As disparate Iraqi groups jockey for power and influence, uncertainty shrouds a planned national conference, writes Salah Hemeid The first month of the Iraqi interim government ended badly. A national conference that was to choose a 100- member Advisory Council, a key element of the government's legitimacy, was postponed for two weeks because of inter-factional bickering over its make-up. Many groups refused to participate in the conference, citing factionalism and cronyism. Others dismissed it as a tool of the American occupation. The three-day National Assembly of 1,000 participants was originally slated for 31 July and has now been rescheduled for mid-August. Its goal was to select a national assembly of 100 members to oversee the interim government and which would have the power to overturn its decisions. Twenty-five members of the former US- picked Interim Governing Council (IGC) who did not get a post in the presidential council or cabinet will become members of the new council -- without being elected by the members of the 1,000-member National Assembly. The plan for holding the conference, stipulated under a law enacted by the American occupation authority, is part of the efforts made by UN envoy Lakhdar Labrahimi to implement UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq which call for an election in Iraq by January -- the first step towards the transfer of full sovereignty to the Iraqis. It is also indicative of the Bush administration's eagerness to speed up the political process ahead of the US presidential election in November, and prove that its political programme for Iraq is working as Iraqis begin running their own affairs. Yet discussions over the make-up of the conference have stirred deep concerns amid accusations that key players in the government are trying to manipulate the assembly to acquire a sizable political ranking in the new regime. Other players are simply fighting to avoid complete political marginalisation. Many Iraqi groups opposed the conference even before preparations got underway. Some criticised it for being held while the country remained under the American occupation; others said the convention should have been held before the formation of Iyad Allawi's government on 28 June in order to allow the conference to foster a national confidence in the government and confer legitimacy on it. At the time Ibrahimi was in favour of holding the conference after the interim government was in place. There was insufficient time, he said, and holding it after the formation of the government would provide a forum for national reconciliation on the one hand, and constitute a constitutional safety valve -- government supervision -- on the other. According to Fouad Mossoum, head of the preparatory committee, the conference was postponed in response to a request by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who cited security reasons -- referring to increasing violence in Iraqi cities, and the possibility that the conference itself might be targeted by anti-government insurgents. Such an attack would certainly dampen public enthusiasm for involvement in Iraq's post-war political restructuring. Whatever the reasons behind Annan's request, the UN role in this delicate process seems to be becoming larger than many Iraqis -- especially the political forces inside the Iraqi interim government -- initially imagined. But there are other concerns underscoring total absence of a national consensus. The preparatory committee, comprising members or supporters of the US-backed political groups -- who formed the defunct IGC and are now inside the interim government -- have set complicated criteria which candidates have to meet including a vague reference to "good reputation". Critics also scoffed at the complicated selection process which gives these groups a mandate to select the candidates, virtually empowering them to make or break political careers or parties. The selection process has been already challenged by representatives of many Shia provinces who favour direct elections, through which they hope to emerge on top. Shia spiritual leader Grand Ayatullah Ali Al-Sistani, a powerful figure who seems to unify many Shia behind his word, demanded elections. Even worse, young Shia cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr has vehemently rejected the formation of the council and vowed that his radical group will continue resistance. On the other hand, opponents to the conference, mainly among Sunni Muslims, have expressed worries about being increasingly marginalised and fear they are being victimised by political favouritism. Influential Sunni groups like the Association of Muslim Scholars made it clear that their participation in Iraq's political future is intrinsically linked to the withdrawal of US and foreign troops from their country. "Elections and the transition of power are worthless as long as Iraq is under occupation," the association said in a statement. Mossoum, of the preparatory committee, declared that the conference should be credible, so the assembly should bring together representatives from all walks of Iraqi life: political, social, religious, ethnic, tribal and others. To this end, therefore, the committee -- as many Iraqi politicians and activists have argued -- should first remove the right of members of the former IGC to be appointed, and accept the principle that they be elected, thereby clarifying the procedures for becoming members of the council. Second, the political groups already in the interim government should not be allowed to select members according to criteria of their own -- which are designed to staff the assembly with their cronies. Third, the system of sectarian, religious and political quotas should be abolished in order to allow wider participation, particularly by individuals who wish to participate in public life and serve their society. The success of the conference, therefore, will largely depend on broadening political participation, especially by opposition forces. This will ensure that Iraq's post- Saddam political landscape is fully inclusive and will help to dry up the wells of political violence, clearing the way for free elections in January 2005. This is the most daunting challenge the interim government facing the US and the UN in the political reconstruction of Iraq. In a congested political climate infused with violence, it will be difficult to guarantee the overall success and legitimacy of elections without a national consensus.
