Nonetheless, his deep friendship with Abdel- Nasser endured against all odds. On the 50th anniversary of the March 1954 crisis, Mohieddin spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly of the events of days so crucial to the history of Egypt and the Arab world. He commented on the memoirs written by key Free Officers, including Abdel-Latif El- Baghdadi, and on the US-UK role during the crisis. Mohieddin refused to theorise on what the current situation would be like if the pro-democracy forces had won the power struggle half a century ago. Not a man to cry over spilled milk, he said that there is no place for "What if?" in history. Events unfold as they do because the objective circumstances of the moment weigh in favour of the victorious, Mohieddin added. But this is a lesson that he had yet to learn in 1954. "I imagined that since I had raised the slogan of democracy and plurality, standing for the principle that people should govern themselves, that the vast majority of Egyptians would fight for a government by the majority, by free elections. [I imagined] that this was the main demand of the nation, and that the call for democracy would resonate among the people, but what happened, as I discovered through the comments of my wife, was otherwise ... during the crisis, she told me: 'By the way, Khaled, I have been meeting with members of your family and mine for the past few days ... and I found out that most people do not support you. They keep saying: What is the story of the elections and parties that your husband wants to restore to us ... we are happy to find a strong man to rule the country and reform it.'" This, Mohieddin said, mirrors the division that happened amongst the ruling elite. "The populist leadership of the labour movement supported the slogan: 'revolution first, then democracy.' I stood for 'democracy and revolution together.' It transpired that the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council) was more capable of persuading the citizens -- for several reasons -- that it was in control. It succeeded because the public opinion was on its side. Political parties were not popular because the vast majority was on the side of 'revolution first, then democracy', not 'revolution and democracy together'. It was no coincidence that the matter of democracy was put off in Egypt. Democracy was the weak point in the course of the July revolution, and it still is." In his memoirs, Now I Speak, Mohieddin relates the story of fellow Free Officer Salah Salem who sent his servant to go shopping in the market. The servant was unable to carry out his chores, as merchants were refusing to sell him anything, in protest of Salem's opposition to Mohamed Naguib and parliamentary life. There were several major labour unions in favour of parliamentary life, suggesting that perhaps a majority of Egyptians were pro- democracy. But the move by El-Sawi Ahmed El- Sawi, chief of the federation of transport and railway workers -- the bribes he gave to the workers -- led to what can be described as a counter-coup against the drive to restore parliamentary life. However, various political activists, particularly the Wafdists and the Communists, stood by the call for the restoration of parliamentary life, said Mohieddin. The university stood firmly by democracy, as did the Bar Association, "but I am speaking about the general public", said Mohieddin. There were trade unions that had a democratic inclination, but could not make their voices heard. In the first days of the revolution, the masses were on Naguib's side. But with time, the masses lost their enthusiasm for Naguib and stood by the revolution, acting under the impression that those who wanted democracy did not want the revolution. Public opinion did sympathise with Naguib because he was the leader, but it did not want the revolution to end. True animosity to the restoration of parties was palpable. Did the Wafd Party represent the majority of Egyptians? "I saw pro-Wafd demonstrations in Alexandria," says Mohieddin, "but I also saw other protests against parties, with people chanting, 'no parties, no more'." Was Naguib serious in his call for the restoration of democracy and parliamentary life? Was Naguib to blame for the rejection of such a call, or should other parties be blamed? "In the period preceding the March 1954 crisis I stood completely alone ... even Naguib stood with the rest of the RCC members against any democratic change and against me in person ... I could say with a clear conscience that Naguib back then was one of those most enthusiastic for the RCC monopoly on power, all power. This was the point of view of many of the Free Officers, but Naguib bears a major responsibility, for he was pushing things in this direction, using his position as RCC president. Also responsible in this regard ... is the Muslim Brotherhood who instigated and continued to clamour against parliamentary life and political parties, so as to impose their control on the revolution ... then things turned against them. Here we have also to recall that political parties did not offer resistance, not