The fallout from the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza has yet to settle. When it does, writes Samir Ghattas*, the political landscape -- for Palestinians and Israelis -- could look very different No sooner had Israel pulled out of Gaza than the Palestinian factions began celebrating the end of an occupation that had lasted 38 years. Militiamen marched through the Israeli settlements that had until recently occupied a third of Gaza's land area. These military parades got out of hand, though the euphoria of the participants is easy to understand. The factions, including Hamas, quickly agreed to stop these shows of force and concentrate on reconstruction instead. A day after this agreement Hamas organised a parade in Jebalya, the largest refugee camp in Gaza. During the parade a massive explosion occurred in one of the vehicles participating in the show, leaving 19 dead and over 150 injured. Hamas blamed Israel for the incident, claiming that Israeli aircraft had fired a missile at the parade. The Palestinian Ministry of Interior contradicted Hamas, claiming that one of the Qassam missiles the vehicle was carrying had exploded accidentally. Israel claims it had nothing to do with the explosion. In retaliation Hamas fired over 20 Qassam rockets at nearby Israeli villages and a new cycle of violence was unleashed. Israel launched Operation First Rain against Gaza and promised to resume the targeted assassination of Palestinian militants. The showdown ended a period of calm that had prevailed more or less intact since the Cairo Declaration of March 2005. The pattern is all too familiar. The period of calm declared in June 2003 collapsed seven weeks later and in its wake Mahmoud Abbas resigned as prime minister. In the subsequent mayhem Israel assassinated several Hamas leaders, including Ahmed Yassin and Abdel-Aziz Al-Rantisi. As pessimists began to predict another round of bloodshed Palestinians were caught up in discussions over whether or not the Israelis had anything to do with the blast at the Jebalya parade. The results of any investigations into the blast are irrelevant to the wider picture, for what Palestinians and Israelis now need to do is look beyond the immediate cause of the flare-up and focus instead on the root causes that are feeding this recurrence in the confrontation. Among them is the way Israelis and Palestinians differ in their understanding of the manner in which the rules of the game have changed following the Gaza withdrawal. Israel believes it is entitled to continue building the separation wall, expand settlements around Jerusalem and attack anyone it perceives as a threat to its security while the Palestinian factions believe they have the right to retaliate against any Israeli action, whether in Gaza or the West Bank. There is a problem here. Israel, in its headlong pursuit of unilateral policies, is still refusing to deal with the Palestinians, including the Palestinian Authority, as a partner in the political process. The Israelis are changing the rules of the game and expect the Palestinians to play by the rules that Israel unilaterally decide. The Palestinians are not convinced. Following the withdrawal from Gaza military adventurism made a comeback on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The Israelis still provoke the Palestinians and then unleash military force against them. You would have thought that in withdrawing from Gaza Israel had finally come to its senses but old habits die hard. Some Israelis are aware of the dilemma. Former National Security Advisor Major General Uzi Dayan recently accused some of Israel's top brass of fueling hostilities and using the situation to boost their own positions. The Palestinian factions, for their part, are under the impression that their actions were the sole reason behind Israel's withdrawal. Just as Hizbullah forced the Israelis out of south Lebanon, so the Intifada forced the Israelis out of Gaza, goes the argument. It may not, however, be quite so simple. Israel still occupies the Shabaa farms in south Lebanon, and Hizbullah is doing little about it. Why? Because Hizbullah is aware of the far-reaching consequences of Israel's pullout from south Lebanon and measures its actions accordingly. The armed Palestinian factions have every right to celebrate Israel's withdrawal, and their acts of resistance were certainly essential in bringing about the withdrawal, but they need to put things in perspective. One of the things the Palestinian factions should remember is that in 38 years of occupation they have managed to kill just 268 Israelis, 75 of them civilian. Resistance factions can fire rudimentary rockets at Israel but they cannot provide protection for their members, let alone the Palestinian public. This is why Hamas called off all its military operations in Gaza less than 48 hours after Israel retaliated. Military bravado is not resistance; it is, rather, a means of oppressing society and blackmailing one's peers. Mahmoud Darwish lamented, two months ago, what he called the Talibanisation of Palestinian society. Politicians need to keep the militants on a short leash, not the other way around. As many predicted, Gaza quickly became a bone of contention between Sharon and Netanyahu. Netanyahu is banking on an increase in attacks against Israel to boost his chances of replacing Sharon while the latter has promised that the withdrawal will result in an improved security situation. Every Qassem rocket that is fired, Israeli analysts agree, is a present to Netanyahu, who was catapulted to the prime ministry in February 1996 after a spate of Hamas attacks. A new wave of rocket attacks could put Netanyahu back in power. Hamas is perfectly aware of this and should explain to the public -- or at least its supporters -- why it is seeking to boost Netanyahu's fortunes. On 26 September Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said that Hamas would not allow Palestinian lives to become a pawn in Sharon and Netanyahu's jockeying for power. These words, belated as they were, are the nearest we have come so far to a statement of policy. Some people believe Hamas upped the ante in an attempt to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Palestinian elections scheduled for January 2006. When it fired its Qassam missiles Hamas was perhaps sending a message to those who oppose its participation in the elections. Israel, the US, the EU, Russia and the UN have all said Hamas can participate only if it changes its charter and lays down its arms. While Hamas leader Mohamed Ghazal was recently reported as saying that Hamas was ready to reconsider its charter he quickly denied the statements attributed to him, suggesting that Hamas is far from ready to accommodate the conditions being demanded of it. Hamas boycotted parliamentary elections in 1994 on the pretext that they were being held under the Oslo Accords. In March 2005 Hamas decided to contest the upcoming elections without making any reference to Oslo. This may be a sign of increasing pragmatism within the group. Certainly, Hamas is entitled to oppose any Israeli or foreign pressure: it is not, however, entitled to assert its views by dragging the entire Palestinian community into military confrontation. Palestinians and Israelis are only beginning to comprehend the way the rules of the game have changed following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza. They would do well to remember the following: that resuming the state of calm may require extra effort by Palestinian factions; that Sharon may lose his leadership of Likud over the withdrawal from Gaza and that preventing Hamas from taking part in the political process may endanger the fabric and stability of Palestinian society. What has now become obvious is that unless Palestinian arms are strictly regulated they can cause untold mayhem on the Palestinian home front and that coordinating the national struggle in Gaza and the West Bank is a task that requires dexterity. What might soon become obvious is that, should Israel treat the Erez crossing in northern Gaza as an international border then Gaza and the West Bank will be effectively separated meaning Gaza may turn into a mini-state, the consequences of which Egypt will have to live with. It is also possible that plans for Jordanian-Israeli control of the West Bank may re-emerge. Whatever the possible scenarios, Egypt must remain alert to the possible repercussions of any shifts in power in both Palestine and Israel. * The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies in Gaza.
