How far can Washington push the Security Council? Ayman El-Amir looks into the maths Washington's war plans received a double setback this week: the vote in the Turkish parliament denying the Pentagon the northern front it had counted on, and enhanced Iraqi cooperation with international inspectors. Raging anti-war demonstrations have further dampened the administration's hopes for waging war in the name of the international community. Nor is Washington likely to find much solace in the progress report of United Nations chief inspector, Hans Blix, scheduled for 7 March: that is expected to be far more helpful to Baghdad than Washington. Yet before it goes to war the US administration has little choice but to consummate the exasperating process of trying to build a simple pro-war majority in the United Nations Security Council, if only to prop up the sagging popularity of its embattled ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Hans Blix, chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Observation and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC), will report on Baghdad's improved cooperation, which has included the unilateral unveiling and destruction of weapons, including Al Samoud-2 missiles. Iraq is also revealing how it disposed of its suspected chemical and biological weapon supplies, both of which leave Washington and London short of any legitimate argument for war. In the absence of such legitimacy Washington has embarked on a feverish round of persuasion, political arm twisting and bribery. Bowing to its British and Spanish allies, it has half-heartedly committed itself to seeking the collective authority of the Security Council before waging war against Iraq, while keeping open the option of unilateral action. The mathematics are simple: to pass a resolution in the Security Council at least nine of the 15 council members must approve it and none of the five permanent members oppose it. The Anglo-American draft resolution currently circulating among members is so far assured only of the support of its sponsors, the US, the UK and Spain, together with Bulgaria. France, Russia and China, all of which wield vetos, oppose the draft, and they are backed by Germany and Syria. The remaining six, no-veto members -- Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Mexico, Chile and Pakistan -- have yet to make their voting intentions known. American hopes are pinned on winning five of the six undecided votes. A majority of nine may induce the abstention of the other three permanent members, rendering German and Syrian opposition inconsequential. US lobbying has so far focussed on winning the three African members on the council. Angola has been pampered and flattered by calls from President Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell. A host of senior US and British officials, with personal connections to the Angolan government, have landed in Luanda in the past two weeks, no doubt bearing promises of further investment by US corporations and US-influenced donor countries and international financial institutions in Angola's oil industry. Guinea, president of the Security Council for the month of March, is regarded as a maverick, having often broken ranks with the consensus of the Organisation of African Unity. Guinea and Cameroon both have strong historic ties to France and are presumably committed to the consensus of the recent African Summit convened by French President Jacques Chirac in Paris. The decisions of the 116-member non-aligned conference in Kuala Lumpur last week and of the Organisation of African Unity's summit in Addis Ababa in early February may help determine their voting intentions. Both came out firmly against the use of force. Then there is Mexico, which has a score of bilateral issues to settle with the US, including immigration restrictions, while Chile has increasingly appeared to be offended by Washington's arm twisting. While Pakistan would be loath to vote for war against another Muslim country it has a lot at stake in its relations with the US, not least support from Washington over the issue of Kashmir. It is expected to abstain. Building consensus in the Security Council is a process of power play, persuasion and the making of deals. Even a resolution sponsored by a minority of three can snowball, depending on the merit of the issue, national interests and tradeoffs. Conventional wisdom suggests that if the US and UK manage to sway five of the undecided members of the council and get a nine-vote majority, then France, Russia and China will refrain from casting a veto. Tactics in the council have therefore concentrated on denying the US the two-third majority vote it needs to legitimise war, with France, Russia, China, Germany and Syria arguing that, with the inspection regime working, there is no case for war. And even if the US succeeds in coercing council members into a nine-vote majority, a Franco-Russian veto is not completely off the card. President Bush and his cabinet of warriors have already decided to go to war on the pretext of disarming Iraq: Iraqi compliance in disarming will not alter that decision, a nightmare scenario for the standing of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. And in the end there is no escaping the fact that war against Iraq has become the prerogative of the US.
