The crisis in Sudan is by no means a zero-sum game. If one side "loses", everybody loses, argues Mohamed Abul-Fadl Sudan's problems are of such a magnitude, so persistent in their ferocity and so deeply ingrained that they threaten the very continued existence of the state. Worse yet, it appears that the Sudanese government has grown addicted not only to the scramble to adjust to these problems but also to exacerbating them through its own mismanagement and through rash reactions to the challenges posed by domestic forces and international agencies. The Sudanese government is beleaguered on all fronts simultaneously, and so far political manoeuvres, diplomatic solutions and even military offences have proven futile. In October, the tensions that had been brewing between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) blew into the open with the SPLM's decision to suspend its participation in the central government. The thinly disguised strains between the two parties over recent months made it virtually inevitable that the situation would reach this point. Nor could the cabinet reshuffle that followed succeed in appeasing the SPLM leadership. The reshuffle was "only a small part of the current crisis", said the newly appointed Foreign Minister Deng Alor. Indeed, such cosmetic gestures as an advisory appointment here and cabinet reshuffle there could do little to bridge the gap between the two parties, since the problem runs much deeper. The NCP has adamantly resisted responding in full to SPLM demands, ostensibly on the grounds that this would only encourage the SPLM to toughen its stance. Meanwhile, the SPLM found in the crisis an opportunity to correct what it regarded were mistakes in the implementation of the 2005 Nivasha Agreement, as well as a means to cover up its own mounting internal dissensions -- it could now blame the NCP for its own failings in the south. In addition, the SPLM was keen to avoid any possible obligations arising from the talks between the government and the Darfur opposition movements, which were held in Sirte, Libya, in October. It is therefore likely that the escalation in tensions between the partners in the National Unity government (the NCP and the SPLM) was no coincidence. By distancing itself from the government, the SPLM would ensure that whatever fallout occurred from the success or failure of the Sirte talks would have to be borne by the NCP alone. In all events, the SPLM was clearly determined from the outset to compel the NCP to respond to all its outstanding demands at once. The purpose was to push its coalition partner into a corner and force it to make a choice: either it could demonstrate the seriousness of its intentions by resolving the outstanding and potentially explosive issues with the SPLM or it could face the consequences of a deadlock, which, in fact, occurred at an extremely sensitive time when regional and international parties were gearing up for the critical Sirte conference on the Darfur question. The historic Nivasha Agreement now appears on the verge of collapse. The exchange of acrimony between the NCP Party and the SPLM has suddenly begun to spiral in a way that many regional parties find mysterious. This, in turn, has raised fears of a deliberate scheme to precipitate an early resolution of the question of the south in favour of secession, the repercussions of which would have a profound impact on the question of Darfur and could well result in the abandonment of political efforts to resolve that crisis. Particularly sensitive to the dangers of the current situation in Sudan, Egypt urgently dispatched Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit and General Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman to Khartoum and Juba in the hope of containing a situation that, if left to spin out of control, could ricochet throughout the region and that could be especially detrimental to Egypt. Although the results of the visit are not clear yet, their message was that "all parties in Sudan must understand the nature of the threats against the future of Sudan, threats that will not distinguish between the north, south, east or west." Egypt simultaneously picked up the pace of the diplomatic, economic, security and humanitarian initiatives towards the various Sudanese provinces and factions. In addition to hosting constructive dialogues with various Darfur opposition factions, Cairo has prepared to send 2,500 soldiers to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, broadened the scope of its economic and humanitarian aid, increased its educational assistance, and undertaken other such actions intended to strengthen Egypt's role in warding of the spectres of military conflagration and national fragmentation. THE ZERO-SUM GAME: It is mistaken to believe that the conflict between the NCP and the SPLM can be won by either party. Each has its own sources of strength which it can mobilise and its own vulnerabilities which leave it exposed to attack. In addition, there are various regional forces that can use diverse means to intervene between the two sides. Therefore, the best way to overcome the current crisis is for the parties to talk openly and honestly with each other, which, in fact, they have begun to do with considerable success on some issues. Nevertheless the pending issues are many, significant and thorny. While the NCP has accused the SPLM of 