even minimal, to the blows coming their way ... their manner of surrender was both puzzling and disappointing," said Mohieddin. What was the position of the US and UK on these developments? "Days after the overthrow of King Farouk, we received a dinner invitation at the house of Abdel-Moneim Amin (one of the new five members who had then just joined the RCC) along with the US Ambassador to Cairo Jefferson Caffery. We went, Naguib, Abdel- Nasser, El-Baghdadi, Abdel-Hakim Amer, Salah Salem and I .... During the dinner, the [US] embassy's political adviser spoke to me, attacking the Wafd mercilessly, saying that the problem with Wafd is that it submits to public pressure and that, as a result of that submission, it abrogated the 1936 treaty and sanctioned armed struggle. Such a climate, he said, encourages communism." Mohieddin continues, "the two major powers, the US and Britain, were not enthusiastic about the Wafd's [potential] return to power. The abrogation of the 1936 treaty and the armed struggle made America unwilling to repeat the experience. Also, parliamentary life could give a boost to the left and to communism. The Americans were against the return of parliamentary life in its old form ... at the same time, the Egyptian middle class was all for the revolution. The politicised section of that class was against 23 July and military rule. But the overwhelming majority, particularly the non-politicised -- and were many of these -- did not support parliamentary life." Some key civilian figures wanted the reinstatement of political life postponed. It was surprising for Mohieddin to see leading experts on constitutional law, people who talked for long about the constitution and parliament, prodding the Free Officers to postpone the election, to ban a session of the Wafd-dominated parliament, and to put off the matter of democracy. Abdel-Razeq El- Sanhuri, Soleiman Hafez and Ali Maher all asked the Free Officers to ignore parliament and the constitution. A majority of the Free Officers listened approvingly, for they knew it was in their own interest to run the country themselves. "I was astonished to see El-Sanhuri Pasha use the Agrarian Reform Law -- which gave every peasant five feddans -- as a pretext to discourage any move to democracy. He said, 'If your aim is to win the nation over through this law -- a law whose outcome is not going to show before five or six years -- why would you want to hold elections in February, at the end of the transitional period?'" Most of those who surrounded the revolution, the advisers and the political powers, sought the continuation of military rule and opposed democracy and the parliament. Along with El-Sanhuri and Soleiman Hafez, Fathi Radwan and Sayyid Sabri, the latter a professor of constitutional law, expressed the same opinion. The Muslim Brotherhood also supported this approach, perhaps hoping that once all other political parties disappeared, it would be in a position to hijack the revolution. Abdel-Latif El-Baghdadi, in his memoirs, questions the position of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and whether his initial commitment to democracy and parliamentary life was a matter of conviction or a mere gimmick. Interestingly, El- Baghdadi admits that even as he wrote his memoirs, he had no answer. Mohieddin has one. "In the beginning, Abdel-Nasser was committed to the Free Officers programme calling for the creation of a national front of the parties and national forces that oppose imperialism and seek liberation and independence. So, he wanted the Wafd back, because it is impossible to have democracy without the Wafd. Then the experts -- foremost State Council President Abdel-Razeq El-Sanhuri, State Council Deputy President Soleiman Hafez, and those from the Al-Fallah (peasant) Society and Al-Ruwwad (pioneers) Society -- convinced him that it would be very unusual for someone to take power and then hand it over to others. They said: Why don't the Free Officers stay in power for a number of years, three or four, for example, and then hold elections, by which time the situation would have improved ... and they said: Because the revolution has popular support, it does not need parliamentary life to survive. The way people cheered Mohamed Naguib and the revolution figures when they toured the northern part of the country in October and November 1952 was impressive. Abdel-Nasser said then, 'this is the Egyptian people that does not care for parties and such matters ... and they stand by us.' Abdel-Nasser reckoned that the vast majority of Egyptians supported reform, not parties. Abdel-Nasser first won support among ministers and then rallied the RCC members around him in a confrontation with Naguib, as Naguib began rebelling against RCC decisions ... Abdel-Nasser was initially committed to democracy. Then he started acting as if staying in power was what mattered. The call to democracy was one of the weapons he used to convince the masses that he should stay in power until democracy was achieved. Abdel-Nasser made a point of keeping the hope for democracy alive in the hearts of