Any dialogue between the Palestinian factions is destined to fail, writes Samir Ghattas*, for the simple reason the factions refuse to talk Less than three weeks remain until the fourth anniversary of the Intifada, which began on 28 September, 2000. However much the uprising has accomplished it remains a fact that Palestinian- Palestinian dialogue has refused to budge beyond square one, and this in spite of many attempts to kick-start the process. Recent developments illustrate the swings and roundabouts that have characterised the process. Upbeat predictions regarding a new round of intra-Palestinian dialogue in the near future appeared to be based on reports describing the preparatory talks that took place in Cairo with leaders from the Palestinian opposition factions, especially Hamas, as positive. Unfortunately, the reactions of the concerned Palestinian parties quickly dispelled the optimism, leaving the disconsolate impression that the predictions were just one of those mirages that flicker briefly across the horizons of the Middle East. On 9 August Al-Ahram announced that Egypt had "reached an agreement with a Hamas delegation over matters pertaining to Palestinian unity and arrangements to safeguard security... in the wake of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and some portions of the West Bank." Perhaps there was such an agreement. No sooner, though, had this news appeared than Hamas did everything possible to refute and undermine it, on three separate occasions in three Arab capitals. Before leaving Cairo Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghosheh said that his movement had set out its position but he made no reference to any agreement. In Damascus another Hamas spokesman, Abu Mohamed Mustafa, stated that Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khaled Mashaal had made it clear in Cairo that Hamas would offer nothing until a full Israeli withdrawal became a reality on the ground. Finally, in Beirut, Hamas representative Osama Hamdan issued a statement declaring that Hamas would not disarm even if Israel withdrew from Gaza, and called upon all Palestinian forces to adhere to the "option of perpetuating the resistance" in the period following any Zionist withdrawal from Gaza. Nor was Hamas alone in issuing statements. In Gaza, a Palestinian Jihad spokesman declared that the Hamas delegation's visit to Cairo was simply a matter of protocol and that the visit had produced no practical results. Meanwhile, Fatah, the PLO organisation headed by Arafat, denied reports that a Fatah delegation would be arriving in Cairo to follow-up on the talks that had begun with Hamas. Subsequently it became clear that Fatah had no intention whatsoever of sending a delegation to Cairo in the first place. Such negativism has not lessened Cairo's determination to help the Palestinians reorder their domestic situation through the only feasible mechanism, which is Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue. Not that it has not had cause for exasperation. Hardly had Cairo announced the date of a forthcoming visit by Omar Suleiman and Abul- Gheit to Ramallah than the suicide bombings in Beersheba (Bir Sabaa), for which Hamas claimed responsibility, occurred, timed, many supposed, to coincide with the announced visit. The visit was postponed. But Cairo remained determined to proceed with its mission and announced that the visit would be rescheduled for 8 August, reflecting Egypt's belief that there is no alternative to dialogue, even in the face of so many setbacks. In a hasty attempt to explain the situation some commentators have suggested that Palestinian leaders believe it better to postpone dialogue and any intra-Palestinian agreement at this juncture and wait and see whether Sharon's own domestic crises work to obstruct Israeli disengagement from Gaza or even abort it entirely. At the same time, they argue, the Americans are too preoccupied with presidential elections to concern themselves with any developments in Palestine. But however sound these interpretations may be with regard to the present situation they fall short of explaining the dismal failure of every previous round of dialogue. Whether they took place inside Palestine or out each round collapsed, and after each collapse the concerned parties went on record to say how vital the process was, and how urgent was its success. The situation is such that there is little chance of any substantial progress in the next round of talks, if, indeed, they take place, or in any subsequent rounds that, on past experience, the concerned parties will be clamouring for. Nor is there likely to be any success until people begin to examine the reasons behind the failure that has haunted such dialogue for four years. If we are to do anything beyond this constant treading of water a number of crucial questions must be confronted. Which Palestinian factions are responsible for this dismal record and are they solely to blame or have other regional parties been instrumental in obstructing the dialogue? Have the dialogues been running aground on differences over strategic aims, or merely over means and tactics? And are these differences so deep that they are impossible to bridge? What have been the operative criteria and terms of reference in previous rounds and would the factions agree to resume dialogue if these were made explicit? Until now none of the concerned parties appears to have seriously posed these questions. In the absence of such a process