Grappling with a manifold crisis

As Berbers continue their revolt in Algeria, Diaa Rashwan* explains how their demands reflect serious discontent throughout the country: especially among the young
Exactly two years after coming to office, Algerian President Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika is up against his first major domestic crisis. In another outbreak of the civil strife which has plagued Algeria since 1992, the Kabylie region of Algeria erupted in violent protests in April. More than 70 died in clashes between government security forces and protesters and hundreds were wounded, mostly Berber civilians. There was also widespread damage to public buildings and utilities throughout the region's five provinces.
The Kabylie "Intifada" soon spread to the capital Algiers, as demonstrators took to the streets to protest the government's repression in Kabylie. After hundreds of thousands of protesters clashed with police on 14 June in Algiers, authorities decided to ban all demonstrations. The riots in Kabylie were sparked by the death, on 18 April, of a young Berber student while in police custody in Beni Duwala, near Tizi Ouzou, the main city of the predominantly Berber region, 100 kilometres east of Algiers. Official sources estimate that 20 per cent of Algerians are Berber, while Berbers estimate that the ratio is closer to one in three.
As events developed and passions flared, Berber demands assumed increasingly clearer form. In order of priority, the Berbers firstly sought urgent solutions to a critical economic plight that manifests itself in unemployment considerably higher than Algeria's overall jobless rate of 30 per cent, and in severely truncated access to government-allocated housing and public utilities. Secondly, the Berbers are calling for the state's paramilitary gendarmerie troops to withdraw completely from Kabylie. The hated gendarmerie are implicated in the heavy casualties of the recent flare-up and have a record of repressive incursions into the region. Lastly, the protesters want the Berber language, Tamazight, to be recognised as an official language with status equal to Arabic. This demand has been part of the Berbers' long-standing campaign for the official recognition and protection of Berber identity.
The way in which Berber demands are prioritised this time suggests that this uprising differs from previous ones. During earlier episodes (the most notable of which was the "Kabylie Spring" revolt of 1980), protesters stressed linguistic and cultural demands. The protesters' agenda focused on the state's refusal to grant official recognition to Tamazight, which Berbers feel has been imperilled by the state's successive Arabisation drives since 1962. Algerian history adds to Berber feelings of bitterness. The Berbers were prominent during Algeria's struggle for independence from France, from the moment it erupted in November 1954 in the Auras Mountains, a major Berber stronghold. The Berbers feel doubly slighted by the government's failure to give their culture official recognition: official scorn seems ungrateful as well as repressive.
Opinions vary among the various Kabylie groups about how best to secure their demands. But they agree that successive Algerian governments since independence have been inimical to their needs. A significant segment of the population by any figure, the Berbers feel that their cultural rights have been gravely prejudiced by the state.
This accumulated rancour doubtless intensified the fierceness of the recent rioting. But on this latest occasion, many of the causes had little to do with cultural demands. Indeed, despite its distinct ethnic focus, the Kabylie uprising may be seen as part of more general political and economic turbulence. That the violence spread to areas of the country with an Arab majority gives further credence to this view.
The Berbers' economic and social demands are shared by many of the Algerian people. The country's economic slide has caused unemployment to soar to 30 per cent and income per person to plummet by 250 per cent since 1992. It is now a measly $1,500 per year. The housing shortage of which the Berbers' complain is a general phenomenon. It is estimated that at least two million housing units are immediately needed even to begin solving the housing problem. In addition, although the Berbers charge that government corruption is a source of their distress, that grievance is shared by virtually all political and social forces in Algeria.
Indeed, even the Berber demand that the national gendarmerie withdraw from the Kabylie region must be seen as part of a general disgruntlement with the pervasiveness and practices of security and military forces in their nine-year-old confrontation with armed militants. Though many believe that the nation's security forces played a positive role in the fight against Islamist extremist violence and terrorism that has killed more than 100,000, others believe that the security forces exacerbated the violence by engaging in spurious covert operations that they sought to blame on the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other militant groups. In short, the Berber complaints have captured the national mood.
If we accept that Berber demands reflect more general discontent throughout Algeria, then the Kabylie uprising, and the rapidity with which it spread to the capital and other areas of the country, may mark the beginning of a grave crisis for President Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika. There is a certain irony in this. Bouteflika had little to do with the turmoil that erupted in 1992 and that has yet to be resolved. His electoral success came largely because he was not directly involved in that conflict and, therefore, enjoyed considerable political credibility. Voters hoped he would restore stability and revive the nation's teetering economy. And, indeed, it appeared that he intended to fulfill this promise, effecting a programme of national reconciliation, which prompted many Islamist insurgents to lay down their arms and assimilate again into society in exchange for amnesty from prosecution. But although this programme had considerable success, the country is still troubled by violence.
The fragile security situation has worsened the Algerian president's difficulties. With the outbreak of the Kabylie uprising it has become clear that the country's dire economic plight has become so inextricably intertwined with the security situation that it jeopardises the president's programme for social and economic reform upon which he has staked his presidency. Consequently, Bouteflika has intervened personally in the recent events, through direct appeals to the Algerian people and by forming a commission for enquiry into the causes of the disturbances. But until now his efforts have failed to yield results, as the protests and clashes increase.
There are several possible explanations. It may be that disruptions of this nature were inevitable, that the country's economic plight is so severe that the protest movement gathered a momentum of its own and it is pure coincidence that Berber grievances in Kabylie sparked it. But we should not ignore the possibility that certain domestic and foreign forces, which have an interest in obstructing solutions to Algeria's political, security, economic and social plight, have also fuelled the Kabylie uprising in particular and the overall protest movement in general.
At this stage it is difficult to predict for how long the rage will run. The forces involved and the intricacies and incongruities of their diverse alliances and interactions make pat prophesies unhelpful. Indeed, within the Berber community itself, the numbers of active forces and the disparities between their respective opinions and political alliances make it difficult to assess even the course of the Kabylie uprising. Kabylie politics add to the complexity of the situation. The two main political parties which have long been seen as representative of Berber demands, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) led by Said Saadi and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), led by Hussein Ait-Ahmed) appear to have lost much of their influence among the community. The most that can be said at this juncture is that the most crucial factor determining events will be the vast numbers of young Algerians who, jobless, homeless and poor, their dreams and futures are most at risk from Algeria's current social and economic malaise. And they have the least to lose from continuing the violence.
* The writer is an expert with the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and managing editor of the annual State of Religion in Egypt Report, issued by the Centre.
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