Europe's courting Hamas without reigning in Israel is a non-starter, writes Ramzy Baroud* The electoral success of Hamas since the first round of local elections held in Gaza last December has signaled a dramatic shift in the way the movement is perceived, both nationally and internationally. Of equal relevance, this success is likely to be mirrored in the way the movement envisages its role on the post-Arafat Palestinian political scene. In my opinion, the defining moment was not Hamas's direct participation in the three rounds of local elections leading to the now postponed parliamentary elections -- originally scheduled for 17 July -- but in fact the passing of late Palestinian Authority (PA) president Yasser Arafat on 11 November 2004. Arafat's death shifted the political pendulum in favour of Hamas, and convincingly so. Arafat's unanticipated absence brought to the surface an array of internal conflicts within his own party, Fatah. This internal strife manifested itself in open power struggles between the movement's traditional, elitist leadership -- labelled the "old guard" -- and the younger generation. Chaos was forthcoming with Fatah militants shifting their focus from battling the Israeli military in the occupied territories to allying themselves with local offshoots that in one way or another claimed links to the increasingly fractious political party. The past force of unity among Palestinians has become a force of instability and an expression of political and social volatility, rendering reforms within the party not just desirable, but imperative. Nothing can be said to stress more the importance of Fatah's structural and organisational mayhem in further validating and fortifying Hamas's repute among ordinary Palestinians who voted convincingly in favour of Hamas candidates in successive municipal elections. Hamas is now in control of over a third of the occupied territories' municipal seats, including those of most major cities. But one must not undermine Hamas's own undertakings, since its formal inception in the late 1980s, and even before, in garnering support among Palestinians, such as the movement's active involvement in relief work, educational projects, and most notably its violent and often deadly responses to Israeli military policies, culminating in the second Palestinian uprising during the last five years. All of this has made the Israeli government's calls on the newly elected PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to simply "dismantle" Hamas closer to wishful thinking than to an attainable goal. Hamas is no longer a few fiery young men circulating badly inscribed fliers, but a united, stable and growing political force whose consent in any future political settlement is nothing short of a necessity. Abbas made the right choice when he decided to "engage" Hamas, rather than confront it. But engaging Hamas in the political process comes at a price. The PA president has succeeded in deferring Hamas's response to Israeli military provocations in the occupied territories, with the hope that Israel would not falter on its commitment to "disengage" from Gaza. However, Hamas's one-sided commitment to the ceasefire has contributed to the movement's reputation as a responsible political player that enjoys both credibility and unequalled discipline. Moreover, it provided the movement with a badly needed break to focus solely on converting its growing support among Palestinians to uncontested political presence in the course of local -- and soon parliamentary -- elections. But as always, the strong showing of Islamic factions at polling stations ignites dilemmas for democracy advocates, mostly in the West, and Hamas's sizeable gains are no exception. European Union states were the first to wrangle with such a quandary, considering that the union has, since 2003, proscribed Hamas's both military and political wings, recognising them as terrorist organisations. "Western countries have repeatedly urged the Palestinians towards a democratic process," writes Donald Macintyre in the British broadsheet The Independent. "Having urged the vote to take place, how do they deal with formerly blacklisted elected officials?" Although the EU is yet to declare an official turnaround of its management of Hamas, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has admitted to journalists that British diplomats have in fact met officials representing Hamas's political wing on two occasions. In fact, a meeting between Hamas officials and EU diplomats, in the occupied territories and abroad, takes place "every 10 days to two weeks", according to a senior member of the Islamic movement, Mohamed Ghazal. Even if top EU officials, cited in international media, insist that the contacts with Hamas were merely "technical" and that they don't "signify any change in policy towards the organisation," the timing of these meetings has indeed surpassed the realm of technicality and passed into the domain of politics. "Europe understands that there can be no order in the Middle East without Hamas," argued Hamas's spokesman in Gaza, Sami Abu Zuhri. The fact that the US government has not harshly repudiated Europe's intent to engage Hamas can be understood either as tacit support for these contacts, or as an American incapacity to provide a substitute for Europe's diplomacy aimed at accommodating and eventually pacifying Hamas's rising political esteem. Israeli officials are reportedly "fumed" by these contacts. "We believe Europeans should be strengthening moderate Palestinians and not appeasing the extremists," said Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Roger in response to the widely reported news. "Anything that demonstrates acceptance of Hamas as a legitimate player is a problem." The supposed angry Israeli response is a requisite if Israel is to maintain the belief that it is oblivious to Hamas's political importance. However, the Israeli position becomes less certain when one ponders announcements by the Israeli army's "Civil Administration" in the West Bank, that "it has no problem with contacts between its own officials and Hamas members who are elected as mayors and other ranking local officials," according to The Independent. It remains to be said that the unavoidable realisation that Hamas is a political force that must be engaged rather than boycotted poses a dilemma to the movement itself. Hamas, fully aware of the double standards according to which the West has long perceived the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, must realise that advocating and executing suicide bombings indiscriminate of Israeli civilians -- even as a response to Israeli targeting of Palestinian civilians -- is likely to stamp out any possibility of politically legitimising a movement widely seen, at least outside the Middle East, as fanatical and terrorist. This provides Israel with the future leverage of manipulating Hamas's violent responses whenever Sharon wishes to once again render the Islamic movement an invalidated outcast. Contacts between Hamas and European diplomats are likely to continue and perhaps evolve into higher level exchanges, as long as all the parties concerned -- including Israel and the PA -- are benefiting from such "engagement". Both Israel's proposed "disengagement" from Gaza, scheduled for August 2005, and the Palestinian parliamentary elections are two important factors that will likely influence and determine the direction and magnitude of the ongoing exchanges. Yet the central factor that is likely to decide the future character and attitude of Hamas is Israel's own political attitude and military policy in the post-Gaza phase, if in fact a withdrawal from Gaza materialises. Continued Israeli domination of the West Bank, fortifying and expanding illegal settlements, and insistence on completing the Separation Wall built illegally on Palestinian land are good enough reasons for Hamas to preserve its militant posture towards Israel. This leads to only one possible conclusion: to engage Hamas successfully, Europe, with equal thrust and urgency, needs to "engage" and "reign-in" Israel. Otherwise, European diplomacy will remain partial and frankly useless. * The writer is an Arab-American journalist and editor-in-chief of PalestineChronicle.com . He is the author of the forthcoming book, A Force to Be Reckoned With: Writings on the Second Palestinian Uprising.
