By Ibrahim Nafie Intensive contacts aimed at convening an Arab summit to discuss recent developments in the Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli peace process, are currently underway. Several pressing issues militate towards the summit, most significant, perhaps being the Israeli government's concerted attempts over the past two years to thwart the peace process. The government of Binyamin Netanyahu has left no stone unturned in its efforts to undermine the agreements signed with the Palestinians by previous Israeli governments. Since the Arabs have committed themselves to peace as a strategic option, an Arab summit is necessary in order to determine the best means to force the Israeli government to abide by its contractual obligations to the Palestinians. The exigencies of joint Arab endeavor and inter-Arab relations also render a summit meeting necessary. Should, then, the summit be restricted to exclusively addressing the peace process, or should it be expanded to take account of issues arising from inter-Arab reconciliation and Arab economic cooperation. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. Restricting the agenda to a single issue would enable the participants to focus their efforts, rendering greater force to the resolutions produced by the summit. Such focus also ensures that the participants do not get sidetracked by other issues, however pressing. Planning for an expanded agenda is much more involved, considering the number and diversity of issues that need to be discussed, and might make it impossible to push forward with the summit as quickly as we might want. Another important factor in setting an agenda involves the relationship of the proposed summit to previous Arab summits. Is the forthcoming summit to adopt entirely new positions or is to be an extension of earlier summits, notably the Cairo summit of 1996? Conversely, if the proposed summit does not aim to reformulate Arab positions, why should we hold it in the first place? Certainly, the resolutions adopted by the Cairo summit are sufficiently comprehensive. They treated all aspects of the Arab-Israeli peace process as well as inter-Arab cooperation and they remain valid. The very format of the summit has already been the subject of lengthy deliberation. Is it to be a full scale summit attended by all Arab parties or a mini-summit restricted to those countries directly involved in the Arab-Israeli negotiating process. Naturally, if the agenda is to comprise a full range of issues concerning joint Arab endeavours, a full scale summit would appear the logical solution. Conversely, if it is to be restricted to the peace process, the latter format would be seem in order. Moreover, if we opt for the mini-summit format, is it to be considered a prelude to an expanded Arab summit? Such an option appears particularly compelling as the show of unanimity offered by an expanded summit following on the heels of a mini-summit would lend greater force to any resolutions adopted. Of equal importance to the summit planners, regardless of the format, is whether the issues on the agenda should be resolved prior to its meeting or whether the summit itself should serve as the forum for solving these problems. It would appear desirable to reach a minimal level of Arab consensus over the issues prior to the summit. Summit meetings rarely offer sufficient time for Arab leaders to voice their points of view on the many issues before them and then to reach agreement over their joint positions on these issues. Perhaps, therefore, it would be appropriate to follow the model of other regional and international organisations The EU, for example, entrusts special committees with the task of studying, delineating and reaching consensus on a variety of issues prior to convening a summit, freeing the participants of the summit to engage in the task of ratifying their resolutions and determining the agenda of future cooperative endeavours. On the other hand, a summit may be better suited to reaching any understanding given that Arab leaders are more capable acting with speed than are ministerial or technical committees. Timing, too, is one of the most important considerations. Should a summit be held as soon as possible, or should we wait until we see the results of the US diplomatic initiative? There remains, naturally, the most vital question of what we expect the summit to accomplish. Certainly it is to be hoped that it might contribute to intensifying Arab diplomatic efforts aimed at elucidating the Arab position on the peace process, exposing the intransigence of the Israeli government and working to isolate Netanyahu internationally. In this context, one of the summit's tasks should be to create an Arab presidential delegation, consisting of Arab heads of state, that would engage in a round of visits to major nations in support of the Palestinian cause and the Syrian and Lebanese positions. Such a delegation would concentrate its efforts on the US administration in order to urge it to exert pressure on Israel in order to compel it to take a more positive stance towards the peace process. If, indeed, the creation of a presidential delegation is to be one of the tasks of the summit, the summit should be held relatively quickly, prior to the next round of congressional elections, since the electoral climate in the US could provide an excellent opportunity to impress upon the US administration and public that US influence and interests in the Middle East are at risk as long as Israeli obstinacy persists.