50 violations of the Nivasha Agreement, the SPLM has produced a long list of outstanding differences. The most important of these concern the redeployment of government forces from the south, the unification and retraining of the joint forces, the question of the south's share in the management of and revenues from oil contracts in the south, support for the census commission and the release of hundreds of SPLM prisoners. However, some observers maintain that of all the problems, the Abiye question is the one that touched off the current crisis. Acrimony between the National Unity partners erupted on numerous occasions over this oil-rich area located on the border between the north and the south. The Nivasha Agreement called for a special administrative system to be set up for Abiye under the office of the presidency until the referendum on southern independence scheduled for 2011, at which point the fate of Abiye would also be decided. In July 2005, the NCP rejected the findings of the Abiye border commission, charging that the international experts had overstepped their authority by relying on documents from before 1905 in delineating the Abiye boundaries. The problem has continued to fester, to an extent that caused Daniel Arap Moi, Kenya's special envoy for peace in Sudan, to warn that the current situation "will threaten peace and stability in the province if it is not remedied immediately". The former Kenyan president went on to urge "both parties to the peace agreement to exercise self-control and to honour their commitments." As the foregoing indicates, the problems between the two sides are too sensitive to be solved without mediation by outside parties. Moreover, the understandings that have been reached so far and that have helped reduce tensions are extremely delicate and are in need of ways to guarantee that they do not break down. This even applies to the peace agreement which has been signed by 14 international parties. However, SPLM Secretary- General Pagan Amum leaped ahead of regional efforts to contain the crisis when he appealed to the United Nations Security Council, the international community and the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) to intervene in order to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement. In a like vein, in his talks with President George W Bush and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in Washington and New York this month, Sudanese First Vice-President Salva Kiir Mayardit stressed how precarious the situation in the south was as a result of the counter-productive behaviour of the NCP. Kiir Mayardit could be assured a sympathetic ear in Washington in view of the Bush administration's stance towards the government of Sudan. Nearly a decade ago, the US imposed economic sanctions on Khartoum, but recently introduced exemptions for the southern provinces of Jabal Al-Nuba, the Blue Nile and Abiye. Washington also continues to list Sudan as a government that sponsors terrorism and it still characterises violence in Darfur as a "war of genocide" in spite of the fact that the international investigatory commission into that crisis could find no conclusive evidence to that effect. Nevertheless, some sources in Sudan do not think it likely, at least at present, that the US will impose further sanctions or try other means to force Khartoum to agree to SPLM demands. They hold that the US realises that the SPLM is also guilty of excesses in the south and appreciates the danger of encouraging the movement to push for early secession. In addition, Khartoum has become too important an intelligence source in Washington's war on terrorism for Washington to risk losing at this stage. In the opinion of Al-Fateh Arwah, the Sudanese ambassador to Washington, the pressures that the Bush administration is currently applying on Khartoum are for show. "It is unfortunate that Sudan has fallen victim to the domestic political rivalry between the Republicans and Democrats," he said, recalling that Bush was only driven to refer to the violence in Darfur as genocide at the time of the 2004 presidential elections in order to best his Democratic rival John Kerry who had attacked the Bush administration's handling of the Darfur crisis. NEW CALCULATIONS: The Darfur crisis has passed many turning points, but the one that was marked by the Sirte meeting on 27 October is qualitatively different in terms of how it affects all involved. In previous meetings of this nature, the rebel groups attained numerous goals, the most salient being that they won the sympathy of broad sectors of regional and international opinion. This generated the momentum of a powerful pressure front that applied itself against the Sudanese regime, not only with respect to Darfur, but also with respect to virtually every Sudanese problem. The opposition seemed to have begun to even out the score in a "game" that is exhausting both sides. However, in the lengthy talks that took place in Sirte and that brought together numerous international delegations, Khartoum attained three successive political goals. Firstly, it made its presence felt with a large high-level delegation empowered to take decisions in these UN-African Union sponsored talks, whereas the two major factions in Darfur (the Sudan Liberation Movement wing led by Abdul-Wahid Nur and the faction of the Justice and Equality Movement led by Khalil Ibrahim) were