As Islamists enter post-revolutionary politics, they may not be able to control the outcome as they wish, writes Ayman El-Amir* Protests and revolutionary movements that rocked several Arab countries in the past four months had Islamist partners who are poised to play an important role in the post-revolutionary system. Like other members of the wider protest community that toppled decadent autocracies, they have more than an equal stake in scrapping the regimes that oppressed and persecuted them and in shaping a new era of political change. However, unlike other partners they are largely captive of a single- minded ideology that places them at odds with the more liberal forces of society, the challenge they face is whether they should stick persistently to their time- honoured ideological dogma and try to dominate the new momentum for socio-political change or accept being a team player in a large field and the compromises that go with it. Revolutions have been consummated in Egypt and Tunisia, are in full swing in Libya and Yemen, are making progress in Syria, Algeria and Jordan, and are still lurking in Bahrain despite setbacks. The Islamist factor is strongly present and is sometimes leading the protest movement. In Egypt it is the Muslim Brotherhood; in Tunisia it is the Islamic Renaissance Movement; in Jordan it is the Islamic Action Front; in Yemen it is the National Coalition for Reform; in Algeria it is the Islamic Salvation Front; in Morocco it is the Justice and Development Party, and in Syria the clandestine Muslim Brotherhood is on the frontline. In the state of revolutionary fervour all forces coalesced around the paramount objective of overthrowing the old regime. When the dust settles they will eventually pursue their separate orientations of implementing the change they sought. As was the case in previous revolutions they may clash, split or compromise on their way to develop the new society they aspire to. Police state regimes exemplified by the case of Egypt and Tunisia, and ideologically stiff secular regimes as in Syria and previously in Iraq, blocked political Islam for decades. Islamic forces lay in abeyance, or were secretly active until the revolution gave them a legitimate voice. When they emerged on the scene they found themselves partners in a revolutionary coalition creating a new political direction. They can either merge with broader governments of national unity to steer their relative countries or try to dominate the scene and forge a national consensus led by their religious ideology. They are better organised, hardened by experience, competent in mobilising the masses and have wide networks of followers and sympathisers. Islamic precepts have broad appeal at the grassroots level that is readily available to build on. The former Mubarak regime in Egypt was incensed by and strictly banned the Muslim Brotherhood's election slogan "Islam is the Solution" although it hardly translated into any meaningful political programme. On occasion, they found it convenient to strike a deal with the ruling National Democratic Party as they did during the first round of parliamentary elections organised in November 2010 before they found they were cheated and boycotted the second round in December. Compromise is not part of the political ideology of hard-line Muslims today any more than it was to old-time communists of the past or the contemporary Baathists of Syria. The ideology of a single party that professes to represent the consensus of the broad masses still persists. The Islamic faith has its sway in the Arab region and in some non-Arab countries in Asia and Africa. It remains the fastest growing religion in the world, particularly in Europe. In the Arab world it has clearly replaced the political ideology of Arab nationalism of the 1960s, relegating it to the realm of romantic mythology. It has developed into the most effective antithesis to Western imperialist globalism and to coercive socialist dictatorship at home. Nationalism has been wrapped in a religious mantle that is more inclusive and more resilient. That partly explains why its manifestations are so vehemently resisted in the West while it was mobilised to confront and eventually expel the Soviet occupation force in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The question to come will be what shade of political Islam will dominate in the post-revolutionary era? Sunni Islam has long been the dominant religious doctrine and background political culture in the Arab world. However, fundamentalist Wahhabism, jihadist Al-Qaeda and the retrospective Salafis are part of Sunnism. When it comes to political competition, the more radical Sunnis will tend to upstage moderate ones, casting those who differ with their radical interpretations of Islamic theology and worldly affairs as apostates. This is what happened in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s when fundamentalist groups like Islamic Jihad, Islamic Group and Takfir wal Hijira argued that the state and society were living in a state of jahiliyyah or in ignorance of divine guidance. That was accompanied by a wave of assassinations and political violence to restore society back to the state of true religion. In Algeria, the military abolished the 1992 parliamentary elections that were swept by Islamists, unleashing a decade of bloodshed in which political opponents and state figures were assassinated and innocent farmers in outlying areas were indiscriminately slaughtered in their sleep. In recent weeks, the Salafis who have long been dormant in Egypt staged a strong political and religious comeback, taking -- in some examples -- the law into their own hands. A group of Salafis meted out cruel punishment to individuals they believed have offended society and deserved the enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia justice. Muslims in general, including those who live in secular states like Syria, are not opposed to governance guided by Islamic code. Intellectual debate on the merits of the secular state does not go far beyond think tanks and closed circles of political analysts. In this context, the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood has historically taken the lead in matters of religion and was an influential force in matters of politics and social affairs since it was founded in the late 1920s. That is not to say that it was not, at times, amenable to political pressure or compromise. During the 25 January Revolution it announced in advance that it would not participate in the uprising. It was not until 2 February, during the Battle of the Camel that the Muslim Brotherhood's young elements showed up in force to organise protesters and defend Tahrir Square's tumultuous gathering from pro-Mubarak hoodlums. The Muslim Brotherhood has recently founded its first political organisation, the Freedom and Justice Party. This proposition has one advantage and two disadvantages. First, it will be able to contest elections like any other secular party but with a religious silhouette that assures it of a huge following of the faithful. However, it will be playing a political game on a levelled field, unprotected by the guiding dictum of "conformity and obedience" -- the controlling principle of the members of the Brotherhood. It will be subject to political challenge, criticism, opposition and internal controversy. Secondly, as a political party with a balanced programme for political, social and economic change it will be the target of theological snipers from other ultra-religious organisations, both public and clandestine. Its religious springboard for a non-religious party, as the newly issued Electoral Code insists, will prove both a liability and a restrictive factor. Even in decades old secular Tunisia and Baath- controlled autocratic Syria Muslims organisations, usually an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, find in the mass protests and new revolutionary spirit a liberating factor. They are tempted to lead, mobilise and influence the direction of the revolution or rebellious movement. In the current state of revolutionary turmoil religious-oriented mass organisations are stepping into uncharted territory where they will be judged by unconventional political standards they may not be able to control. * The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
