By Hassan Abu Taleb Congratulations are in order to the Sudanese who are on the threshold of signing a final peace agreement that will bring a close to the civil war in the south. However, the forthcoming phase will still be extremely complex and will require continued hard work, good will and cooperation from all Sudanese and international parties concerned. The three framework agreements in Naivasha on the status of the capital, power-sharing and the administration of the three disputed zones in central Sudan have greatly facilitated the task of drafting a final agreement. Little more remains than to collate existing agreements into a single comprehensive legal document, and then to formulate the means of implementation, inclusive of international guarantees, troop redeployments and the possible creation of an African or international peacekeeping force. The comprehensive final agreement will undoubtedly give rise to an entirely different system of government than that which currently exists. The power-sharing between the ruling party in Khartoum for 14 years, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) within the framework of a centralised federal government is certain to produce an entirely new political configuration in the country. If the government in Khartoum will be expected to furnish a base of support for the agreement in the north and among its allies in the south, the SPLA will have the similar onus of rallying the support from among the other forces in the south, which will have the right to participate in the government of the southern provinces as well as the opportunity to participate in the federal government. If they are sincerely committed to taking Sudan across the threshold into a new and brighter historical era, both sides will have to mobilise their energies and those of their allies at home and abroad towards consolidating the peace and generating the best possible political, economic and moral climate before the referendum is held on the province of Abyei three years from now and on the south six and a half years from now. The six-year interim period that will be ushered in by the peace agreement will lead to one of two possibilities. Either Sudan will separate into two nations, peacefully and voluntarily, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, or it will remain a geographically united federation with an open, pluralistic form of government embracing the north's predominantly Arab Muslim identity and the south's predominantly African Christian or animist identity. Regardless of the outcome, the concerned parties throughout this period will face formidable challenges, prime among which is the need to build mutual confidence. Although the two sides have endured arduous negotiations and made major concessions in order to create a viable formula for Sudan of the future, the actual process of working together requires an even higher degree of mutual trust. This trust, after all, will be constantly put to the test during the implementation of the various articles of the agreement, whether those pertaining to the division of wealth and power and to the establishment of political and religious liberties, or those pertaining to the shape of government in Sudan, in general, and in the federal capital, in particular, and to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. In addition, rehabilitating the troops of the southern liberation army to function in a non-combatant climate is a task that will be fraught with problems and will require considerable technical assistance. Simultaneously, the central government will have to demonstrate its ability to restructure and develop in order to accommodate to the provisions of the peace treaty. Perhaps what could most jeopardise the transition to peace is if the SPLA were to act as though it were the victorious party, for this would trigger tensions capable of flaring up again into armed confrontations. It will therefore be important to ensure that there are no potential flashpoints between the two sides, at least in the initial phases of the interim period. However, the involvement of outside powers at various levels, as called for by the agreement, also has the potential to trigger strong sensitivities. This applies especially to the forces of the north, among which there are emerging separatist movements such as the Movement for Justice and Equality (JEM) The proponents of this movement maintain that the six-year interim period will only sap the resources of the north for the reconstruction and development of the south, which they believe will ultimately secede anyway. They therefore demand the immediate division of the country, to be effected within a year, leaving the north with its Arab-Muslim identity and without foreign intervention under any guise. There are also a number of northern forces that had been excluded from the negotiations and that, therefore, instinctively regard the agreement with considerable scepticism. These forces have adopted a wait-and-see approach until they can determine the extent to which the government actually implements the mechanisms for pluralistic government and the guarantees for political and press liberties. Meanwhile, Sudan's neighbours appear keen that the interim period proceeds as smoothly as possible and in a manner that favours the continued unity of the country. A peaceful and still unified Sudan, they believe, will work to quell potential insurgencies in their countries on the part of secessionist movements following the lead of the Sudanese south, should it eventually opt to secede. For its part, Egypt is following the Sudanese situation closely. It, too, is eager that the interim period strengthens the unity of the country and feels that it will have a pivotal role to play in bringing about the successful implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement expected to be signed next month. Perhaps, Egypt's most important contribution in this regard resides in its ability to rally a broad base of support for the agreement, capitalising towards this end on the strong relations Egyptian officials have developed over the years with the various Sudanese parties that had established representative offices in Cairo over the past decade. But, there are other ways that Egypt can help promote a peaceful interim period. On the one hand, Egyptian investors will be attracted to the south of Sudan where they can participate in the economic development of the country and thereby strengthen Egyptian-Sudanese bonds under the new circumstances. On the other hand, Egypt, with its considerable expertise in security, will be able to offer the necessary technical and material assistance for rebuilding Sudan's security services in accordance with the provisions of the security protocol signed between the north and south last October. On the question of Darfour, Egypt is strongly opposed to international sanctions or other pressures against Khartoum. However, the Egyptian government is simultaneously keen to help restore calm to that Sudanese province and to participate in an African peacekeeping force that is to be formed to restore security in western Sudan. Egypt also hopes to persuade the Sudanese government to take further practical steps to rein in the insubordinate militias, notably the Janjaweed, which is rumoured to have received government backing. In the opinion of Egypt, as well as that of other neighbours of Sudan, sanctions against Khartoum at this crucial juncture would be counterproductive and inconsistent with the spirit of the peace process. It makes little sense to encumber Khartoum with punitive measures just as the avenues towards peace, stability and progress have reopened and just as the government of Khartoum is about to be restructured on the basis of political plurality and civil liberties. Efforts now must focus upon helping Sudan capitalise on the opportunity it now has before it to become a united yet culturally diverse and vibrant entity. This in turn entails ensuring that the values of tolerance, equal citizenship and the rule of law prevail over those superannuated values that foster internecine tensions, hatred, injustice and oppression.
