America as catalyst

Fact and fiction in Arab economic development: 1950-2000
America as catalyst
In the second of a two-part study, Galal Amin argues that during the socialist era and beyond, Americanisation was the impetus for faster and greater change
WESTERNISATION IN THE AMERICAN ERA: Looking at Egyptian and Arab social development from a wider historical perspective, it is important to distinguish between the process of growth of the middle class and of westernisation before and after the Second World War. The process of westernisation of Egypt goes as far back as Mohamed Ali's efforts at modernisation and since then, the middle class has never ceased to grow after centuries of virtual stagnation. But the growth of the middle class in Egypt, as well as, of course, in other Arab countries, was exceedingly slow until the mid-20th century. So as well was the process of westernisation. Another important difference between the two periods has to do with the major external sources of westernisation, for what was European westernisation until mid-century, became predominantly American from that time onwards. This difference meant a great deal to the rate of change, some of its major characteristics, as well as to the nature of the domestic agents who administered this change.
For as with everything American, westernisation in the American style was inevitably faster than anything that went on before. After a century and a half of contact with Europe, western ways had hardly touched, by the mid-20th century, 80 per cent or more of the Arab rural population and Egyptian peasants, were, at mid-century, leading a pattern of life not easily distinguishable from that of the Ancient Egyptians. By the end of the century, however, and after only 50 years of the American era, Egyptian villagers enjoyed electric light and television programmes. To implement such rapid transformation, the old pattern of political life led by sophisticated politicians educated at British or French universities and with a genuine respect for the law and for the principles of the constitution, was obviously unsuitable and even a serious hindrance. Army officers seemed much more capable of doing the job and, in any case, they belonged to the very social class whose interests were now to be served.
But westernisation in the American era also showed other special features of its own. One should not get confused by the fact that Americanisation was proceeding under banners carrying very "un-American" slogans, such as comprehensive planning, public ownership of economic enterprises and import substitution policies. All such policies were necessary to accelerate a process that would have otherwise been too slow from the point of view of both westernisers and those being westernised. Foreign aid was also necessary to supply the needed infrastructure that would have been built much more slowly by private foreign investment.
All this was done under a much wider umbrella called "Economic Development," which was undoubtedly a post-World War II invention. What was previously often called "Colonial Administration" came to be called by this better sounding name; but both processes fulfilled basically the same function of westernising the "aliens" among whom the only beneficiaries were the middle classes.
WESTERNISATION BY STEALTH: "Economic Development" could have been done in many ways, not all necessarily fulfilling these two major functions: westernisation and the growth of the middle class. The greater satisfaction of basic human needs, for instance, could have been achieved with a minimum of westernisation, could have benefited mainly the poorest sections of the population, and would have been quite an adequate definition of "economic development." Instead, the increase in per capita income was selected as constituting the essence of economic development, and the rise in the rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product of the country as a whole was the most widely accepted goal. But GDP could grow rapidly and per capita income could show a significant increase while the basic needs of the really poor remain largely unsatisfied. Rapid growth of GDP and a rapid rise in per capita income are however, almost inconceivable without a big dose of westernisation and a rapid growth of the middle class.
A further distinguishing feature of the American era, as compared with the European, is that the dominant external power was now rich in agricultural resources when compared with Britain or France. Rather than needing to import precious agricultural products for food or manufacturing, the US had an embarrassing food surplus which it needed to dispose of. A good part of foreign aid was thus "food aid," and it may not have been a pure coincidence that in the economic development of almost all Arab countries, during most of the past 50 years, agriculture suffered serious neglect in favour of either industrial growth, mineral production, particularly oil, or a variety of services.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR A BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION?: All this was said to have been in response to a "Revolution of Rising Expectations," a slogan that is only partly justified. Like so many things done during the past 50 years in the name of the population as a whole (poor as well as rich), middle class expectations were presented as the aspirations of the whole country. Foreign aid was similarly given in the name of the poor who, in fact, benefited little from it. Armies were lavishly and expensively equipped for the avowed goal of protecting the country, but the main benefit from that vast expenditure went to a particular section of the middle class. This phenomenon is, however, neither new nor surprising. Marx famously noted, as long ago as the late 19th century, that the noble slogans of the French Revolution were little more than the expressions of bourgeois aspirations even though they were presented as expressing the sentiments and aspirations of all men. Thus, "Freedom" was merely the freedom of the bourgeoisie from the fetters imposed by the feudal lords, and the two other slogans of "Equality" and "Fraternity," in actual application, excluded the lower classes who did not possess the economic means to enjoy them. Marx proposed socialism to bring these highly desirable goals within the reach of the lower classes, but had he lived long enough he might have very well called the "socialist" regimes which attached themselves to his name, by the same name which he used for the principles of the French Revolution, that is, "Bourgeoisie Anecdotes." And he would have almost certainly found much in the Arab experiences of the last 50 years to deserve the same label.
