Although Turkey has yet to respond to the US's request for support in a war on Iraq, as Gareth Jenkins writes, the country's new government is busy manoeuvring on the domestic, regional and international fronts Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul's two weeks of shuttle diplomacy to seek ways of averting a US-led military campaign against Iraq entered a new phase last week as representatives of six Middle Eastern countries agreed to meet in Istanbul on 23 January. The foreign ministers from Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran and Syria were due to hold initial discussions prior to a possible meeting of regional leaders in Turkey or Syria in late January or early February. Sources close to Prime Minister Gul admit that they have little hope that the meetings will produce a solution acceptable to both Iraq and the US. Privately they admit that, while Gul is genuinely anxious to avoid another Gulf war, his initiative is driven primarily by domestic considerations. "Over 80 per cent of the Turkish people are strongly opposed to a war against Iraq," said one government source. "Even if we don't have much hope of success we have to be seen to be doing something. We also have to think of our relations with Iraq once all this is over. Iraq is very important to our economy and is likely to be even more important once all this is over. We want the Iraqi people to know that we don't want them to suffer a war." Even though neither Gul nor his advisers are willing to admit it, there is also little doubt that the Turkish government sees the crisis with Iraq as an opportunity to assert itself as a regional leader. Since it took office in November last year, there has been considerable speculation as to the extent to which Gul's pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) has a religious policy agenda. What has often been overlooked is that the Turkish Islamist movement has always included a strong nationalist element, and a nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, in particular, which often underlies the religious solidarity cited by Turkish Islamists in their calls for closer ties with the countries of the Middle East. During his time as government spokesman for an Islamist-led coalition in the mid- 1990s, Gul was fond of referring to Arab states as "former Ottoman provinces" who, he claimed, still looked to Turkey for leadership. He even frequently touted the idea of the creation of an "Ottoman Commonwealth", comprising the states whose territory had once formed part of the Ottoman Empire with Turkey at their head. But, although Gul's initiative may be designed to placate domestic public opinion and establish Turkey as a regional leader, it has exasperated the US. On Monday, during a visit to Ankara, General Richard Myers, the chairman of the US Military Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly denied that the US was impatient with Turkey over its refusal to give a clear answer to Washington's request for the deployment of aircraft and troops in Turkey ready for use in a second northern front against Iraq. "Any idea that I'm impatient or that we made demands here is not the case. It was nothing of the sort," Myers told reporters. "Turkey has been very cooperative in all of this." Privately, however, US officials make little secret of their frustration. US military planners are known to favour a two front strategy against Iraq, either through military offensives from both the south and north of Baghdad or, merely by deploying US troops in northern Iraq, tying down Iraqi forces and thus weakening Saddam's defences against a US offensive in the south of the country. Most of the detailed US negotiations over the deployment of American troops in Turkey have been conducted with the Turkish military. Even though it has avoided giving a clear commitment, sources close to the Turkish government admit that, in the end, they have little choice but to accede to whatever Washington requests. "We don't want a war with Iraq but we are 99 per cent certain that it is going to take place," said a source close to the military. "When it happens it is much better for Turkey to be part of it than to be excluded. Not only is the US an important ally but if we don't support them, including, even if they don't fight, and we send our own troops over the border if necessary, then we won't have any say over what happens in northern Iraq. And the last thing we need is a Kurdish state or autonomous Kurdish region there." But the generals have resisted suggestions that they should either assume responsibility for making a decision about Turkish support for the US or pressure the government to do so, claiming, somewhat disingenuously, that such decisions are the responsibility of the civilian administration. Turkey's fiercely secularist generals have made no secret of their dislike and distrust of the JDP government, whom they suspect of harbouring an Islamist agenda. By throwing the ball into the government's court, the military is killing two birds with one stone. Not only are they avoiding criticism for the considerable political influence that the military still wields in Turkey, but they have left the government facing a choice between the lesser of two evils. Either the government antagonises the US by avoiding a clear commitment to backing its planned military campaign against Iraq, or it risks erosion of electoral support by agreeing to Washington's demands. As Gul's government dithers, it appears to risk eventually doing both.
