Struggles over power sharing have brought Iraq's political process to a woeful standstill, Mohamed Al-Anwar reports from Baghdad As political turmoil over the formation of the new Iraqi government entered its ninth week, the Iraqi people are becoming increasingly skeptical about the direction the political process their country is taking. The failure of the National Assembly, in its second meeting on Tuesday, to put an end to the political impasse has further complicated the situation. On Wednesday, Iraq's main political blocs in the National Assembly continued haggling over two key issues: the distribution of leadership positions and negotiations over naming a speaker for the assembly from Sunni members after Iraq's former interim President Ghazi Al-Yawer turned down the post at the last minute. "The formation of the government is still a few weeks away," said one member in the assembly, raising fears that the country will continue its plunge in deeper political chaos. Even when it appeared that arrangements had been set the assembly meeting, scheduled for 11am on Tuesday, had to be postponed for three hours. A hone missile had detonated that morning near the assembly's main hall delivering, perhaps, an expected message from parties who have been excluded or who chose to exclude themselves from the political process. But the real surprise came after the green light had been given. Not long after the assembly got down to business, Yawer delivered a bombshell of his own when he announced that he was rejecting the post of speaker of the assembly. Suddenly it was back to square one, the assembly adjourned, the various contingents retreated into their respective huddles and statements were issued to the press to the effect that negotiations were still in progress. The task of the National Assembly at this stage is to elect a speaker and two vice speakers. It is also entitled to select the country's interim president and two vice presidents who in turn will name a prime minister. The prime minister will then form a government. The Assembly is also due to finalise a constitution. A deadline of 15 August has been set for drafting the country's permanent constitution but if such delays in forming the government continue, the whole political process risks stagnation. For the past week, the Shia-dominated United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the Kurdish list -- the two blocs which hold the majority of assembly seats (215 out of 275) -- were struggling to entice Sunni Arabs into the government, in part by offering them the speaker's post. Although Iraq's Sunnis boycotted the elections, there are now 17 Sunni representatives in the assembly. However, the task of selecting a Sunni for the speaker's post will not be an easy one since most of the Sunni MPs do not enjoy grassroots support among Iraq's Sunnis. The Iraqi public was plunged into yet a deeper depression with the realisation that the current political process in Iraq is as far removed as it possibly can be from their expectations. Despite continuous assurances from various Iraqi politicians that there were no unbridgeable differences, suspicions were confirmed over the gap between statements politicians issued to the press and what has been going on behind closed doors. Iraqi politicians downplayed fears of a political stalemate. "The meeting didn't fail," Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Mahmoudi of the UIA told Al-Ahram Weekly. "Rather, the opportunity was given to Sunni Arabs to select a candidate of their own choice to be speaker of the house." In a similar vein, Sheikh Jalal Al- Din Al-Saghir, also from the UIA, saw no reason for concern. Such delays, he suggested, were normal, citing the case of former Turkish Premier Necmettin Erbakan who took four months to form a government. The situation here, however, is not nearly as simple as such reassurances were intended to portray. When former interim President Iyad Allawi withdrew from the meeting he was followed by Minister of Defense Hazem Al-Sha'lan, then President Yawer, and lastly Minister of Interior Fallah Al-Naqib. Both Shia and Kurdish circles began to give off signals that there are certain matters that should not be handled unilaterally. It was also clear that there was much more going on beneath the surface than the question of Sunni Arab representation. The various manoeuvrings suggested that some parties are still pushing to become part of the post-election government, including Allawi and his list, and that they have formed an undeclared alliance to force the UIA to concede a number of ministerial posts. Such pressures are almost certain to set the assembly's agenda back indefinitely, as parties jostle for position and shift alliances. The longer this situation persists, the greater the chances that the UIA will weaken and perhaps fragment, enhancing the likelihood that the Kurds will obtain written guarantees regarding the nature of their autonomous entity. It will also greatly strengthen Allawi's hand, ensuring him a prominent role in the forthcoming government and, perhaps too, the UIA's agreement to his so-called 10 demands. One such demand calls for neighbouring states to refrain from intervening in domestic Iraqi affairs, an oblique reference to Iran. (see p.7)