citizens." "When problems started, Abdel-Nasser decided that the survival of the revolution is the first priority and that democracy comes second. At one point, he submitted his resignation in protest against the way in which the Guardianship Council was formed, because the way in which this was done suggested that parliamentary life was not going to be restored. But when his colleagues went to him at home, he withdrew the resignation, although nothing changed ... nothing suggesting that parliamentary life is to be restored." And this is not the only serious charge Mohieddin makes. In his memoirs, he claims that Abdel-Nasser plotted bombings in various parts of Cairo during the March crisis. El-Baghdadi corroborates the same charge in his own memoirs, citing six instances of bombings. Why would Abdel-Nasser do that? "Abdel-Nasser wanted to prove that Mohamed Naguib is throwing the country in chaos, and that if Naguib were to stay and Abdel-Nasser to go, the result would be utter chaos. This much Lutfi Wake, a senior Free Officer who served as presidential chief of staff at one point, confided to me." But what about the escalating crisis and the signs of division within the army? Mohieddin remembered the scene vividly. "When I returned from meeting Mohamed Naguib, having notified him of the RCC decision that I take over as prime minister and that he return as president of a parliamentary republic (a ceremonial post, for Abdel-Nasser said he was not prepared to do business with Naguib, but could negotiate with Mohieddin), I went into the army command and found the officers enraged. One officer refused to shake my hand, another swore at me, a third turned his back to me. I went into the command room and it was full of officers. An artillery officer, named Rabie Abdel-Ghani, came to me and took me by the collar, saying, 'this is the man who messed it all up.' Others joined in the assault, then Gamal Salem came and pushed them away, kicking them. Abdel-Hakim Amer also came to my help, and both told the officers to stay away from me. The headquarters of the Cavalry Corps was across from that of the Army Command, but I was prevented from crossing to that Corps, which was under siege at the time. We heard planes roaring overhead, and Abdel-Hakim asked those around, 'who ordered the planes to fly?' Ali Sabri said: 'I did'. All our thinking at the moment focussed on avoiding clashes between army divisions. I offered to go to the Cavalry Corps to cool down the situation and Abdel-Hakim agreed, but Military Police Chief Ahmed Anwar prevented me from going. "Then we held a meeting of the RCC, at the time situated next to Abdel-Hakim Amer at the Army Command. The RCC decided right away to cancel the decision that a cabinet was to be formed by Mohieddin and that Naguib was to go back as a ceremonial president. My position was clear and I had conveyed it to Naguib, asking him to accept the offer and telling him that authority should be in the hand of a prime minister selected through parliamentary majority. I told Naguib, 'either you accept or refuse... you're no longer in power, and it is best to accept, for you have no other way.'" But was it Abdel-Nasser who masterminded this rebellion in the RCC against Naguib? "Abdel-Nasser was a born tactician. Before meetings, he would know how things stand and assess things ... who is to stand by him and who is to oppose him. He would conduct his contacts on that basis. In other words, he would make a lobby and then control the RCC. What he wanted he knew how to get." In his memoirs, Abdel-Latif Al- Baghdadi claims that Abdel- Nasser spent 4,000 pounds to entice groups hostile to parliamentary life to spring into action during the March crisis. Mohieddin supports this claim. "When I returned from abroad in 1956, and in my first meeting with Abdel-Nasser, he showed me photos of the protests against Naguib and Mohieddin in the March 1954 crisis. I said, 'why are you showing me these pictures?' He said, 'these are the answer to what the Cavalry Corps did, to its backing of Naguib and parliamentary life. I asked, 'how much have these protests cost you?' He said, 'four thousand pounds.'" Mohieddin, a man with 60 years of hard political experience behind him, finally offers his own take on the March crisis. "Knowing what the public wants is the key to the success of any political effort. It is not what you want that you work on, but what the people want. It was supposed that the mere call for 'democracy, pluralism, and proper parliamentary life' would win the masses, but it appeared that the people had other considerations in mind. The peasants had no longer to dismount when they saw the mayor coming, and they liked that. What the people think is what matters. The Egyptian people, back then, were hungry for justice, and they sensed the tendency of the July Revolution (for justice) and they weren't willing to risk a reversal of this tendency. The masses were comparing the July Revolution with the ousted regime. My main focus was that the revolution come first, and then be reinforced by democracy, but the people thought otherwise."
