Freeing five per cent of all occupied lands and involving 21 of 150 illegal settlements, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is not something to marvel over, writes Ramzy Baroud* It is rather peculiar how the Palestinian Authority (PA) opted to get engaged in a process that was solely aimed at excluding it, and how the debate has completely shifted from Israel's real motives to internal Palestinian quarrels over post-withdrawal details and definitions. When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his plans to "disengage" from Gaza and a tiny West Bank enclave, he maintained that his unilateral move was principally compelled by the fact that Palestinians were no partners in peace. They never were, his right-wing officials parroted; a reality, they contested, that most likely will not change in the near future. Thus "disengagement", for the sake of Israel's security, boils down to demographic supremacy, not Palestinian rights. The Israeli narrative was always clear, albeit iniquitous. Israel was "leaving Gaza in order to retain large chunks of the West Bank," The Jerusalem Post reported, summarising the declared positions of Israel's top officials. This concept was originally initiated by the ever-blunt Chief of Staff Dov Weisglass last year, Israel's top military strategist, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, and, according to the Post, Sharon himself. Those unfamiliar with the situation on the ground held their breath for the earthshaking disengagement. Those familiar with Israel's military and political manoeuvres, however, must have understood: Sharon is once again toying with land, politics and demographics, yet the same sorry ending is awaiting Palestinians -- the lock, the key, the prison guard and the ever-familiar scene of Palestinians being held captive at checkpoints. True, the settlements were and remain more or less the core issue. Removing 21 settlements from Gaza, four from the West Bank and evacuating over 8,000 Jewish settlers is a good thing, it was assumed. But blindly accepting the aforementioned conclusion is forfeiting a very valuable lesson that should've been deduced from the botched Oslo experiment: Israel is very keen on details. The odd part is that the Israeli government laboured little to give false impressions regarding the real meaning of its army and settlers redeployment. Israel did not wish to hide the fact that it would retain control over the borders of Gaza, whether land, air or water. Equally there were no real efforts made to hide the fact that Israel maintains the right to strike the impoverished and overcrowded Strip at the time of its choosing. Gaza's "open air prison" status, conferred since the Israeli occupation in 1967, will hardly be affected. Nonetheless much is gained. For one, Israel can comfortably subtract Gaza's 1.5 million inhabitants from its demographic nightmare, maintaining, for a while longer perhaps, the myth of a Jewish majority. The move will also end Israel's futile military quest to subdue a strategically inconsequential enclave, scrapping with such a decision the unfavourable international attention given to its occupation of Gaza, the demoralisation of its armed forces and the unavoidable loss of life as a result of Palestinian attacks on its fortified yet still unsecured settlements. So while journalists and commentators engagingly debated the fate of the rubble of the Jewish settlements following the limited Israeli withdrawal and whether extremist organisations will claim control over Gaza or if PA President Mahmoud Abbas has what it takes to "reign in the militants", a more relevant debate was almost completely cast aside: will Israel become less of an occupier after a few thousand settlers are relocated to a less vulnerable spot with their pockets full of cash (nearly a million dollars per family), a cost that will eventually be paid by American tax payers? It's important to recall that Sharon's disengagement was Israel's response to George W Bush's roadmap, which was hypothetically approved by both Israel and the PA in June 2003. As "painful" as the disengagement was, maybe it was Sharon's only dramatic escape from being bogged down by any kind of mutual commitment (although trivial considering the pitiable roadmap text), by deadlines, by reciprocity and ultimately a dynamic political process. "Never again", is what the disengagement from Gaza really means. Never again will Israel be scolded for not carrying out its part, for not fulfilling a scheduled redeployment; never again will Israel's actions be filtered, pondered and judged by a UN official, an EU diplomat or even by the Americans themselves. Israel does what's best for Israel. That's the bottom line. That, too, was omitted and replaced by the Hamas bogeyman, ready to strike and strangle Palestinian secularists -- the men for not wearing beards and women for not covering their hair. The fact that Israel intended to maintain "security control" over Gaza and the evacuated parts of the West Bank changes nothing, apparently. Meanwhile, the Israeli Separation Wall carries on consuming West Bank land, snaking in to include the illegal settlements, disfiguring the topography, the demographics, everything. As for the occupied East Jerusalem, well, it's effectively not a part of any Palestinian territorial contiguity anymore. It's unfortunate that Palestinians are dignifying the Israeli move by willingly "cooperating" regarding the post-disengagement fate of Gaza, rather than drawing international attention to the foreseeable future of the West Bank. It's troubling, to say the least, that the fear of a Hamas takeover has, in some ironic way, unified Israeli and PA concerns. Palestinian official, Saeb Erekat told foreign journalists in Jerusalem of a visit he paid to Prime Minister Sharon a year and a half ago, according to UPI correspondent Joshua Brilliant on 11 August. "I want to be your partner in this," Erekat appealed to Sharon. "Please. Weigh the consequences of what you call unilateral steps. We don't want Palestinian extremists to stand up in Gaza and say this (limited withdrawal from Gaza) is the result of suicide bombers and Qassam [rocket attacks]." What the outspoken Erekat had seemingly forgotten is that the legacy of blood espoused by successive Israeli governments in Gaza should've been of a greater, more urgent concern than the fear of an inflated Palestinian interpretation regarding driving the Israeli military out of the wretched enclave. What has also been conveniently omitted by the official Palestinian account is that had it not been for the Palestinian people's steadfastness and all acts of resistance and sacrifice since the first hours of the Israeli occupation of Gaza some 38 years ago, Israel would've never for a moment pondered leaving the cheap, yet scenic Gaza settlement resorts. In the final analysis, regardless of what Israel has aimed to achieve by disengaging from Gaza, and regardless of how Palestinians wish to interpret such a move, the Gaza Strip is still an occupied land constituting barely 4.5 per cent of the overall occupied territories of 1967. Gaza's fight for freedom is still intrinsically linked to the Palestinian suffering and struggle in the West Bank, in Jerusalem, and the fight of millions of Palestinian refugees demanding recognition of their right of return. So, while the disengagement has successfully engaged international media and has created quite a stir within internal Israeli and Palestinian politics, it is posed to change very little on the ground. Only within the framework of a complete military withdrawal from Gaza and the rest of the occupied territories, in accordance with international law and based on mutual agreements by both parties, shall a real solution evolve. Other than that, it's politics as usual. * The writer is an Arab-American journalist who teaches mass communication at Curtin University of Technology. He is the author of the forthcoming Writings on the Second Palestinian Uprising.