Nor is this surprising. For the limits that material benefits could reach within any particular society at any particular time must be drawn not by the ideology of the class in power but, much more importantly, by the limits of the available technology which also determines the nature and quantity of goods and services in search of a market. Thus, the extent of the Arab middle classes that could be supported and encouraged under British and French rule in the late 19th and early 20th centuries could not have gone beyond what agricultural land could produce and what the British and French manufacturers were producing for export. The greater American and European surplus which was available for export in the second half of the 20th century, including capital as well as consumer goods, must have required and urged the expansion of the middle class, whether in Arab countries or elsewhere in the Third World. This must ultimately be the meaning of "Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries" which occupied so many people and filled so many pages during the past 50 years: essentially another "bourgeoisie anecdote."
THE ISLAMIC PROTEST: Nasser, as well as Lenin, must have meant something different: just like the inspirers of the French Revolution and all the other well-meaning advocates of greater equity. But the end results, in all cases, were at least from this point of view, disappointing. I have already suggested why this disappointment may have been almost inevitable. But it was also inevitable that the failure to put the noble slogans into effect should bring about violent protest from those whose aspirations had been aroused far beyond actual fulfillment. It was also to be expected that, like the aroused hopes themselves, protest would be expressed in a language that is far from being a faithful reflection of the real cause of discontent. For, since bourgeoisie aspirations were expressed as "economic development", or even sometimes as "socialism," the frustrations of the social groups who failed to rise up the economic and social ladder were expressed mainly in religious terms.
It is amazing how easily we seem to fall in the trap of mistaking an economic and social issue as an ideological one. Here again, a huge amount of effort has been spent trying to explain what is called an "Islamic revival," or the growth of "religious fanaticism," in ideological or intellectual terms while the economic and social factors are staring at our faces. A long history of "discrimination against Copts" is thus searched for and discovered in order to provide an explanation of the very recent eruption of ugly fights between Muslims and Copts, again ignoring the role of some obvious economic and social factors which are also relatively new. Similarly, school curricula, television programmes and new books and sermons by religious preachers are blamed for the growth of fanaticism when, in fact, all this could supply only the rhetoric but not the causes of the protest. Three decades of rapid population growth in an already very densely populated area, with a very sluggish growth of cultivated land as well as a very slow growth in remunerative employment opportunities, particularly in Upper Egypt, and coming after two decades of raising slogans of ambitious development plans and social justice for all, could have hardly failed to produce the phenomena of growing religious fanaticism and Muslim-Coptic hostilities.
It is also no accident that the unrest happened in the part of Egypt where western tourists have started to come in increasing numbers to visit Egyptian antiquities. Thus, a revolt against an increasingly bourgeoisie society, which became much more openly bourgeois from 1970 onwards, carried out by those sections of the population who came to realise that they have neither benefited nor have much hope of benefiting from the economic policies of the "bourgeois revolution", chose to express itself in non-economic terms. This again is not at all new, for history is full of examples of economic and social discontent expressed in ideological terms. In the Arab World, it was more apt to direct the attack against the other component of the bourgeois revolution, namely "westernisation." In such terms, the protest would acquire greater dignity, appear much less petty and allow the expression of a much greater variety of emotions.
The intellectual leaders of this religious protest need not themselves belong to the same marginalised classes. Some of them may indeed have had modest social origin, but some of the more sophisticated of these intellectual leaders had made some significant economic advances but for some reason or another chose to "betray" their own class. These latter intellectual leaders of the "Islamic revival" belonged mostly to middle-class families of professionals (lawyers, judges or university professors etc.) where their grudge against westernisation seems to have been inspired less by economic than by emotional reasons. Their strong stand in defence of "tradition" and their anger as they watch its rapid decline, seem to stem not from feelings of envy and spite at the rapidly westernising new middle class, but from nostalgia for the good old days which happen also to be the days when their own families enjoyed higher social status. Thus, a large number of people seem to be speaking the same language of protest, all upholding "tradition" and resisting "westernisation," but in fact carry very different sentiments.
GLOBALISATION: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WESTERNISATION: It was hardly to be expected that such a thorough process of social transformation would cease or change direction just because of the fall of the socialist bloc. Certain aspects of this great transformation were bound to undergo some modifications, sometimes to an extent which would create the illusion that things are no longer what they used to be. But in fact, things were to continue, in many respects, in basically the same way. The most obvious change, since 1990, which, not completely by accident, coincided with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, was, of course, that the United States seemed to have much freer rein in running Arab affairs than ever before, and the process of westernising Arab societies has become, more than ever, a process of "Americanisation." This change was given, since 1990, a variety of names including "The End of History," a "Clash of Civilisations" and "globalisation." But this tendency to give new names to a process that started a long time before was motivated, as usual, merely by the desire to accelerate the process.
