For Syria, this year brought mixed results, with some successes in warming relations with other states, and many failures in addressing domestic problems, writes Bassel Oudat in Damascus This year, Syria was able to partially come out of its isolation. While it was able to warm cool relations with some Arab and European countries, and decrease the negative effects of the political and economic boycott by the US and other European and Arab countries, it was unable to restore its Arab and international relations to their past glory. Re-entering the political scene was a breakthrough for Syria, nonetheless, and it sought to play the regional role it was prevented from playing since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri and the exit of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Its relationship with some Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, sharply deteriorated at this time, as did ties with the US and the European Union. On the other hand, this year was perhaps the most difficult for Syrian citizens, with the Syrian regime unable to redress a number of key domestic economic, political and social problems. Syria's foreign policy troubles began when the UN Security Council asked Syria in 2004 to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. The situation was compounded with Al-Hariri's assassination a year later, at a time when Syria was the most influential player inside Lebanon. It was accused by some circles of masterminding the assassination, who then demanded that it withdraw its troops. These demands were supported by major Arab capitals, especially Cairo and Riyadh, as well as the US and European countries, especially France. Syria's failures continued after it was isolated by Arab states and the US recalled its ambassador to Damascus. Washington also imposed economic sanctions on Damascus and some Syrian officials, while Europeans refused to visit there and Syria became isolated and under siege. But in 2010, Syrian-Saudi relations witnessed a breakthrough, with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad visiting Saudi Arabia for the third time. And in August King Abdullah visited Damascus, promptly taking Al-Assad on a surprise visit to Lebanon. Syria described the meeting as "historic" and the trip succeeded on two fronts: first, it restored relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia; and second, it reconnected Syria with Lebanon under Saudi auspices. Lebanese politicians no longer refer to Syria as an enemy. Many speak of special relations between the two countries. Indeed, in 2010 Syria opened its doors to Lebanese politicians who were hostile to it in the past. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri visited Damascus several times and his personal relationship with Al-Assad became warm and friendly. The same happened with Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader and head of the Socialist Progressive Party. The prime ministers of both countries signed together 17 economic cooperation agreements. Syria was also successful with its neighbour to the north, Turkey, which signed 51 cooperative agreements with Damascus, the latter gaining Ankara's support in its position on negotiations with Israel. Syria also made some progress in relations with Russia, with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev visiting Damascus. At the same time, Syria revived ties with South American states during Al-Assad's tour of Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and Cuba, which the Syrian leadership described as the launch of a new foreign policy. Countering this Syrian progress has been a number of failures, including unchanged US-Syrian relations. Syria could not persuade the US to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Damascus, either by sponsoring Syrian-Israeli talks, retracting some economic sanctions against Syria, or sending back the US ambassador to Damascus. Syria's failure on this track caused sanctions to be renewed for one more year, and disputed issues continue to disrupt bilateral relations. Washington still views Damascus as a supporter of extremist Palestinian groups and terrorist groups in Iraq, as well as interfering in Lebanese affairs and being an ally of Iran. On the European front, relations warmed up during the year, as visits by European politicians to Damascus increased and France appointed a special envoy for Middle East peace. Nonetheless, this progress did not result in tangible actions beyond pleasantries. Syria was unable to persuade the Europeans to allow it to join the Union for the Mediterranean, or to strengthen ties in a substantial sense. The visit by Al-Assad to Paris also failed to secure support for Syria's role in Lebanon, postpone indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, or pressure Israel on peace negotiations. Accordingly, while ties with Europe improved, problems remain. Furthermore, Syria was unable to move the stalled Syrian-Israeli track in the peace process because it could not convince the US administration to sponsor talks, while both sides continue to threaten each other. Making matters worse, a decision by the Israeli Knesset subjects any peace deal to a referendum. This makes it impossible to reach a settlement and more difficult to hold talks with Israel. Syria failed to adopt a new strategy to deal with these developments. Russia welcomed closer ties with Syria but Damascus failed to persuade the Russian military establishment to sell advanced weapons to Syria, or alter Moscow's quasi-neutral position towards Israel. The two sides have yet to agree on whether the Russian Navy will use the Mediterranean port of Tartous as a military base, something that Damascus is pressing for. It is clear that Syria is incapable of achieving the goals of its relationship with Russia. On Iraq, the outcome in 2010 was a mixed bag. Damascus succeeded in making Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki recant accusations against Syria, end his hostilities towards it, and even visit there in a bid of friendship. But Syria's failure came when after supporting Iyad Allawi as nominee to lead the Iraqi government it folded under Iranian pressure and accepted Al-Maliki in his place. As a result, wide sections in Iraq were upset and disappointed with Damascus -- mostly Sunnis in Iraq. In this way, Iranian pressure pushed back the rising role of Syria in Iraq. Ties between Syria and the Palestinians also cooled after Al-Assad and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas quarrelled at the Sirte summit in Libya in September over the follow-up committee to the Arab Peace Initiative. Damascus still refuses to receive Abbas and has some concerns about dialogue between Fatah and Hamas on Palestinian reconciliation. But the biggest fiasco of Syrian foreign policy in 2010 was its failure to convince Cairo, and President Hosni Mubarak in particular, to restore relations to normalcy. While Damascus put a lot of serious and intense effort to this end, with the mediation of Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah and others, it was unsuccessful. Relations between the two countries remain tense despite Syria's hopes to revive and warm ties quickly. Domestically, there was an increase in problems challenging the Syrian government. Economic conditions worsened and open market policies resulted in a drop in Syrian industrial and agricultural production, price hikes, a rise in unemployment to 20 per cent, and increased poverty. Meanwhile, the regime did not find a formula for a relationship with the opposition, the security forces tightened their grip, and arrests of opinion-makers rose. At the same time, the government did not implement the decisions of the 2005 congress of the ruling Baath Party, calling for abrogating arbitrary laws, amending emergency laws, revising publishing laws and issuing a law to regulate political parties. Meanwhile, the next congress is approaching quickly.
