Syria must act now, as must the Lebanese, to forestall potentially grave consequences, writes Hassan Nafaa* The main assumption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559 is that Lebanon is a state under occupation, a country ripped asunder by militia. The resolution calls "upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and urges "the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias". This resolution takes Lebanon, a small but central state to the Middle East conflict, into a future of uncertainty, drives it back into the days of conflict. The last round of power struggles in that country ended, albeit temporarily, in the early 1990s, in Syria's favour. Five parties were engaged in a power struggle in Lebanon throughout the Civil War: Syria, Israel, the US, France and Lebanese factions. The latter took sides with one or more of the regional and international rival parties. This situation remained unresolved until Syria managed to tip the balance in its favour. Damascus used several international and regional factors, the latest and most significant of which was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, to settle things in its favour. When the US was seeking to form an international coalition in the Gulf War and needed Syria, the latter agreed to be part of the international coalition in return for consolidating its influence in Lebanon. The US consented and other rival international and regional parties had no choice but to step back from the Lebanese scene and bide their time. Things changed the moment the US decided to occupy Iraq. There was no room for Syrian involvement in the US unilateral quest to occupy Iraq. The Syrian regime was in no position to provide political cover for a lasting US occupation of Iraq. Such action would have undermined Syria's standing in the Arab world. As soon as it occupied Baghdad, the US began exploring ways of getting rid of the Syrian regime, perhaps along with other regimes in the region. Only the timing and method remained to be decided. The US seems to have postponed or ruled out military intervention in Syria, because it is having enough trouble in Iraq. But Washington has not given up its aim of toppling the Syrian regime through other forms of pressure. The Syria Accountability Act was merely the first step. The second was to make Lebanon a less comfortable place for the Syrians. The UNSC resolution must have been prepared months ago, waiting for the right moment to be launched. Both France and Israel knew that the US intends to use Lebanon as a tool to pressure Syria. Both knew that the UNSC decision would set off a new round of power struggles in Lebanon. And they willingly took part in that scheme. France decided, for a change, to side with the US. In a rare move, the two countries submitted the draft resolution jointly to the UNSC. Israel waited until the UNSC resolution was passed, then made military threats to Syria, as if reminding everyone that it is an integral part of the power struggle in Lebanon. Resolution 1559 is a political defeat for Syria, but it is Lebanon that is in immediate danger. It is Lebanon that may end up paying a heavy price for that move. The resolution benefits the Americans and the Israelis, just as it harms the Syrians and Lebanese. France, however, looks to be coming along for the ride, hoping to win something, ready to risk everything. From the Syrian point of view, Resolution 1559 may seem weak, "with no colour, taste, or odour", as more than one official comment described it. This may be true from the legal point of view. The resolution barely secured the required majority. Six UNSC members abstained, including Russia and China, both permanent UNSC members. The resolution does not make charges against Syria or even mention it by name, particularly in its executive clauses. Also, it is based on chapter VI of the UN Charter, not the more assertive chapter VII. This is why 1559 does not contain implementation mechanisms or a deadline to be followed by sanctions. The resolution is legally questionable, as it involves a clear violation of Clause 7 of Article 2 (chapter I) of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in internal matters of UN member states except in cases defined in chapter VII. Regardless of the questionable legalities of 1559, the resolution is procedurally correct and has serious political ramifications for the Syrian and Lebanese governments. What the resolution does is start a chain reaction that may lead to a major conflagration, one that Israel seeks, one that the US -- wrongly yet again -- assumes it can control and benefit from. The US is aware that 1559 makes impossible demands on Syria. A complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, when accompanied by a dismantling of Hizbullah and an end to so- called Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, would only put Lebanon in its entirety under US-Israeli influence, a matter that jeopardises Syria's own security. The US knows that the Syrian regime is not foolish enough to place a noose around its own neck. What Washington wants, by pressing for such a resolution, is to isolate the Syrians internationally, depict the Lebanese government as a puppet regime, and drive a wedge into the Lebanese political scene, a wedge that can be used at will to set off a new civil war in the country. Unfortunately, by insisting on amending the constitution to extend Emile Lahoud's presidency, Syria has made a fatal mistake. It gave the Americans the chance to proceed towards their initial goals. I understand the requisites of Syrian security and believe them to be harmonious with those of Arab security in general. I also sympathise with much of Syria's security-motivated foreign policy. What I fail to understand, however, is why the Syrians staked national security on a single Lebanese official, practically walking into a minefield in the process. This Syrian mistake has given the enemies of Syria and the resistance, indeed of Arabs and Muslims, a chance to claim that the real problem in the region is despotism, not US and Israeli occupation. France can justify its position by saying that the Syrians failed to heed its repeated advice, and by claiming that its co-drafting of the resolution made it less harsh than Washington wanted. This may all be true. It is also true that without France supporting such a resolution, it would not have passed, or even been voted upon in the first place. France has done a great service, free of charge, to Israeli and US policy in the region. In the meantime, Paris has jeopardised its own reputation in the region, and its prospects of controlling coming events are subsequently minimal. The US and Israel now have what they wanted and will only involve France in future plans if the latter agrees to play along without asking questions. I am not one for crying over spilt milk. So let's start thinking about how to avoid the worst. For starters, it is necessary for all Lebanese national forces, irrespective of where they stand on Lahoud's re-election, to find a purely Lebanese way out of the current crisis. They should do that in total independence from Syria while keeping in mind Syria's strategic and security concerns, for the latter overlap with those of Lebanon. For its part, Syria should accept the decision reached by the Lebanese, even if they were to decide to reverse the process of amending the constitution and put in power a Maronite figure who can achieve national consensus without changing the status of the resistance; for that must remain unchanged until a full and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is reached. On the upside, the current crisis offers Damascus a rare opportunity to prove that it is not just one of those Arab regimes that would risk everything to stay in power. The Syrians could do worse than introduce genuine and comprehensive political reform, reform that strengths the country both socially and economically. Posturing and political bravado would be ruinous. A regime has a responsibility to protect state and society, even if its own survival is at stake. Any regime with a modicum of nationalism should prefer to give power voluntarily to its own people than to agents riding on US and Israeli tanks or to leaders surfing the angry wave of ensuing turmoil. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