Privatisation, which started two decades ago, is now to proceed at a much faster pace. "Structural Adjustment" and the withdrawal of the state are to be hurried, and trade liberalisation and the removal of barriers in the way of private capital movements are to be completed. There is, of course, nothing new in all this, but it would be useful to give it a new name, and the term "globalisation" seems to be particularly helpful.
For the Arab World, in particular, there is one particular aspect of "Globalisation" that needs to be singled out, namely the "opening up" to Israel. All the alleged advantages for the Arabs from closer economic relations with Israel could be presented as advantages of globalisation, without the need to evoke any memories of past disputes. Thus, the celebrated book by Thomas Friedman, "The Lexus and the Olive Tree," which is straightforward, outspoken propaganda for globalisation, quotes Israel more often than the United States, when giving examples of globalisation that are worthy of imitation. If all the pieces of advice given in this and similar books are taken and implemented, the Arab World would, of course, continue to "westernise" along the same lines but perhaps at a faster pace and with a much stronger American, and one may even add, Israeli flavour. The term "westernisation" may, therefore, soon become a little misleading since it would be describing a very specific phenomenon by a very general term.
The old causes of discontent will remain and are likely to intensify with the acceleration of the processes of economic, social and cultural transformation, but the protest may also take some new forms. There are the economic frustrations of the marginalised sections of the population, resulting from higher unemployment, lower subsides, reduced public expenditure and generally a much lower level of protection for the less privileged groups. To these are added the cultural frustrations resulting from the greater encroachment of alien ways of life and the frustrations resulting from the new wounds afflicting national pride: the repeated attacks on the nation state coming from foreign capital and western powers, particularly the United States and Israel. "Globalisation" will come to symbolise all these attacks at the same time: economic, cultural and political. Whether religious rhetoric will be able to express all these various types of frustration is not certain, but it is very possible that an amalgamation of the various kinds of protest under a new kind of rhetoric will emerge. In any case, it would be wrong to view the present stage of globalisation as "final" in any important sense. It represents neither the "End of History" nor a final or decisive victory of private enterprise. Westernisation is obviously now spreading to all corners of the earth, reaching territories that have, until very recently, been fairly successfully protected against its attack. But it still has a long way to go before it is completed, to the extent that there are still many countries, including several in the Arab world, where the middle class is still small. It is also wrong to imagine that, even with a much deeper infiltration of the process of westernisation and the further growth of the middle class, the Arab world would have lost all chances of a cultural revival. To appreciate this, one has to look at what is happening today from a much wider time perspective than we are usually inclined to do. Arnold Toynbee's much larger vision of world history could again be instructive here:
"When we come to consider the results of the encounters between the Modern West and the rest of the World, we shall find, however, that the period of four and a half centuries that has elapsed since the opening of the drama is conveniently short and that we are dealing with an unfinished story. This becomes at once apparent if we turn our attention back to an earlier story of the same kind. If we measure off the history of the impact of the modern West on its contemporaries down to the time of writing against the history of the impact of the Hellenic civilisation on the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonic, Indic and Sinic societies, and if, for the purposes of this chronological comparison, we equate Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont in 334 B.C. with Columbus' crossing of the Atlantic in 1492 AD, the 460 years that bring us down to 1952 AD, in the Modern Western record will bring us to the year 126 AD (in the older era). At that date, who could have guessed the subsequent triumph of Christianity? This historical parallel indicates how utterly the future might be hidden in 1952 AD, from the mental vision of a Western student of the impact of the West on the rest of the World."
Although this was written 50 years ago, nothing has happened since then to make it less true.
THE GAP BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS: Debates on issues related to Arab economic and social development have been using, over the past 50 years, a great variety of slogans, labels and terminologies with highly emotive undertones. These include such terms as economic development, foreign aid, self-reliance, open-door policies, outward and inward-looking strategies, socialism, social justice, economic stabilisation, structural adjustment, and most recently, globalisation. Not only is it unwise to take these terms at face value and to assume that their actual implementation brings us closer to their literal meaning, but it is also unwise to think that the actual implementation of any of them (or the lack of it), depends to any significant extent on the result of the debate that may arise about it.
Two major and interdependent processes seem to have dominated actual economic and social changes in the Arab World during the past 50 years: the process of westernisation and the rapid growth of the middle class. These seem to have been two of the most important "facts," but they have been disguised in the rhetoric of economic development, both within and outside the Arab World, as something very different, and were given a great variety of names that seem to have been more misleading than enlightening. We were led to believe, for example, that it was possible to accept a great amount of foreign aid while pursuing an "independent path" of development at the same time, or that it was possible to achieve a high rate of growth through foreign aid or private foreign investment, while at the same raising the standard of living of the poorest sections of the population, or that true progress can only take place by "catching up" with the West.
After 50 years of "progress" along these lines, we have strong reasons to suspect that all this may have had much less to do with facts than with fiction.
* The writer is professor of economics at the American University in Cairo.
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