conspicuously absent. Secondly, Khartoum had taken the initiative before the conference to declare a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur, thereby generating positive impressions of its good intentions, whereas the rebel factions merely expressed their scepticism of Khartoum's initiative without reciprocating. The third point was won by default when, just as regional and international delegations were arriving in Libya in the hope of making a breakthrough in the crisis, eight factions joined the boycott. Many regional and international parties were extremely angered by this move, a sentiment that was reflected in a UN Security Council statement declaring the council's "readiness to take action against any party that seeks to undermine the peace meeting", raising the possibility of sanctions against the rebel factions. As a result of the boycott, the factions that did attend Sirte were of relatively minor political and military weight and it thus appeared that the conference would fail to reach anything conclusive. Colonel Qaddafi was of the opinion that the strong regional and international presence counted for little if the two largest factions were not on hand, as these constituted the mainstays of any future arrangement for security and stability. The most significant factions that were present in Sirte were the Idris Bahr Abu Qirda wing of the Justice and Equality Movement, the Federal Alliance led by Ahmed Ibrahim Dreij, the Reform and Development Movement led by Khalil Abdullah, the wing of the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Adam Bakhit and a group representing the Sudan Movement headed by Khamis Akbar. In addition, there were two Arab break-off factions from the Sudan Liberation Movement, the United Revolutionary Force Front led by Ibrahim Al-Zobeidi and the Democratic Revolutionary Force Front led by Salah Abu Surra. Some have suggested that boycotting Sirte was the most appropriate choice for the major Darfur factions. Several days before the meeting six factions held a meeting in Juba after which they announced their decision not to attend. Abdul- Wahid Nur issued a statement in which he explained that he would not attend unless several conditions were met first, foremost among which was the immediate deployment of international forces to protect civilians in Darfur. He also objected to Libya as the choice of venue for the meeting. Leaders of other factions said that they needed more time before the meeting in order to discuss at length the controversial issues so as to be able to avert a repetition of the mistakes in the Abuja Accord. Concluded last year between the Sudanese government and the Minni Arko Minnawi-led wing of the Sudan Liberation Movement, the accord has since come under harsh criticism even by some of its former supporters and is now on the verge of collapse due to arguments between Minnawi and Khartoum over the mechanisms for implementation. The Sirte sponsors rejected the factions' demands for two reasons. Firstly, they held that there had been sufficient time to prepare for the meeting if the concerned parties had been serious instead of indulging in escalatory posturing. The date for the Sirte meeting had been set in August through an agreement between the UN and the African Union. As there had been no encouraging progress in the negotiating situation since then, the crucial issue was not the time and preparation factor but rather the need to make some breakthrough in bridging the gap between the negotiating positions. The second reason, according to the sponsors, was that the international community was pressing for steps to keep the pressure up on the government of Sudan so as to create a climate conducive to its acceptance of the conditions and demands of the rebels. These reactions reflect a recent and subtle shift in the attitudes of some regional and international quarters concerned with the Darfur crisis. Until only a few weeks ago the tendency was to pin all responsibility for the success or failure of the conference on whether the government would attend. Now it appears that some have caught on to the rebels' game, which is to prolong the crisis indefinitely in the hope of either sapping the strength of the government so that it will finally cave into their demands or of propelling the international community to use its political, economic and military leverage to impose conditions in Sudan that would work towards the realisation of their objectives. FAILURES AND CHALLENGES: It is well known that the Darfur rebel factions enjoy considerable sympathy abroad. They have been encouraged by this fact to reject and even sabotage numerous initiatives. That there is no clear consensus on the priorities among the possible solutions or even on the question of whether to use peaceful means or military force has further complicated the crisis. Recently, some quarters have suggested using a combination of both diplomatic and military means, but their conceptions in this regard are still vague. In view of the general disparity in opinion, a clear and convincing perception of how to reach a settlement remains out of reach. Still, in spite of the boycott -- or perhaps, in a large part, because of it -- the Sirte meeting set the Darfur crisis on a new road, forcing the local, regional and international circles concerned to readjust the way they determine their actions