The US is locked down in Iraq with only time left to tell which side of the equation, itself or the Iraqi resistance, will prevail, writes Ahmed Abdel-Halim* The military situation in Iraq, and the Middle East in general, is tied to transformations that have taken place internationally, regionally and locally in the recent past, specifically during the last year. There are also several facts on the ground affecting it. The United States has a presence across Arab soil while primary American ground forces are stationed in Iraq, a fact that has given rise to several significant situations. This presence has become a "deterrent factor" by way of the threat of military force (in theory at least) alongside increased political and economic pressures to serve American-Israeli interests and resolve regional conflicts according to an American-Israeli vision. It has also led to a tightened blockade of Iran and the use of various means to keep Iran out of the region's power equation while stepping up Israel's role in the forthcoming period. American pressures have been focused on nuclear weapons without addressing Israel, the only certain nuclear state in the Middle East. Additionally, the US has placed increased pressure on the region's states with regard to their internal makeup, again, at least in theory. Within this context, recent transformations affecting the military situation in Iraq can be observed as follows. First, America's military reach is decreasing, as the United States is unable to wage new military campaigns, at least at the current time. Political harmony has been reinstated due to regional, but also international considerations. Second, European activity has been increasing, both collective and individual, in the context of American political and strategic thought in general as well as the increased use of the United Nations and the Security Council and its resolutions (in contrast to American actions before, during, and after the military campaign against Iraq). Third, Russian and Chinese roles remain limited with regard to the region's troubles and crises, and particularly regarding the increasingly violent events taking place in Iraq. Fourth, new and grave regional situations are being formed, such as those in Lebanon and Syria as well as that in Iran. This development carries with it new and negative prospects as well as the increased likelihood of the use of American military force to meet political goals. Finally, this is all crowned with increased armed violence within Iraq against the occupying American forces and Iraqi powers loyal to the United States and supportive of it maintaining a military presence on Iraqi soil. The United States is the main player in the region's events, and yet its role in Iraq, and the likelihood of its continuation, is contingent on the outcome of its quandary there, as has been shown in recent studies and analyses. American intellectuals and political and strategic analysts have produced most of these in the United States itself. The American quandary in Iraq can be summarised: first, from the outset, planning was only undertaken for the military operation -- which was carried out proficiently until its close -- without appropriate consideration (or, with misjudgement) of the possibilities as to what might take place following the military operation, or as to the entire political process. This resulted in subsequent American military action being inadequate. Second, the military-strategic formulation was flawed; a fact that stems from the misjudgement of the political and military climate in Iraq following the American campaign as well as the inappropriate selection of forces to achieve desired political changes within Iraq. Third, this resulted in overstretching American military forces within Iraq so that none were left to use in emergency situations. Fourth, this has all been accompanied by economic and human costs above that anticipated, which has been directly reflected in American public opinion that has grown weary on the street and in Congress, and even within the administration itself. A complementary result has been the unwillingness of Americans to volunteer in the American armed forces. Indicators show a decrease in volunteering by 40 per cent until now and this percentage fall is continuing to grow. This unwillingness has directly impinged on the ability of the United States to send requisite support in forces to Iraq and elsewhere. This has all affected the achievement of US goals as stated prior to the war. Until now, stability has not been secured in Iraq, and the US has not been able to reconstruct Iraq according to its prior vision. It has also not been able to form a police force, or armed Iraqi forces, to perform the duties required of them or to accept a handover of responsibilities from American forces in order to lighten the pressures upon them. On top of all this, the United States continues to be incapable of dealing with the predicament of the international military "coalition", wherein states allied to America do not want to participate in American military activity in Iraq or in the Middle East in general. The primary question being reiterated within the United States now is: if all these problems are being met in dealing with a relatively weak power -- Iraq -- then is it possible to shoulder another military operation in stronger places, such as North Korea and the Taiwan Strait, for example? Would it be possible to wage such an operation against Iran, or even Syria in the future? Further questions pertain to the extent to which this situation might affect the political influence of the United States in the Middle East, particularly with regard to its pressures for political reform in the region's states. On the other side of the equation is the Iraqi resistance, which the United States describes as terrorism. To start with, America is fundamentally mistaken with regard to this and Iraqi identity, with its special characteristics, which has developed throughout Iraq's history. Iraqis reject the presence of foreigners on their land and meet violence with violence, and continue to do so as long as foreigners remain on the soil of their homeland. These characteristics have been prominent in the development of actions by the Iraqi resistance against the American presence. While there may be distinct orientations among resistance groups within Iraq that lent randomness to their operations in the beginning, now there is full coordination, and even cooperation, between these groups. Iraq's borders are lengthy and porous, open to the surrounding states, and this fact has opened the door to foreign support of resistance operations. Yet we must not forget in this context that the amount of weapons that were present in Iraq, and the weapons of the Iraqi armed forces that disappeared following the entrance of the allied forces to Baghdad, are sufficient to supply resistance operations for many years to come. There is no disputing that the Iraqi resistance is capable of continuing armed operations against American forces in Iraq, harming them and increasing the cries of American citizens against an ill-defined war for which no end is in sight. The final question on this matter is whether the United States can review its political and military policies towards Iraq. A friend of mine who works closely with American decision- makers provided an answer when he told me that there are three factors influencing the outcome: the ability of the United States to solve the quandary of an international military coalition, something it has not been able to do until now; the war's affect on the internal economy of the United States, which has placed extra burdens on American citizens; and the piling up of losses, mainly human losses, for American forces in Iraq. And so the conflict continues. The US is attempting to step up its military strikes against elements of the Iraqi resistance, and these elements are meeting violence with violence. This situation is confounded by a central Iraqi power that does not control Iraq, as well as increased fragmentation among Iraqis on an ethnic basis. The result is that the conflict will depend on the resolve of the conflicting parties and on the length of time it will consume. * The writer is member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
