Palestinian elections will mark the real crossing of the threshold into the post-Arafat era, writes Samir Ghattas* In the wake of Yasser Arafat's death came a deluge of official statements and encouraging analyses on the renewed possibilities of reaching a settlement to the Middle East conflict. The predictions were not only premature, they were wrong. It is idiotic to place the entire onus for the failure of peace efforts on Arafat alone. Nor will his successor, whether Abu Mazen or anyone else, be able to win Palestinian approval for a final settlement with Israel that sinks below Arafat's bottom line at Camp David II. The roadmap does not hold out much hope -- assuming, of course, the first phase of the plan gets under way -- of steering the disputants towards a final settlement. The most we can conceivably expect is the declaration of a temporary Palestinian "mini-state" after which the two sides will have to resume negotiations over final status issues. It is impossible to estimate how much time it will require to reach mutually acceptable compromises over the questions of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, the borders, water and Israeli settlements. And this is not to mention other negotiating minefields such as security, sovereignty, compensation and additional issues such as demographic exchange. It is against this complex and potentially fraught background that we must view what some Israeli analysts have termed the if-only-Arafat-were-alive syndrome. In an environment as volatile as the Middle East it is folly to make long-range predictions, especially with regards to a solution to the Middle East conflict. Enough to recall that since 1937 there have been more than 100 proposals and initiatives, all of which have proved futile. It is, then, more useful at this juncture to focus on the impact of Palestinian efforts to navigate the post-Arafat phase. The forthcoming PA presidential elections are, understandably, garnering the lion's share of public attention in Palestine. It remains important, though, to probe a little deeper than ordinary press coverage with its sensationalist bent and tendency to give endless play to the results of various unreliable opinion polls. At this juncture in particular, it is important to take stock of several factors that are not only shaping the electoral process but may also have a commensurate impact on the foreseeable future, especially as pertains to the process of restructuring Palestinian political society. The determination of the Palestinians to ensure a smooth and democratic handover of power is the first of these factors. Contrary to the expectations of many the Palestinians proved remarkably adept at filling the vacuum left by the death of Arafat. With alacrity and urgency they initiated a series of broadly-based and democratically-spirited dialogues as a result of which they were able to cap any security breakdown and forestall a precipitous slide into civil war. The Palestinians have every right to take pride in this accomplishment. Equally to their credit is the transparency that characterised nominations to the PA presidency. All the indications are that there will be a large and enthusiastic voter turnout for the elections which will be conducted in accordance with the conditions of an impartial international monitoring team. As important and encouraging as these signs are, the many serious challenges that await the Palestinians in the post-electoral phase compels them to regard democracy as more than a temporary exigency for overcoming the current leadership void. The Palestinians must adopt democratic processes as the sole means of arbitrating internal differences and towards this end the new leadership must make it a priority to entrench democratic mechanisms and foster a democratic culture. In the nomination process for the PA presidency two candidates emerged from Fatah. Regardless of whether or not Marwan Barghouti withdraws his nomination, this underscores the depth of the ideological and generational divide within Fatah. And while the left-wing factions failed to reach a consensus over a single candidate to represent them in the elections the number of independent candidates was more than double those fielded by the 13 factions that dominate Palestinian political life. Islamic opposition factions, such as Hamas, having declared they would boycott the nomination process to the PA presidency later announced that they would participate in all the polls at the presidential, legislative and municipal levels. This decision is indicative of an important shift in the thinking of these factions. From the behaviour of the various parties to the nomination process it is possible to deduce more general phenomena. For one, they throw into relief the growing factionalisation of Palestinian society, a mode of socio-political organisation that contrasts with civil society, in the sense of non-governmental grassroots organisations that are autonomous in the pursuit of their social and political ends and free of the legacy of dictatorial control and forms of physical and intellectual intimidation. Although there are encouraging signs of the development, albeit slow and faltering, of a Palestinian civil society, factional society, which is a major impediment to the development of civil society, is far from drawing its dying breath. Yet it is civil society that the Palestinian people and their leadership must usher in if they are to enjoy the mode of political life they deserve. Justifying the perpetuation of the factional order on the grounds that Palestinians are still in the process of national liberation is no longer acceptable. Indeed, many of the factions have no objective grounds for existence to begin with while others have effectively exhausted their historical purpose. A crucial operative factor at this stage pertains to the manner in which Arafat's powers were distributed. Under the new Palestinian "troika" Abu Mazen has taken over as chairman of the PLO Executive Committee (and was then nominated for the position of PA president), Farouk Al-Qadoumi (Abul-Lutf) now serves as head of Fatah while Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ela), still prime minister, has assumed some of the powers that Arafat had withheld from him. Compared to the situation under Arafat this formula for the distribution of powers appears balanced. It is not, however, without certain drawbacks and even potential dangers. Regional, kinship, partisan and other allegiances were at play in the re-distribution of Arafat's powers. Because of the way these criteria operate it remains possible that power will once again converge into the control of a single hand, even if it is one that sports a silk glove. Because the three members of the troika all belong to Fatah the formula is also highly fragile. That other factions are demanding and manoeuvring to obtain a share of the Arafat power legacy is certain to produce awkward situations, such as an elected PA president having to contend with an elected parliament dominated by an alliance of opposition parties and independents, or a split between the PA and the PLO. The status of the Intifada is also a crucial formative factor in the post-Arafat phase. The opposition factions have once again begun to air their fears that Abu Mazen will attempt to halt, or even sell out, the Intifada. They had suspected him of similar designs when he served as prime minister under Arafat. It should be stressed here that Abu Mazen is not alone in his objections to the militarisation of the Intifada. Indeed, Mustafa Barghouti, his prime rival for the position of PA president, is one of the more outspoken critics of the militarisation of the Intifada. Simultaneously, it has been some time since the Intifada's advocates have been able to propel the movement forward or even capitalise on its former momentum. These realities do not imply that the Palestinians should renounce the option of resistance; what they imply is that they must revitalise the resistance by restoring it to its proper grassroots framework. A consensus must be reached over aims, strategies and means. Perhaps it was the realisation of this need that in a large measure accounts for the revival of the truce option, over which the factions have already reached certain understandings. Our only hope is that they avoid the pitfalls of the first truce experience for this time the consequences of a breakdown will be catastrophic. As crucial as the foregoing factors will be in shaping the Palestinian polity in the post-Arafat phase, we cannot ignore the panoply of external factors. Indeed, the comportment of Israeli, Arab and international powers may have a far greater impact on the ability of the Palestinians to re-establish themselves on a solid footing, especially in light of the absence of a figure of the power and stature of Arafat. In all events, regardless of the outcome of the ballot and the identity of the new PA president, 9 January 2005 will mark the official beginning of a new era, one rife with possibilities and surprises. * The writer is the director of the Maqdis Centre for political studies in Gaza.
