Enormous leaps have been made, writes Fahd Suleiman, in unifying the Palestinian national voice The first two rounds of the Palestinian national dialogue hosted by Cairo at the beginning and end of 2003 contributed greatly to bridging the gaps between participants. It was the third round, however, that achieved the major breakthrough, which is reflected in the Cairo Declaration. Several developments helped prepare the ground for this achievement. One was Hamas's decision, emulated by other militant factions, to abide by a ceasefire on condition that Israel reciprocated. The question of the restoration of calm -- or a ceasefire -- was one of the issues that had remained unresolved in the first two rounds of the national dialogue. Also, Hamas's resounding announcement that it would take part in the 2005 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections effectively signaled that it was willing to integrate with both the Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in view of the fact that parliamentary membership automatically confers membership in the PLO National Council. This effectively resolved the question of a unified framework for the Palestinian movement. Hamas, and the Islamist movement in general, developed outside the PLO umbrella. Previously, Hamas had insisted that any integration must preserve the PLO and Islamist movement as two distinct entities, arguing variously for a redrafting of the PLO Charter or the creation of a new umbrella organisation under which both entities would be subordinate. On deciding to participate in legislative elections, Hamas will take its place in existing political institutions -- the PLO and the PA -- without stipulating prior agreement over political objectives or organisational structures. In so doing, it has resolved, in principle, a critical issue that had thwarted the first two rounds of dialogue. The electoral process itself is producing rapid changes in the Palestinian political system at the PA level. In addition to the presidential elections held 9 January, the first phase of municipal council elections was held 23 December in the West Bank and 26 January in Gaza, with the remainder of the municipal elections and the PLC elections to be completed by 17 July. The elections stimulated heated controversy over electoral laws and over the principle of proportional representation, with the first round of municipal elections coming as a shock to the ruling Fatah party. Of the 10 municipalities in which elections were held, Hamas won a majority in seven, which enhanced confidence in the electoral process and, simultaneously, strengthened the conviction in the principle of proportional representation. The third round of the Palestinian national dialogue took place against a backdrop of increasing international focus on Palestinian electoral campaigns and the Israeli "disengagement" plan for Gaza -- its first political initiative since the outbreak of the Intifada, one that it intends to put into effect as of 20 July. Israel is keen for relative calm to prevail in order to stage a smooth and dignified withdrawal, as opposed to one that could be portrayed as a humiliating defeat for its forces and the occupation, as was the case with its withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000. Palestinian moves to restore calm have intersected with Israel's desire to create optimal conditions for its disengagement plan, a desire complicated by the dissension Sharon has met from Israeli settlers and from within the Likud Party. Simultaneously, the progress of Palestinian elections has so far met the expectations of the international community, keen to see the completion of this process as one of the preliminary steps towards the resumption of the roadmap. This is not to suggest that all was rosy before participants met in Cairo. However, the scene was set for participants to exercise their dynamism, spirit of initiative and ability to take crucial decisions at the right moment, thereby making it possible to translate trends and tendencies into substantive and cohesive tasks and aims that were embodied in the Cairo Declaration. Otherwise put, the participants did not merely take preceding developments and move them ahead; nor was their conference shaped exclusively by those developments, even if it moved in the direction of their trajectory. What the conference achieved was to give concrete shape to the issues that preceded it, elevate them to the peeks of the national agenda, weave diverse threads together into a uniform fabric and furnish a forward looking vision for the Palestinian movement as it forges towards the realisation of national rights. The restoration of calm to help enable the Israeli departure from Gaza with as few retaliatory re-incursions as possible, the completion of municipal elections and the holding of legislative elections, comprehensive reform and preparations for the long- awaited convention of the Palestinian National Council -- these were the concerns that still loomed on the eve of the Palestinian conference in Cairo. As long as these issues remained general bullet points, they would not stir major differences between the various factions or trigger a significant departure from the PA line. However, everyone knew that it would be another story when participants began to probe below the headlines and seek a consensus over principles