in the coming phase. As the post-Sirte situation currently stands, it is now difficult to lay the fault for the current impasse at the feet of the Sudanese government alone. The boycott declared by the major Darfur factions handed the government the opportunity to refute such claims. It also opened the rebel factions to harsh criticism, as well as to the possibility of sanctions that could be even harsher than those imposed on the government of Sudan. In addition, the alternative of sending in the "Hybrid" forces is looking increasingly attractive to some as the most appropriate way of dealing with an intricate and increasingly intractable situation. If the international community failed in its first practical political test and the Sudanese government did not succeed in dispelling the suspicions of others, the rebel factions can expect a different style of treatment after having embarrassed some of their supporters and failed to reach an agreement among themselves. In short, the Sirte conference, which will continue for an indefinite period, has reshuffled the deck. Sadly, the "game" is being played on an extremely difficult and increasingly bleak-looking board. Turmoil and suffering have mounted tragically in almost every corner of Sudan as the result of the regime's inability over the past 18 years to produce clear and constructive ideas for surmounting its difficulties and because the opposition forces have failed to capitalise effectively on their outside support and create a sufficiently solid and cohesive base to be able to present themselves as a viable alternative, capable of protecting the unity of the country and steering it back to democracy, security and stability. Moreover, the fact that the vast majority of Sudanese political leaders have been unable to rise above their narrow ideological, regional, political party and social affiliations and, perhaps, their own personal ambitions has worked to create a climate conducive to the grimmest scenarios inspired by the thirst for vengeance, desperation, fanatical ideas, and/or hidden agendas. Much now rests on the ability of the central government to summon the wisdom to engage in an honest and objective process of introspection and, on the basis of this, to introduce fundamental changes into its rhetoric and practices on all issues. Unless it forges a truly fresh and constructive approach, the frustration that has infected most political forces in Sudan and that has begun to spread abroad will mount and express itself in ways that will close off all avenues to political settlement, leaving open only the door to massive punitive and military solutions. The ongoing tensions between Sudanese forces have long since spilled over the borders of Sudan. Now, as the problems worsen and the spectre of the disintegration looms closer, the symptoms of Sudan's syndromes have begun to infect Sudan's neighbours and other countries with strategic interests in that country. These considerations along with the fact that the region cannot sustain more chaos will hopefully galvanise regional and international forces into moving swiftly in order to bring the spiralling situation back under control. The Government needs to rise to five major challenges: - It must urgently settle the outstanding issues with the south, stop playing the stalling game with the SPLM over its participation in government and work out mutual concessions in order to close the breach of acrimony and distrust. To allow the Nivasha Agreement to collapse will hasten the partition of the country, the damage from which will reverberate throughout all Sudanese provinces and abroad. - It needs to be more responsive and proactive in Sirte, taking advantage of the opportunity to further embarrass the rebel factions by agreeing to constructive proposals and sending out reassurances that will dispel the climate of escalation and the spectre of military solutions. In this regard, the government should take heed of the caution in the August report of the International Crisis Group which warned, "if equitable solutions to all the problems can not be found, Darfur will continue to suffer and new wars will begin." If that prediction comes true and if the government does not change its approach, there is no doubt where the international community will lay the blame. - It should strive to make the peace agreement in the eastern province a model of its desire for calm and the restoration of stability. Towards this end, the government should fulfil all its political, economic and security obligations, thereby putting paid to the allegations that it is dragging its feet. This will go a long way towards alleviating the suspicions of the SPLM as well as the Darfur opposition movements. - The government should broaden the scope of civil liberties, amend the constitution in a manner that upholds the value of these liberties and safeguards them, and urge the northern opposition parties to participate in the forthcoming elections, the results of which will have a major impact on many crucial issues. - It should strive to take further advantage of the albeit subtle shift in international attitudes towards it as a result of its agreement to allow in the "Hybrid" force, its responsiveness to the Sirte meeting, the frequent mistakes and the disarray of the opposition, not to mention the growing apprehensions among regional and international quarters.
