The brutal murder of the symbol of Lebanon's reconstruction threatens to make the conflict between Syria and Lebanon the most critical in the region Mohamed Sid-Ahmed comments The assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri has opened a new chapter in the never ending saga of conflicts in the troubled Middle East. His death has brought the simmering crisis between Syria and opponents of its presence in Lebanon to a head, sparking fears that the conflict between the two countries will replace the one between Israelis and Palestinians as the most acute in the region. In an interview with the New York Times, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said the war with Israel was coming to an end. The interview was published on the day Al-Hariri was killed in the worst terrorist attack since the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990. A previously unknown organisation calling itself "Victory and Jihad in the Levant" claimed responsibility for the attack, but the claim was dismissed as a smokescreen aimed at shielding the identity of the real culprit. The massive explosion that killed Al-Hariri and 14 others sent shock waves throughout the Middle East, heightening the security concerns of many Arab leaders who fear the turmoil that threatens to engulf Lebanon, alongside the turmoil in Iraq and, despite Mahmoud Abbas's reassurances to the contrary, in Palestine, could spill over into their own countries. According to Mahmoud Abbas, the situation on the Israeli-Palestinian front is moving towards peace. In actual fact, however, it remains closer to an all-out war. The argument now being raised to justify pursuing a policy of appeasement towards Israel is that Sharon "has changed his language". But the problem is that the change in language is not reflected in any real change in substance. Words are now being used to convey the very opposite of their meaning. Divorced from their substance, they are not an accurate reflection of the political reality. It is still unclear how the crisis between Syria and Lebanon will evolve. What is certain, however, is that if it does explode it will not be confined to the Lebanese theatre. It will not be just a replay of the civil war that raged in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. This time around, the situation will be yet more complicated if only because a relapse is always worse than the original malady. Passions are running high in Lebanon, where voices from across the country's various ethnic and religious communities are demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the resignation of the pro- Damascus government. A wide coalition of opposition forces, ranging from the right-wing Phalangist leader Amin Jumayal to the left-wing Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, have openly accused the Lebanese and Syrian governments of responsibility for Al-Hariri's murder. Al-Hariri's death marks a shift in Lebanon's power structure, with the opposition, bolstered by the tough anti- Syrian stance of Washington and Paris, emerging as stronger than the governing coalition. Unlike most Lebanese politicians, Al-Hariri was not a member of one of the powerful clans that traditionally dominate the complex sectarian mosaic making up the country's body politic. Born into a poor family, he left Lebanon at a young age for Saudi Arabia, where he became a successful entrepreneur with close ties to the Saudi royal family. Thanks to the oil price boom following the October 1973 war, he built up a personal fortune estimated at $2 billion, making him one of the ten richest men in the world. Credited with being the architect of Lebanon's reconstruction, he used some of his personal funds to rebuild the war- ravaged country. The question that needs to be asked is who had an interest in getting rid of Al-Hariri. And is interest the only factor determining the features of the new map of alliances and confrontations in the region? A distinction needs to be made here between two types of conflict situations: one that arises for "objective" reasons between protagonists with contradictory interests difficult to reconcile, and another that arises for "subjective" reasons between protagonists whose interests are not necessarily irreconcilable and who can therefore come to a settlement. That is not to say, however that conflicts arising for objective reasons are always more acute than those arising for subjective reasons, although the former are more fundamental. For example, a conflict exists between Lebanon and Israel. And there is also a conflict between Lebanon and Syria. In the Arab understanding, the contradiction between Lebanon and Israel is a fundamental contradiction, while the one between Lebanon and Syria is not. Still, the contradiction between Lebanon and Syria at this specific moment of history is the more acute of the two. What happens when the less fundamental contradiction eclipses the more fundamental one? How do contradictions interact in such situations? By what mechanism do new contradictions supplant older ones? What is new since Al-Hariri's demise is that a secondary contradiction between Lebanon and Syria has acquired precedence over a fundamental one. Who benefits from this development, whose immediate effect has been to propel the issue of Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon to the forefront of the political agenda? The one party that has absolutely no interest in bringing an end to the Syrian presence in Lebanon is Syria itself. Already strained before Al-Hariri's murder, Syro-Lebanese relations have sunk to an all-time low. With the Lebanese government balking at an international investigation into the murder, tensions are rising and positions hardening. Al- Hariri is regarded by all Lebanese as the prime mover of the reconstruction drive, the man who restored to Beirut its pre-civil war reputation and standing. And Al-Hariri was not an enemy of Syria. He always strove to strike a balance between the various Lebanese constituencies. But Lebanon cannot be at peace when its environment is raging. Is it possible to cling to the notion that the interests of Lebanon and Syria are identical? It is clear that the perpetrators of the act against Al-Hariri were not amateurs but seasoned professionals who struck with maximum impact, using 350 kilogrammes of explosives to pulverise Al-Hariri's motorcade and bring to an end the fragile peace the Lebanese have been trying to hold together. The main target of the assailants was to stir up all the contradictions in the region, not only inside Lebanon. All of which leads us to believe that the act was perpetrated not by a network or an organisation, but by a state. Explanations of what actually happened are still confused and contradictory. Fingers have been pointed not only at Syria, but also at the Mossad and terror organisations. The real culprit, in American eyes, is an axis made up of Syria, Iran and Hizbullah. But Syria does not stand to gain from Al-Hariri's death; in fact, quite the contrary. According to its information minister, Israel, whose record of targeted assassinations in Lebanon is well known, is a much more likely suspect. But the issue having precedence over all others is to get out of the present quagmire peacefully. The contradiction between Lebanon and Syria should not be allowed to become the primary contradiction in the region. Every effort must be made to prevent the situation from sinking once again into widespread chaos. Egypt has called on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid emotional reactions that threaten to destabilise the entire region.
