Change of focus

With the imminent changing nature of US assistance to Egypt from an aid to trade basis, Egypt needs to lobby US policy-making circles in order to redefine its status in US economic and political relations, writes Manar El-Shorbagy*
US foreign aid has, for years, occupied considerable space in Egypt's public debate. The aid programme has provided an excellent launching point to reflect on the status of Egyptian-American relations. Recently, with the anticipated cuts in aid, more discussions have focused on future relations between the two countries.
However, one of the most noticeable deficiencies of this public debate is that it scarcely addresses the foreign aid decision-making process in the US. On the few occasions in which this dimension was discussed, the tendency was to highlight how the White House, and maybe other executive branch agencies, handle the issue. The US legislature -- Congress -- is almost totally absent in these discussions. With the impending shift in the nature of US aid to Egypt from aid to trade, it is particularly essential to fully consider the expanded role played by the US Congress in foreign assistance.
It is understandable why Congress has been overlooked. After all, successive administrations have always "proposed" the aid package, which is then passed largely unchanged by Congress. But the fact that Congress chooses not to use its constitutional "power of the purse" by no means implies that it is not in possession of the most potent weapon that shapes foreign policy. Congress has the power to increase funds above White House requests, refuse funds for certain programmes and policies, place conditions on the use of funds, or terminate existing programmes altogether. Indeed, Congress has frequently used all of these tools.
That Congress chooses not to take any such measures in the case of Egypt tells a great deal about Egyptian-American relations and provides valuable insight into the impact of the legislative dimension on those ties.
Generally speaking, the US Congress began using its "power of the purse" to shape foreign policy only after the Vietnam War. The executive branch's handling of the war and its decisions on other foreign commitments prompted Congress to protect its constitutional prerogatives in foreign policy decision-making. Since then, Congress has loaded the annual foreign aid authorisation and appropriation bills with policy directives and restrictions on the president's use of aid to set foreign policy goals. Earmarking -- specifying minimum and maximum amounts the administration can give to a certain country or programme -- has also been made use of by Congress.
During the post-Watergate and Vietnam era, the budgeting process witnessed considerable changes. The mid-1980s ushered in a new period of huge budget deficits in America, which had its impact on the annual budgeting process, including foreign aid appropriations.
Amidst all this, foreign aid to Egypt and Israel -- the two largest recipients of US assistance -- remained intact. Aid to both countries has survived the budget-cutting climate, the growing public disdain of foreign aid, the normally decentralised congressional decision-making process, in which several competing committees and subcommittees are involved, as well as the increasing involvement of several executive departments and agencies.
More so, the aid to Egypt and Israel has survived the end of the cold war, which deprived many bilateral aid programmes of the stated rationale of "containing communism."
There have always been different justifications for assistance to Egypt and Israel. For Israel, the aid rationale was treated as self-evident. In this case, US assistance has taken the shape of an entitlement and spilled outside the confines of the foreign aid budget, rendering its actual sums difficult to calculate. Besides the regular aid package to Israel, Congress occasionally approved supplemental assistance. The package is also free from the strings normally attached to US foreign aid. For example, Israel is allowed to use a portion of its military aid to buy locally-made equipment. USAID does not have an office in Israel because the assistance is not designated for special projects; Israel may use it in any way it deems fit, with no accounting requirements to be met.
Aid to Egypt, on the other hand, is encumbered, and only a small portion of it is in direct cash. Egypt's aid has been rationalised in terms of security-oriented geo-political goals. USAID states that Egypt plays "a pivotal role in US foreign policy in the Middle East." During earlier stages, the goal was to deepen Egypt's commitment to cooperate with the US in Middle Eastern affairs. Later, the very stability of Egypt has become a goal in itself. USAID's current statement makes clear that "a stable Egypt continues to be vital to the advancement of US goals in the region."
Besides, as the assistance to Egypt is not exempt of the usual strings, it has also been perceived as benefiting the US economy. In fact, a large amount of it is spent inside the US.
There has been a wide consensus among US decision-makers in both branches of government on the rationale behind aid to Egypt. Now that Egyptian-American talks are moving from the "aid" to the "trade" discourse, Congress is, more than ever before, at the heart of the decision-making process.
Although it is the US legislature that has the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations," US presidents once had a considerable role through "fast-track," granted by Congress according to the Trade Act of 1974. Fast-track requires the president to consult, notify and involve Congress, as he negotiates a trade agreement. The agreement, however, would only take effect after an implementing bill is enacted. Such a bill would be handled under an expedited congressional procedure, that is, fast-track, which includes deadlines, limits on debate and prohibition of amendments.
However, fast-track, among other issues, was hostage to the acrimonious battles between the Clinton administration and the US Congress. Congress denied the president its use, refusing to renew it when it expired.
The Bush administration is currently lobbying Congress to retain fast-track, a process which could take time, given the equally divided Senate and the priorities of the Bush legislative agenda. This could temporarily hamper US trade negotiations with foreign countries.
There have been times when presidents averted this hurdle by concluding "executive trade agreements." However, a very small percentage of such agreements is actually implemented without congressional approval. Moreover, while executive agreements have the force of law and do not require Senate approval, unlike treaties, they do not supersede US laws with which they conflict.
This all means that the shift from "aid to trade" necessitates more Egyptian attention to relations with Congress, which by no means implies lesser attention given to the executive branch. Rather, it denotes that Egypt needs to "redefine" its status in US policy-making circles on a totally new basis, putting forward a compelling new rationale to convince US law-makers that it is in the very interest of the US to enhance trade relations with Egypt.
In a congressional climate in which many countries compete in this area, it is not enough to simply rely on the US executive branch to lobby on Egypt's behalf.
* The writer is an expert on Egypt-US relations and a lecturer at the American University in Cairo.
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