of introspection some have suggested that part of the reason for the failure resides in the factions' over-indulgence in strategic manoeuvring, which favours keeping issues pending until some unforeseeable time when other options become available. If such behaviour may be justifiable in dealing with the enemy it hardly appears reasonable when dealing with matters that are crucial to internal Palestinian relations and, as a consequence, to the fate of the Palestinian people. It is ironic that we should have to remind the Palestinians of such a simple political principle; they were, after all, among the first Arab parties to recognise it and among the keenest to sustain it. However, it appears that the Palestinians, for whatever reasons, have let it slide, to the extent that they are unable to agree upon a common political agenda and a united framework of leadership. The current fragmentation stems, to a large extent, from changes in the internal balance of power over recent years, perhaps the most obvious manifestation of which has been the decline of Fatah's ability to spearhead the Palestinian political movement. As in other liberation movements, the Palestinians have had their opposition forces. Yet despite the many crises that Palestinians have faced Fatah was always able to maintain its position at the helm, building as large a united front as possible. That this is no longer the case is the result of several interrelated factors, including Fatah's own internal crisis, which has absorbed energies that would otherwise have been spent more productively. Then there is the rampant corruption within the PA and the impact this has had on the prestige and influence of Fatah. Simultaneously, the Israeli government's systematic destruction of PA institutions and, specifically, its security agencies, has rendered the PA unable to fulfil its obligations to protect the safety and well-being of Palestinians which, again, reflects negatively on Fatah. To compound these problems, Fatah has proven inept at setting the tone and direction of the Palestinian Intifada, largely as a result of its wavering between accepting and rejecting peace initiatives. Naturally, the very factors that have combined to debilitate Fatah have worked to strengthen the hand of the opposition parties, Hamas above all. It is important, too, to take stock of the qualitative transformation that has occurred in the configuration and outlook of the Palestinian opposition. Whereas factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) have taken pains to ensure that their actions and positions would not compromise the unity of the PLO, the same cannot be said of the Islamist factions. Hamas, in particular, never recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and it has repeatedly spurned offers to become a member in that umbrella organisation. Nor does it recognise the legitimacy of the current PA, in which it also refuses to take part. Hamas presents itself as an Islamic alternative to every aspect of the Palestinian national project and whatever the organisation's leaders say in public, Hamas's actions, especially its timing of suicide bombings, leave no doubt that its goal is to topple the PA and take its place. Such is the backdrop against which Palestinian- Palestinian dialogue is taking place. As a result the parties concerned have to be dragged to the table. It is all too easy to picture them staring petulantly out of the window, unable or unwilling to face the situation head on. Then, afterwards, they refuse to acknowledge to themselves or to others what transpired and the true reasons for failure. Yet other powers, not least of which Egypt, still hold out hope that the Palestinian factions will eventually attain the degree of maturity necessary for them to mend their rifts, or at least set aside their differences, so that they can unite against the Israeli occupation. But, as logical and sensible as this sounds, the experiences of other liberation movements tell us that sustaining a unified front requires more than stating the ideal. A unified political front must have solid political and organisational foundations, and among the most important of those foundations is a party possessing the prestige and influence necessary to formulate viable systems of operation and policies behind which it can rally the widest possible spectrum of opinion. Only by bringing cohesion and order to their ranks were the peoples of China, Vietnam and Algeria, for example, able to bring their resistance movements to the desired culmination. As determined as they appear to defy it, the Palestinians are not about to become an exception to this rule. Still, before we despair entirely, there may yet be a faint glimmer of hope with the announcement this week that arrangements have been set in motion to hold new Palestinian elections at the municipal, parliamentary and presidential levels. Strengthening this hope is that most of the Palestinian factions, including Hamas, have appealed to Palestinians to register to vote. Although democracy is more than the ballot box, voting offers a way to expand the base of popular participation in the decision making process. If, indeed, the various factions abide by the will of the people as expressed through the polls, perhaps sufficient internal order will be restored to bring the long-errant Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue process safely to shore. * The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies.