and mechanisms that would govern the performance of national tasks over coming months. Would these talks end up reproducing the status quo with all its well-known deficiencies, or would they produce a qualitative leap beyond present difficulties and open up the prospect for future development? First, it was necessary to resolve a question of focus. Should participants look beyond the end of the year to preparations for final status negotiations and set aside questions of domestic reform on the grounds that solid, reliable progress is being made? This was the opinion of President Abbas. The opposing view was to couple the questions of internal reform with the 2005 national agenda. Some further held that it was pointless to dwell on anything beyond that since it was unlikely Israel would be willing to resume negotiations soon. Ultimately, this was the view that prevailed. Did it follow that there was a relationship established between the principle of ceasefire and domestic arrangements whereby progress in the latter is contingent upon the stability of the former and whereby Fatah's opposition would be rewarded for its commitment to the former by concessions in the latter? Such a contention is imprecise, its weak point residing in the reciprocal formula that hints at cohesion between the conflicting interests of constituents of the opposition. In addition, it fails to clarify why it is in the higher national interests of all -- the PA and opposition alike -- to pursue the restoration of calm and domestic reforms as two sides of the same coin. Perhaps it is more accurate, in light of the commonly held conviction over the need for unity of rank, that the restoration of calm will facilitate progress in domestic arrangements which, in turn, will work to fortify calm, which, still further, can be used to strengthen national cohesion that likely will needed to confront the formidable challenges that await on the road ahead. The principle of restoration of calm represents a crossroads. Each of those standing at this juncture arrived there from a certain point of departure and has a certain perception of where he wants to go and how to get there. There are those who regard a ceasefire as an essential prerequisite for halting, as Mahmoud Abbas termed it, the "militarisation of the Intifada" and enabling the resumption of negotiations. This position is founded on the premise that while the Palestinians may not have a firm guarantee that the occupying power will reciprocate, it would be difficult for it not to. Proponents of this position put great faith in the efficacy of international pressure. Accordingly, advocates of this position maintain that a ceasefire should not be bound by a timeframe, whether before negotiations as a prerequisite for resumption or after negotiations in order that they continue. For others, restoration of calm implies a temporary halt in resistance operations dictated by such exigencies as the need to regroup and re-organize and facilitate the Israeli departure from Gaza. Proponents of this view insist upon a timeframe and upon conditions that Israel must fulfill--a halt to all forms of aggression, a halt to settlement construction and the "Judaisation" of occupied territories, the release of Palestinian prisoners and political detainees and withdrawal to the lines of pre-28 September 2000. As it is recognised that the resistance's power is insufficient to secure Israeli commitment to these demands, the purpose of them is to keep the door open for military operations while taking advantage of the tactical opportunity to build up morale and a sustainable, armed resistance movement. A third view holds that a ceasefire is not so much an option but an inevitability dictated by current political circumstances and that it must be declared unilaterally on the basis of the Sharm El-Sheikh summit. This view maintains that the Israeli commitment in Sharm El-Sheikh was purely a tactical move motivated by its desire for a smooth withdrawal from Gaza; that it has no sincere intent to halt aggression whether through the overt exercise of violence or in other forms (the construction of the separating wall, settlement expansion, the Judaisation of occupied areas, closures and detentions, etc.). It is important to note that Sharon rejected Egyptian proposals for a single summit statement so as to avoid the mutually binding nature of such a document. Separate Palestinian and Israeli statements were issued, the latter permitting a weaker Israeli commitment by rendering it contingent upon prior Palestinian commitments. As a result, whatever ceasefire the Israel agrees to will be inherently fragile and short-lived, so it is pointless to insist upon a timeframe. In reaching for a practical and balanced formula on this issue, and in placing ceasefire in the context of Gaza, domestic reform, preparations for final status negotiations and ongoing Israeli attempts to impose de facto realities on the ground, the third round of Palestinian national dialogue effectively lifted the ceasefire issue out of a purely time- related context and set it in a functional framework defined by the accomplishment of specific national targets. It also preserved the concept of reciprocity whereby Israel will be expected abide by its commitment to "halt all forms of aggression against our land and people wherever they are and to release all Palestinian