Ditching their vocal radicalism, the Syrians voted in favour of a flawed United Nations resolution on Iraq. And, says Mohamed Khaled El-Azaar, they did the right thing It was Syria's lot, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, to be part of the protracted and sensitive deliberations on the Iraqi crisis. With multilateral bargaining underway and conflicting international and regional factors being weighed and scrutinised, Syria was embroiled in a global game of high stakes. Not only was the fate of the Iraqi leadership in jeopardy, but Iraq's own future as a central player in the region was becoming increasingly uncertain. Syrian diplomats were obviously mindful of how delicate the situation was. For the two months preceding Resolution 1441, Damascus made it clear that it considered itself the voice of Arab, Islamic and Third World countries at the international debate. The Syrians were aware of what these countries want to see happening. Arabs, Muslims, and most Third World countries did not want a military option to evolve, nor the United States to act outside the authority of the United Nations. They wanted an international inspection procedure to be put into place with regard to Iraq's alleged ownership of weapons of mass destruction. They also wanted the Security Council to be consulted on any further action, and to make a decision only after the international inspectors submit their report. For obvious reasons, these countries -- tired of seeing Israel treated with kid gloves despite its repeated violation of international resolutions -- wanted to expose the double-standards implied in the US-United Kingdom approach to the crisis. The Syrians had all of this in mind, but still had to watch their step. Resolution 1441 addresses some, but not all, of these concerns. In particular, there is no mention of Israel's policy, not even a hint that some future action will be taken in this regard. It makes no reference to the need to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the entire region, or inspect countries, including Israel, for violations. And it does not call on Israel to sign treaties banning these weapons. The failure to include these conditions was, many thought, a reason for Damascus to vote against the resolution, or at least abstain. It didn't. The Syrian vote did not conform to the country's conventional politics. But these are unconventional times. The Syrians, knowing this, changed tack. The resolution came about as a result of intensive negotiations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Syrian position was close to that of Russia, France and China, and once these three countries approved the resolution, Damascus found it hard to disagree. A vote against the resolution could have been seen as dissatisfaction, not with the United States, but with the other countries which Syria regards as friends and allies. Besides, Syria did not want to be the "odd man out" in the vote. The main aim of the resolution was to prevent the United States from acting unilaterally. The resolution, therefore, had to be passed unanimously, since unanimity was the only way to dissuade Washington from acting outside the mandate of the United Nations. Regardless of how fair or legally sound the resolution was, political considerations made it wise for the Syrians to provide the Security Council with the required consensus. Russia, France, and China all held intensive consultations with Syria, asking it to vote in favour of the resolution. Damascus was not in a position to turn down this request, however, since any Syrian quarrel with Washington would more than likely cause these countries to side with the US. Washington still classifies Syria as a terror-sponsoring state, criticises its influence in Lebanon, denounces its ties with Hizbullah, and resents its hospitality to Palestinian opposition factions. Considering their political record, the likelihood that US officials will one day include Syria in the so-called axis of evil should not be dismissed. As soon as the resolution was passed, Damascus felt the need to justify its vote. It stated that it had received assurances from all UN Security Council permanent members, including the US and the UK, that the resolution would not be used as a pretext to attack Iraq. The Syrians say they were told that the UN Security Council would retain a central role concerning all action taken on Iraq, that it would respect the territorial integrity of Iraq, and remain dedicated to finding a comprehensive solution to the problem. Another explanation for the Syrian vote concerns the Arab reaction to the entire affair. The Arab world, as a whole, did not act cohesively in light of the US stance on Iraq. The Arabs failed to project a concrete signal of solidarity regarding US military intentions. The Arabs voiced their opposition to US policies but failed to back their words with actions, and have also failed to construct an initiative involving punitive measures against the US and UK if Iraq is attacked. The Syrians took all of this into consideration and decided to play it safe. They did not want to seem daring in volatile times. To some extent, Iraq's own position seems to favour a moderate stand. Just a few days before the resolution was passed, President Saddam Hussein suggested that Iraq was considering accepting the resolution. The Syrians saw this as a signal. They did not want to be seen as more hard-line than Saddam. The Syrian vote was perhaps extraordinary, but so were the circumstances. Damascus was acting under pressure and its options were limited. It was actively involved in the negotiations that preceded the resolution, and the efforts it made may explain some of the positive aspects of the resolution, particularly the one which tries to avoid US military action. It would be wrong to blame the Syrians for the numerous pitfalls of the resolutions, since it was beyond their power to change these. Syria could have voted differently, but this would not have improved the situation. The opposite, actually, is true. By voting for the resolution, Syria became part of a process that gave Iraq an imperfect option. Better that than no option at all. Related stories: A pretext for war? Reparing the damage Clear and present danger Choices of a lifetime
