By Galal Nassar The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported last week that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has secretly agreed to add $1.35 billion to Israel's military spending over the next five years after a decade of falling defense expenditures. A day earlier, Netanyahu announced that he had agreed to a request from Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai for a boost in military spending as part of the government's 1999 budget, but he provided no figures. The funds are reportedly to be earmarked exclusively for "strategic purposes," notably to cope with the threat of non-conventional weapons which Israel claims are possessed or being developed by Iran and some Arab states. The reports on Israel's budget increase came only a few weeks after Israel's announcement that it has acquired three German nuclear-powered submarines capable of carrying surface-to-land missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. This announcement has provoked diverse reactions at the official and popular levels within the Middle East countries neighbouring Israel. The Washington Post, which published a detailed report on the deal, said that Israel obtained these submarines in order to protect its nuclear arsenal from potential attack and to launch reprisal strikes. Ha'aretz reported that Bonn is footing the bill for two out of three of the submarines and that Israel only has to pay for one. The news of the deal coincided with reports of a comprehensive overhaul of the Israeli navy. These forces have recently been supplied with an Israeli-manufactured "Jaffa" advanced missile carrier which supports eight Harpoon and six Gabriel launchers. At the same time, Israel radio announced that Israeli Minister of Defense Yitzhak Mordechai will soon be signing a memorandum with Pentagon officials to allocate an additional $45 million so as to enable Israel to develop its third Arrow-2 anti-missile defense system. These reports on Israeli arms buildups need to be seen against the backdrop of the fundamental features of Israeli military thinking. Both in the past as in the present, the Israeli defence outlook has been imbued with a strong militarism engendered by the nature of the founding of the Zionist state, its demographic, geographic and social composition, and the character of its international relations. Israel's primary strategic problem is its limited strategic depth, a consideration that has affected the military outlook of the state and, consequently, the strategy of its defense policy. Thus, Israel had to come up with an ambitious security plan which, according to military experts, is based on five main principles. Although the means by which to implement this plan have been subject to modification and innovation, its objectives remain essentially unchanged. The first principle is secure borders, a notion that has continuously preoccupied Israeli leaders due to the disparity between the official boundaries of the state and the area under its control. Thus, prior to 1967, secure borders depended upon the provision of an effective intelligence and mobilisation system to be able to confront several Arab countries on different fronts. Following 1967, the notion of secure borders was modified to accommodate the desire for territorial expansion. This involved convincing the international community that the occupied territories were essential to Israel's national security and that, hence, it could not afford to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders. The second and most essential pillar of the Israeli security concept is the possession and deployment of military superiority. Ironically, the highest levels of Israeli armament buildups in both traditional and non-traditional weaponry occurred in the period following the conclusion of peace agreements with Israel. The third principle of Israel's defense outlook is to link itself strategically to international powers capable of guaranteeing its security. By lending itself to these powers' interests in the changing climate of international relations and with regard to specific areas of conflict, Israel has been able to secure for itself the most up-to-date war materiel as well as the highest levels of economic aid and political support. The volume of US strategic cooperation with Israel and the American government's absolute pro-Israeli bias speak for themselves. Promoting the immigration of Jews around the world to Israel is not only a basic tenet of the Zionist movement. It figures in this context as the fourth constituent of Israel's security philosophy: a renewable source of manpower to staff the Israeli army. The last, but not least, pillar of Israel's security philosophy is the need to fragment the Arabs, a tenet derived from the lessons of the 1973 October War, during which Israel was pitted against a successful joint Syrian-Egyptian campaign. Israel continues to adhere to this way of thinking, although the current climate generated by the peace talks has altered its tactics. Other recent international changes have also forced Israel to carry out some readjustment in its military strategy, in addition to the above-mentioned tenets. These changes included the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War which meant for major Arab powers the loss of an important strategic ally; the deepening of Israel's relations with the US under America's sole hegemony over the new international order; the development of Israel's relations with other influential world powers, such as China, India, and the countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America; and the intensification of West's campaign to control traditional and non-traditional armaments systems and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in a manner that simultaneously conforms with their interests and maintains Israel's technological superiority and its status as the sole nuclear power in the Middle East. In light of the above, the primary foundations of current Israeli military strategy may be summed up as follows: -- The provision of an early warning system, relying on an integrated network consisting of the most advanced technology in this domain and on the technological capabilities made available to Israel by its allies (the Horizon satellite, the US strategic warning system, stationary or mobile electronic warfare equipment, pilotless aircraft, intelligence); -- Maintaining Israel's regional nuclear monopoly and other non-traditional deterrent capabilities. This is manifested in Israel's possession of approximately 100 Jericho missiles, its drive to develop the Jericho-3 to reach a range of 2,000 kilometres, and its possession of tactical Lance missiles; -- Active defence which depends on the possession of anti-ballistic weaponry and warning systems (Patriot missiles, pilotless aircraft, fighter planes, the US radar network); -- Absolute air superiority, currently based on the possession of approximately 700 fighter planes, in addition to anti-armour helicopters, and medium-range transport planes and helicopters. In addition, approximately 80 per cent of the Israeli airforce is of the latest technology, dependent upon a strong core of F-15 and F-16 warplanes most of which can travel long distances at night and can refuel in flight, increasing the range and diversity of their theatres of operation; -- The possession of advanced traditional fighting forces. Israel's strategy is to maintain 15 armoured and mechanised infantry divisions, 4,000 tanks, a sustained and highly precise fire-power and the capacity for night combat; -- Securing the domestic front, a consideration that has acquired increasing importance since the Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War. In spite of the limited damage caused by the 39 Scud missiles, strategic planners have realised that it has become essential to protect Israel's backyard, in light of its increasing vulnerability to Arab missile attacks. Moreover, Israel's objective in maintaining a nuclear deterrent monopoly has been evident and remains unchanged since the 1960s, when the Israeli government first began to leak hints of its possession of nuclear warheads. This is to intimidate the Arabs into making political and strategic concessions. The question remains, however, as to when Israel would actually have recourse to the nuclear option against its Arab neighbours. In light of the elements of Israeli strategy outlined above, one might conceive three scenarios in which Israel might unleash, or threaten to unleash, its nuclear arsenal. The first would be to deter the Arabs from contemplating the military option in order to liberate occupied territory or from using their ballistic missiles against targets inside Israel. The second would be to deter an Islamic country such as Pakistan from assisting an Arab country in launching a nuclear arms programme. The third would be to blackmail the US into continuing to meet Israel's political and material demands.
