Pan-Arabists who yearn to end the region's injustices should think again before siding with militant Islamists whose agenda is radically different, writes Hala Mustafa* Since the bombings in Sharm El-Sheikh, Arab satellite networks have been abuzz with programmes discussing a regional model of jihad, so to speak. Given airtime, jihad supporters took the chance to propagate intolerance, accusing their opponents of every evil under the sun, from treason to blasphemy, and claiming that jihad is the way ahead. Statesmen, meanwhile, have called for conferences to address the phenomenon of terror. Fine, but grand rhetoric alone is not going to get us through this ordeal. Conferences, we all know, are little more than show business. Often, they become an end in themselves. It is, therefore, my fear that the coming days would turn into a frenzy of preparations and exchanges, perhaps even a race for popularity and media opportunities. Once the conferences are over, we would all go home feeling good. Another denunciation of terror would have gone on record, but the task of defining terror would remain unfinished. The inability to differentiate terror and legitimate resistance would persist. And the task of clearing the name of Muslims and Islam would be left unaccomplished. See you at the next conference! Having let out steam, we would wait until another horror shocks us back into life, and then do it all over again. "Conspiracy," someone will shout. "Not true," another would retort. I don't wish to bore you with details of ineffectuality. So, I will now proceed to the task at hand. What do jihad supporters want? Supporters of jihad have existed in the region for sometime now. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928, a decade or so after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic Liberation Army (ILA), a Jordanian outfit with Palestinian influences, appeared in the 1950s. An ILA-affiliated group attacked the Egyptian Technical Military Academy in the 1970s. And soon after, Jihad Organisation and the Gamaa Islamiya came to life in Egypt. Gulf extremists met Egyptian jihad members during the Afghanistan war and Al-Qaeda was born. Taliban, Algerian Islamic groups, Palestinian Hamas and Jihad surfaced at approximately the same time. Hamas and Jihad, mind you, are more than just resistance groups. They have their own political agenda, and this is why they are having trouble with the Palestinian Authority. The regional dimension of jihad became clear with the Islamic revolution in Iran and is unmistakably visible in Iraq today. Other groups in Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia and the Philippines share a similar ideology. Of all these groups, factions have splintered, wings have branched out. In many cases, regimes with sagging popularity have aligned themselves with Islamic militants to bolster their own power. Right before it fell, Saddam's regime became enamoured of Islamic vocabulary. The Baathists were basically secular, but had no qualms incorporating Islamic rhetoric in their discourse, especially in times of conflict. The Islamic jihad model, so to speak, was born out of the failure of the pan-Arab model. Some people have even tried to reconcile the two, incorporating both into one "revolutionary Islamic model". The two share an anti-imperial, or anti-Western agenda, focussing on the liberation of Palestine. Some of those who supported the pan-Arab agenda in the past imagine, perhaps out of pure idealism, that the reconciliation of the two quests is possible. I disagree. For one thing, the proponents of regional jihad have never acceded to power, and this makes them hungrier for power than their pan-Arab counterparts. The jihad types have the weapons and the media coverage, are posing as defenders of legitimate causes, such as resistance and liberation, and claim to be doing God's work -- something their pan-Arab counterparts never claimed. Jihad supporters are serious about power and about replacing Arab regimes. Their legitimacy, they believe, supersedes the pan-Arabism of post-war revolutionary regimes. The Islamists and pan- Arabs may get along, but not for long. The prospect for future differences between the two groups is ample. I am not out to judge or tarnish. All I am saying is that an organised network of groups exists, a network with an expansionist agenda. These groups have emerged out of the realities of Arab and Islamic societies, and yet they are harder to define and talk to than anything we've had in the past. It is hard, for example, to know how much of their thinking is domestic and how much is not. This is why it would be unfair to place the responsibility of confronting these groups at the doorstep of local security forces. Domestic security forces cannot and must not be expected to prepare a comprehensive political programme of dealing with Islamist militants. Many people are not fully aware of the prospects ahead. Most are busy thinking of the confrontation with the US. But it is good to think ahead and act before it is too late. Many around us are nodding with encouragement to jihad-styled groups. Many are hoping that the grandiosity of jihad would revitalise their own quests. This is risky, if you ask me. Egypt can do better. * The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqratiya (Democracy) published by Al-Ahram.
