A split in the Muslim Brotherhood is not to be expected yet, writes Amr Elchoubaki* A mere 14 months separated the deaths of Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Ma'moun El-Hodeibi and his predecessor Mustafa Mashhour. Every departure of a Muslim Brotherhood leader has triggered speculation over whether the organisation will split along the generational divide. Today, with two leaders representing the old guard gone in just over a year, such speculation is as heated as ever. Although there is considerable internal conflict between the various wings of the group it is difficult to envision a rift severe enough to lead the younger generation (a term used mostly for convenience as most of its members are over 50) to create a splinter group. A major reason why the Brotherhood has been able to sustain its cohesion for so long, and will probably continue to do so, is structural. Since its inception 76 years ago the complex multi-tiered structure of the organisation has enabled it to recruit members of diverse age groups, backgrounds and doctrinal persuasions. Although the most prominent strand favours the peaceful proselytising approach to effecting change, the Brotherhood has also embraced a less prominent militant strand, which at one time was indoctrinated into a paramilitary branch that was particularly active from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War through the Nasserist period. The populist-militant duality inherent in the Brotherhood's doctrinal and organisational makeup has engendered other dualities, operating on many levels. Although the substance of these dualities may have changed over time, their continued existence has given rise to an intricate and multifaceted hierarchy. The organisational vibrancy of the Brotherhood started with the way members were invited, recruited and defined by their place in the organisation. In Memoirs of a Call and Proselytiser, the Muslim Brothers founder Hassan El-Banna outlines three levels of conventional membership -- "the right of every Muslim approved by the District Administration": 1. General membership. Candidates have to declare their commitment to piety and to fill and sign an application form, which when approved entitles them to become assistant brothers. 2. Brethren membership. In addition to the obligations incumbent upon general members, candidates are required to safeguard the faith and pledge obedience. They become associate brothers. 3. Active membership. To graduate to this level candidates are required to provide a range of detailed personal information, study MB doctrine, attend weekly Qur'anic sessions, speak Classical Arabic whenever possible, educate themselves in general social affairs, and memorise a minimum of 40 Sayings of the Prophet. This earns them the title active brother. The Muslim Brotherhood's founders established a fourth category of membership that El-Banna insisted remain separate and distinct from the above: jihad membership. Only active members are eligible, and they are hand-picked by the Guidance Bureau (Majlis Al-Irshad). Their duties -- in addition to the aforementioned -- were to follow the Prophet's traditions, perform extra nighttime prayers, lead a life of abstinence, shun un-Islamic practices in worship and business, make financial contributions to the Guidance Bureau and Call Fund, bequeath part of their estate to the Brotherhood, exhort others to piety and discourage sin, carry a copy of the Qur'an at all times and prepare themselves for a period of special indoctrination sponsored by the Guidance Bureau. While the significance of the enormous discrepancy between the commitments and duties at the various levels is readily apparent, there was nothing to prevent members on any level from subscribing to peaceful strategies for change. If anything such flexibility is much more pronounced today. Although, in the 1970s, the Brotherhood declared a political and ideological rupture with its violent past, it has retained an organisational structure eminently capable of accommodating diversity within its ranks and fostering harmony between its diverse factions, in spite of the strict line-of-command hierarchy and codes of loyalty and obedience that frequently seem alien to democratic values. A second factor working to obviate secession is the political culture that has governed the activities of the movement. From the outset, the Brotherhood oriented itself towards the society it sought to change rather than against the state, an outlook that set it apart from revolutionary "vanguards" that espoused a confrontational policy and the overturn of the regime regardless of the circumstances and condition of the society. Moreover, as the Brotherhood perceived itself very much as a part of greater society, it has focussed its attention on the "call to society" and on the promotion of this call through intensive interaction with society, through mosques, clinics and philanthropic organisations as well as labour unions, professional syndicates and parliament. As a result the Brotherhood is much calmer in its approach to the question of power and more confident in its policy of dialogue. New cadres of brothers are not inculcated with the notion that "the revolution" must start tomorrow and that the government in exile must be formed today. Rather, they learn the need for patience, because change is a gradual process that must take place through proselytising. Because of this mindset the generational conflict within the Brotherhood will not be resolved through sudden and radical moves such as the decision to break away, but rather through a cumulative process of compromise and mutual accommodation. The ambiguity of MB discourse has also kept divisions at bay. It is still difficult to pinpoint where the Brotherhood stands on many issues given their vague agenda that blends the sacred with the secular, politics with morals, and work beneath the dome of parliament with work beneath the domes of mosques. MB leaders still sidestep explicit answers to potentially explosive issues, such as the nature of civil government and whether communists or secularists should be allowed to share power and not merely be granted the right to free expression. Although the Brotherhood has recently shown itself more open to the principles and values of democracy, human rights and the rights of women and minorities, it has yet to draw the line between political and religious activity. Instead it remains intent upon preserving its freedom of movement in both domains towards which end it clings to a language of generalities. Nevertheless, this avoidance of specifics, which has been a frequent source of criticism, has served to protect it against rupture, which generally occurs in debates over the concrete rather than the abstract. Finally, a pragmatic reading of the contemporary political situation works against secession. The younger and generally more liberal generation realises that there are few practical prospects for political survival outside the Brotherhood. The chances are extremely slim that they could establish a democratic Islamic party while the legitimate parties that do exist are isolated from the public. Remaining within the Brotherhood is not merely a question of conviction but of external considerations such as the stagnation of party life and obstacles to any meaningful entry into the political process. This applies in particular to the younger generation. It was the four factors above that determined the election of Mahdi Akef (76) as the Brotherhood's new general guide. He belongs to the old guard, but of that generation he is the most open to the opinions of the next generation down the line. A product of the organisation's doctrinal austerity of the 1930s, and a founder of the international Muslim Brotherhood's organisation, he is the exponent of the old mindset. However, that he has already declared that he would accept a Coptic woman as a member of the organisation and that he was ready to make an alliance with Nasserists and Communists if need be, demonstrates that he is prepared to accommodate the new. It is thus impossible to imagine a split along generational lines at this point. Rather, a split in the organisation will become a prospect only if the Muslim Brotherhood is allowed to establish itself as a legitimate party. Then controversy over the separation between the political and religious could result in a parting of ways. * The writer is a researcher at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
