The Tel Aviv bombing may have been against Abu Mazen. But it has also underscored the Palestinians' need for a democratic political system, writes Graham Usher from Jerusalem On 25 February a Palestinian suicide bomber killed five Israelis and wounded 50 others outside a nightclub in Tel Aviv. It was the first attack inside Israel since 1 November. It also brought to a close the period of calm that followed Mahmoud Abbas's ceasefire declaration at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit on 8 February. Calm is relative of course. Since 1 November, 170 Palestinian men, women and children have been killed by Israeli army and settlers. Twenty-five have been slain since Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB) announced a de facto moratorium on military operations on 23 January. But the truce's one-sidedness did not diminish the shock, and not only among Israelis who long ago again started clubbing in Tel Aviv and dining in West Jerusalem. There was anger too among Palestinians. Whatever their frustration over Israel's tardiness in freeing political prisoners and withdrawing from West Bank cities, most still back their president's efforts to trade violence for democratic governance and a return to meaningful political negotiations. That mood was registered in the speed with which Hamas, Jihad and the AMB dissociated themselves from the blast. It was there also in the confidence with which Abbas blamed "third parties" for the attack. In PLO-speak, "third parties" means foreign rather than national forces, with the Lebanese Hizbullah whispered as the likeliest suspect. The whisper became louder. Two AMB men said they had been contacted by Kais Obeid, a Palestinian-Israeli citizen long accused by Israel as the link between Hizbullah and Palestinian militias in the West Bank. Obeid allegedly told them he had recruited the bomber for Hizbullah but wanted the AMB to claim responsibility. Hizbullah dismissed these innuendoes as "lies". As did Syria to the Israeli charge that it had "proof" that the Tel Aviv bombing was authorised in Damascus. "It's a pointlessly offensive accusation. Syria had nothing to do with it," said President Bashar Al-Assad to Italy's La Republica newspaper. How much weight is there to these claims and counter-claims? Few Palestinian Authority officials would deny that Hizbullah has extended its reach in the occupied territories since the Intifada began four years ago. It has served as sponsor, financier and champion of various AMB and Jihad cells, especially in the northern West Bank. Nor, clearly, does it have anything to gain from a renewal of coordination between the Israeli and PA intelligence services. But even fewer PA officials can see what Syria or Hizbullah have to gain by upping the ante now. On the contrary, Syria and Lebanon have not only hosted Abbas: They have thrown their public weight behind his efforts to broker a Palestinian ceasefire. And Hizbullah is currently facing down a ferocious Israeli diplomatic offensive to have them put on the European Union's "terrorist" list. To mount an attack in Tel Aviv in such a period would be political ineptitude. Hizbullah is known for many things: Ineptitude is not among them. The fact is there are many third parties in the occupied territories. Some seek sponsorship from Hizbullah; others from disaffected PA security officials or Fatah leaders, home and abroad. And some use attacks on Israelis as surrogates for power struggles within their own organisation. This may have been the case with the Tel Aviv bombing. On 26 February one Abu Tareq -- supposedly a Jihad official in Lebanon -- claimed responsibility because "the calm period with the PA was an agreement for a month and Israel has not abided by the pacification period." Then came a statement from the known Jihad official, Mohamed Hindi, which also admitted responsibility but added: "The Islamic Jihad policy has not changed. We are still committed to the period of calm agreed with Abu Mazen (Abbas)." In other words: Tel Aviv was a rogue operation without licence from the Jihad leaderships based in Gaza or Damascus. This is what makes Abbas's task so mammoth. On the one hand, he cannot allow unaccountable militias (or fractions of militias) to sabotage his policies. On the other, he cannot bow to Israeli dictates to make root-and-branch arrests, since this would end all chance of agreeing a durable ceasefire. Rather -- through an agreed ceasefire, reform and power sharing -- he has to create a new political culture in which factional sources of power defer to democratic sources of power, says Palestinian parliamentarian Hanan Ashrawi. "Legitimate democracy is the key because with democracy and an inclusive political system the minority cannot defy the majority. This is why I want Hamas and the other factions to participate in the parliamentary elections. The chaos is factional politics in which each claims a veto in the name of the Palestinian people. They can't do that if there is a democratic mandate and a democratic system of which they are part."
