Who is really responsible for the worst train disaster in Egypt's history? The continuing trial of 11 minor railway employees, reports Gihan Shahine, has opened up a Pandora's box of questions regarding accountability Click to view caption The trial of 11 railway employees -- mainly ticket collectors, train masters and supervisors, and mechanical engineers -- on charges of negligence which led to the deaths of 373 people in the 20 February inferno that struck Aswan-bound train No.832, continued this week at Giza's Criminal Court. On Monday, the three-judge panel examined the charred train, compared it with other trains, and studied the report issued by the technical committee assigned by the general prosecutor's office to investigate the accident. All week, and until Al-Ahram Weekly went to print, the court was busy hearing the testimony of almost 20 witnesses. Among them are the head of the Traffic and Transport Police (TTP), the former chairman and deputy chairman of the Railway Authority, and a number of railway security heads. Saturday's session was almost entirely dedicated to the testimony of Major General Reda Shehata, head of the TTP, who took over his current post just nine days after the railway tragedy. His testimony was considered crucial in defining the liability of traffic police in light of current railway regulations. In fact, Shehata's testimony was mainly focused on denying that traffic police had any liability in the accident. Although the role of the TTP, which is affiliated to the Ministry of Interior, is to maintain railway security -- including trains, stations, workshops and passengers -- railway regulations do not grant traffic police any legal authority to take action against violators inside trains, the TTP chief claimed. According to Shehata, if an offence is committed, traffic police officers cannot interfere unless train masters or ticket collectors demand it. Nor can they bar the train from travelling if it is congested beyond safety regulations, or if carriages are ill-equipped, Shehata told the court. Shehata said that the Railway Authority allows the sale of an excessive number of third class tickets. It is the resulting overcrowding -- with a train carriage holding 500 passengers when its normal capacity does not exceed 104 -- which is believed to be a primary cause of the tragedy. Regarding fire hazards, Shehata ventured that the role of traffic police forces is limited to putting out blazes and providing technical advice on how to prevent them. To equip trains against fire is the responsibility of the Railway Authority as defined in railway regulations. "We have no legal authority inside trains, which all falls in the hands of train masters and ticket-collectors," Shehata said. Judge Saad Abdel-Wahab seemed provoked by Shehata's testimony, commenting sarcastically that such regulations seem to give more authority to low-ranking employees than high- ranking officers. "Didn't anyone at the TTP object to regulations that bar policemen from doing their job?" Abdel-Wahab asked. "It is not in our power to establish or change railway regulations," Shehata said, adding that traffic police officers have sent memos to the Railway Authority in the past urging them to correct flaws in the railway system, but have generally received no response. "The authority, however," Shehata told the court, "has started to act a bit more positively after the accident." Purchasing LE3 million worth of fire extinguishers was Shehata's case in point. In the same session, two of the defendants -- Mahmoud Hassan Abdel- Rehim, a train master, and Mohamed Belal, a train supervisor -- were summoned for questioning. Both pleaded that they have no authority to force passengers with tickets off the train, no matter how crowded it is. Nor can they suspend a journey in case a train is overcrowded or ill-equipped, they said. "The ticket is a contract between the Railway Authority and the passenger," Abdel-Rehim explained to the judge. "I summon the traffic police only in cases where a passenger doesn't have a ticket, if a fight breaks out, or, for example, if someone makes tea on board. The overcrowding of the train is the responsibility of the Railway Authority itself." The technical committee's report revealed that the blaze was caused by "an open source of fire", probably one of the kerosene stoves that are often used by passengers during the long journey, or else by railway staff for cooking in the buffet. The report also indicated that although each carriage only had 104 seats it carried an average of 216 passengers. The wooden interior of the carriages and passengers' luggage -- the bulk of which comprised highly-flammable synthetic blankets and clothes -- caught fire, causing the inferno. Although no fire extinguishers were found, kerosene stoves were uncovered in the wreckage. Why didn't train masters report to police that passengers were violating the regulations by bringing potential fire hazards on board? "Legally," train master Abdel-Rehim told the court, "we are not authorised to check passengers' luggage... I didn't see anybody making tea. The train was too crowded to allow anybody the space to sit, let alone make tea." Asked if he knew how the train was set ablaze, Abdel-Rehim snapped, "Only God knows". Defence lawyers explained to the Weekly that although railway regulations grant train masters the authority to stop a journey when the train is overcrowded or ill-equipped, they, in fact, would get suspended for doing so. As such, the lawyers are arguing that the defendants are no more than scapegoats. "The regulations are no more than a way to place a veil over top rail officials' liability in cases of tragic accidents," insisted lawyer Ahmed Youssri El-Naggar. "It was definitely not in the hands of train collectors to operate another train to ease congestion on train 832." The lawyers claimed to have presented the court with information "that would indict the Railway Authority". Amongst this information were documents the lawyers claimed were proof that the authority replaced, in October 2001, another third-class Aswan-bound train that used to depart an hour before train 832 with a more expensive air- conditioned one. Other documents revealed that the chairman of the Railway Authority prohibited the placing of fire extinguishers in train carriages for fear that they would be stolen. Instead, he provided just the locomotive with four small ones. Lawyers also insist that the authority ignored several requests by train masters for more fire extinguishers, claiming an alleged lack of funds, even though 25 per cent of the authority's revenues are spent on bonuses and salaries for high-ranking employees. On Tuesday, Mohamed Arafa, current head of the Railway Authority and former consultant to the minister of transport, explained to the court that regulations stipulate equipping trains with a minimum of three fire extinguishers. Another article in the regulations, however, stipulates that trains should be equipped with a "suitable number of fire extinguishers", Arafa said. The authority, at any rate, found it prudent to place four extinguishers in the locomotive where drivers have "more flexibility than jostling passengers to move and put out the fire". At this point, prosecutors interrupted, telling the court that train 832 actually only had two fire extinguishers, which in any case were non-functioning. "The carriages were already charred beyond recognition and so no one can tell if the train had any extinguishers," Arafa retorted. "And in all cases, the extinguishers would have been useless in putting out such an inferno." The prosecutors did not buy the argument, claiming that experts had indicated that extinguishers could have at least helped curb the fire in the first four minutes of the blaze, and that, whether useless or not, extinguishers should be provided anyway. At this point, the judge injected a comment of his own, wondering aloud how effective fire extinguishers in the locomotive actually are if there is no wireless communication system in place to inform the driver that there is a fire in one of carriages in the first place. The eleven defendants are also charged with wasting LE1.6 million worth of public funds as a result of the damage caused by the accident. Two of the employees are accused of issuing reports that certified train 832 as being well-equipped and fit for transport. Mahmoud Sami, chairman of the Abu Rawash workshop where train 832 is regularly maintained, assured the court that although he himself was off duty on the day of the accident, all documents indeed show that the train was fit for transport. When prosecutors asked for the train's operation dossier No.80, Sami provided only one paper -- which prosecutors criticised as "useless" -- torn from the dossier in question. With more witnesses set to take the stand as the trial continues, it looks as though this sort of back and forth regarding where the blame really lies for the tragedy may only become even more bitter.
