Cairo's silence over Sudan's secretive peace deal speaks louder than words, writes Hassan Abu Taleb* In an unusual sequence of events, the Sudanese vice president recently arrived in Cairo only to leave again, three days later, without having met with President Hosni Mubarak. Meanwhile, the Higher Egyptian-Sudanese Committee approved 15 agreements to revitalise bilateral relations. But its final statement was remarkably silent on the landmark agreement signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July by the Sudanese government and John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Interestingly, no other Sudanese political groups have signed the agreement -- neither those allied with the government, nor those who have fought alongside Garang. At the same time, the Sudanese information minister has paradoxically claimed that Sudan is seeking to revive the Egyptian-Libyan joint initiative. This initiative, the reader may recall, aimed to preserve the country's unity, where the Machakos agreement is based on the peaceful and methodical partition of Sudan. This paradox is reinforced by Cairo's deafening silence on the Machakos agreement. Some Sudanese politicians have suggested that Egypt should back the agreement, and could even take part in the 12 August round of inter-Sudanese talks. Meanwhile, Egyptian officials are said to be examining the contents of the agreement and its possible impact on Egyptian interests. Egypt's silence should not be taken lightly. It represents more than just a reproach or a snub. For the issues that the Machakos protocol addresses do not concern Sudan alone, but touch on Egypt's own higher interests. Any Egyptian government, regardless of its ideological inclinations, has to safeguard two things: national unity, and the unhindered supply of Nile water. To this end, Egypt has water agreements with upstream countries granting it historic rights, and will defend these rights at all costs. Any regional or international development that interferes, however remotely, with either of these two imperatives inevitably raises the alarm in Cairo. The Machakos agreement went well beyond the issues of ending the civil war and establishing a fairer distribution of wealth in the country. And in doing so, it has set a crucial precedence. The agreement threatens to change the entire Sudanese political system in ways that will, almost certainly, lead to partition. Both signatories may have voiced their commitment to making unity an attractive option for the southern Sudanese, but the terms of the agreement itself tell another story. The south will acquire the right to establish its own army, along with a separate administrative, security, and banking system; it will obtain a share of public revenues, and may pass laws that suit the norms and traditions of the south. It is also permitted to obtain funds from abroad without supervision by the Khartoum authorities. If this is not a first step towards secession, what is it? The Machakos agreement lays down three main principles: self-determination, the separation of church and state, and a six-year transition period. It is ambiguous enough to allow for variant interpretations by the two signatories, as well as by other Sudanese groups. The August round of talks will address the distribution of wealth, the restructuring of the interim government, the drafting of a new constitution, security, legislation, and a final ceasefire. The final agreement that follows will create a new Sudan -- if not two, or more. It should be noted that this agreement has been concluded just as a plethora of international schemes were emerging to restructure the Arab region so as to make it even more divided and thus amenable to foreign interference. The fact that the signatories and sponsors of this agreement excluded Egypt from the talks is, in itself, a cause for concern on this point. This is all the more puzzling since Omar Al-Bashir's government is presently on good terms with Egypt. However, Al- Bashir deliberately chose to keep Egypt in the dark about the IGAD-sponsored talks with Garang. The scant information about them which percolated through to Cairo came entirely from African third parties. Of course, some may argue that the Sudanese have the right to determine their future as they see fit, free of the supervision of outside parties, and particularly Egypt. Yet Egypt is hardly in the business of imposing itself as a guardian to the Arab countries, especially Sudan. Its policies toward all Sudanese groups over the past decade testify to this fact, as does the joint initiative with Libya. For the past four years, Egypt has done all it could to provide the Sudanese with a chance of dialogue which might lead to reconciliation and unity. Its attempts met with modest encouragement at first, but were subsequently ignored by all the Sudanese factions. Egypt, as everyone knows, is the only country among Sudan's neighbours that has refrained from arming the opposition groups, and has consistently opposed armed confrontation as a method of settling accounts. Egypt hosted Sudanese opposition members and allowed them to hold political discussions about the future of Sudan on its soil, but insisted that they confine their activities to propaganda and politics. At the same time, Egypt has been a staunch advocate of its neighbour's national unity, supporting the Sudanese government in international forums and seeking to avert the imposition of economic sanctions. Doubtless it was to be expected that some Sudanese would be highly sensitive to what they consider Egypt's "custodial" ambitions. Some of them even blame Egypt for the hell that their country has gone through. Of course, no country should impose itself as its brother's keeper. Yet, if the Sudanese are so sensitive about foreign interference, then why do we hear so little about the fact that the recent agreement was only achieved under tremendous foreign (US, European, African) pressure? This pressure is likely to escalate in the second round of talks, pushing the various parties to more decisions which, in the long run, can only harm Sudanese interests. Do the Sudanese prefer US "custodianship" to Arab calls for unity? The onus now is on those who disparage Egypt's efforts in these terms to prove that they can resist all forms of foreign intervention in their affairs, regardless of its source. Egypt wishes to see true peace and stability in a united Sudan, as the Sudanese know. The people of the Sudan need to work together in a spirit of forgiveness, transparency, and participation. Yet today, such a spirit is still severely lacking in some quarters. The entire Machakos process was flawed from the start. The agreement was signed by two of the parties to the conflict, in the absence of many others, and in particular the National Democratic Alliance, the opposition umbrella group which includes Garang's movement. As a result, the Machakos deal failed to provide the necessary degree of transparency and participation. Garang's movement bases its legitimacy on military force and external support. The Khartoum government, meanwhile, uses its legitimacy to exclude all other political partners from decisions concerning the country's future. The government is also notorious for using religion to manipulate domestic public opinion. Neither the Sudanese government nor the Garang faction have the right to determine the country's future, unless it be within the framework of a comprehensive constitutional conference. Despite these recent events, Egypt's attitude remains crucial to Sudan's future. Some may argue that Egypt should let the Sudanese be -- that our only role is to accept whatever the people of the Sudan may agree while helping garner Arab approval for their actions. Egypt will be happy with this role: but only if the agreement has the support of all the Sudanese people, not just two particular groups. Some suggest that Egypt should take part in the August round of talks, if only as an observer. This is fine with us too, but only if the Sudanese and their hosts agree to this participation, and only if we are allowed to have a say in the formulation of ideas, proposals, and counter- proposals (just as the Europeans, the Americans, and the IGAD representatives do). Those who think that Egypt has no option but to accept a fait accompli in Sudan are wrong. If we are to participate in these talks, then our participation must be more than merely symbolic. For we cannot afford to grant our blessing to a process which we know can only harm our own interests and damage the prospects for a united Sudan. * The writer is an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and chief editor of the Arab Strategic Report.