detainees." As a result, the ceasefire issue no longer remains an open question contingent upon negotiations that may or may not take place. Simultaneously, it is not confined by a deadline signaling the end of one state and the re- commencement of another. As such, it has become an axis for progress towards national objectives. Nonetheless, the commitment to "perpetuate the current climate of calm" on a reciprocal basis has a certain hypothetical quality because it was a Palestinian rather than a joint declaration. This rather hazy point in the Cairo Declaration should not escape us, for it could render calm vulnerable to the winds of Israeli escalation. The points in the Cairo Declaration pertaining to domestic reforms are, by contrast, linked solely to the quality of Palestinian resolve and the domestic balances that drive it. With respect to internal relations, the latest Palestinian dialogue greatly advanced moves towards a unified stance and will mark a historic threshold in the Palestinian national movement if its resolutions are given life. Perhaps the most important breakthrough was resolving the question of a single overarching framework for the national movement. In recognising the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," Hamas made a crucial leap beyond the vague formulas it had previously espoused, referring to the PLO variously as "the representative of the Palestinian people" or "a historic accomplishment of the Palestinian people." With the formula adopted in the Cairo dialogue, the PLO was confirmed as the umbrella organisation of all Palestinian forces and factions. At the same time, the relevant paragraph of the Declaration consciously avoided wording that would lead to dispute. There was no reference, for example, to a need -- previously put forward by Islamist factions -- to "restructure the PLO on new foundations". Instead, the Declaration established the principle that the PLO was to be "developed and enhanced in accordance with agreed upon bases," which renders everything subsumed under this heading subject to the consensus of the constituent members of the umbrella organisation rather than as a precondition for joining it. To strengthen this sense of collective commitment, the Declaration also called for the creation of a committee to "define the bases for developing and enhancing the PLO". The committee is to consist of the chairman of the National Council, members of the PLO Executive Committee, secretary- generals of all the factions and independent public figures. Finally, the Declaration resolved to "continue the pursuit of comprehensive reforms in all fields in support of the various aspects of the democratic process," as well as to amend the legislative elections law to enhance the principle of proportional representation and to amend the municipal elections law in the same manner. That the foregoing were presented in the Declaration as recommendations to the PLC does not diminish their substance, in view of the morally binding force of a resolution issued from a meeting convened at this level. It has been suggested that there is nothing to guarantee that the national consensus voiced in the Cairo Declaration will translate into action anytime soon, or even that all its points will be implemented. After all, so the argument goes, the history of national consensuses over less substantial matters should give reason for pause. While admitting the cogency of this argument, it nevertheless fails to take into account the rush of events that have compelled all forces to make crucial decisions. Among these are the need to amend the municipal and legislative electoral laws in advance of polls which should be completed no later than 17 July, and the need for the National Council to meet before the end of the year to make structural changes commensurate with the Islamist movement's long-awaited integration within an overarching PLO. It is our hope, therefore, that all parties commence work in concert, drawing on the support of Egypt in particular and the Arabs in general, to devise mechanisms for transforming the resolutions of the Cairo Declaration into concrete working papers that will set our national programme on a course to tangible achievement. Experience has taught us that great national initiatives that are followed through by bold action can overcome all obstacles. The Cairo Declaration has all the ingredients of such a great initiative, on condition that it is immediately backed up by mechanisms for putting its provisions in their entirety into effect and precautions are taken against attempts on the part of certain executive circles within the PA to reduce it to no more than a truce agreement. We cannot afford to pass up the opportunity the Declaration has opened up for the realisation of a united coalition within the framework of the PLO, vis-�-vis elected PA governing bodies that faithfully express the vital forces of Palestinian society, amid democratic reforms that will work to sustain the steadfastness of the Palestinian nation, and a plethora of dynamic institutions for mobilising the energies of the people towards the fulfillment of their national aims and aspirations. It is too good an opportunity to forfeit. * The writer is a member of the politburo of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and head of its delegation to the Palestinian factions talks.
