Agreement over the draft security pact between Iraq and the US leaves a great deal unresolved, writes Ibrahim Nawar* The Iraq-US security pact is finally sealed. Negotiations between the two countries on the "principles of strategic cooperation" started in November 2007 with the aim of completing and signing a security pact regulating the deployment of forces by July 2008. It has taken longer than planned to reach a final agreement and the two sides must have breathed a sigh of relief following the Iraqi government's decision last week to agree a final text which will now be presented to the Iraqi parliament this week. While failure to reach an agreement would not have been a disaster -- the UN mandate for Iraq could have been extended for one more year -- Iraqis themselves now have every right to feel happier with the situation. There was much support in the Iraqi cabinet for the draft agreement, especially among the Kurdish and Shia alliance. Political forces outside the cabinet, with the exception of the Sadris, are likely to support the draft agreement or at least show minimum resistance. And while the Sadris have vowed to resist, it is not expected that they will be able to mobilise mass support as they had on earlier occasions. They have been weakened in Basra, Diyala and also in Baghdad as a result of the latest war in Basra (Spring 2008) and long military clashes elsewhere. The political mood in Iraq will also play against them as Iraqis rest assured that US troops will leave by 31 December, 2011 and Iraq comes to enjoy its full power as a sovereign state as soon as the UN Security Council ends the country's Chapter VII status under the UN Charter. Arab Shia tribes in the south of Iraq that had feared Iranians might flood the country should American troops lose legal cover to operate in Iraq after 31 December 2008 are now more relaxed. The above is a rose-coloured view of the situation. There is an alternative view, and it would be hard to deny that many people are worried. There are reasons for jubilation but there are also reasons for concern. A big question mark hovers over the reaction of the Iranian government. It is a question mark that must be thoroughly examined. The American occupation of Iraq had two main objectives, officially at least. One was to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the second to build democracy in Iraq. The first objective was easily achieved. The second is far from becoming a reality. US forces in Iraq will have only three years to help Iraqis achieve three major tasks, to build their political system based on democracy, to build, train and equip their armed and security forces, and to succeed in the socio-economic rebuilding of the country. Under the rules of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) -- officially renamed the Agreement on the Withdrawal of US Troops -- US forces will continue to operate in Iraq to help fight terrorism. Although American troops in Iraq have never been involved directly in inner Iraqi political struggles, they played a vital role in enabling the Kurdish alliance in Northern Iraq and weakening the Sadris in Baghdad and the south. Their role -- officially, at least, and according to the security pact -- includes guarding the Iraqi constitution and protecting the political system from any military coup that may destroy the democracy in the making. Under the UN mandate the Iraqi government did not need to approve military operations. Following the agreement American military commanders will now have to obtain permission from the ruling coalition before launching any military strike. It is now possible for US military forces to be politically manipulated. Raids against Iranian agents or suspected terrorists working unofficially for Iran may be restricted. Although Iraqi airspace will come under Iraqi government control there are doubts about the Iraqis' ability to control American air activities over Iraq. Questions remain about flying permission and even visas for US personnel who fly directly into Iraq using US air bases. The door has been left open for the Iraqi government to politically manipulate American commanders but it is a two-way street. The latter could also be in a position to militarily manipulate the Iraqi government. There are many technical details in the US- Iraq security pact that can be used to the disadvantage of the other party. The Iraqi political system is too fragile to cope with political or military manipulation. Objectives, as well as means, have to be clear. The main structural defect in the system is the principle of quota representation. This principle has infected all aspects of life in Iraq, politics and education, culture, commerce and finance. There are now attempts to break away from the principle. American policy-makers in Baghdad should use their leverage in order to promote these attempts, bringing Iraqis closer together. Within three years the failure of these attempts would bring the division of Iraq into three political entities -- Kurdish in the north, Shia extending from the centre to the east and the south and Sunni from the centre to the West -- inexorably closer. Such a development would have a devastating effect on the geopolitical situation in the East Mediterranean and the Gulf with Iran emerging as the absolute winner. Some Iraqi leaders are aware of the danger but they are working in different, and often opposite, directions. Iraqi National Accord, a secular organisation, is commonly viewed as an enemy by the Sadris, though both groups oppose the division of Iraq. Muqtada Al-Sadr also agrees with Sheikh Harith Al-Dhari, the head of Association of Muslim Ulama, over the full and immediate withdrawal of American troops, yet still views him, as a Sunni, as the enemy. There are also major divisions inside the Shia ruling camp. Two prime ministers from the Daawa Party (Al-Maliki and the former Jaafari) are each trying to forge a new political current away from the Supreme Islamic Council. Upcoming Iraqi local elections are likely to indicate how future political battle lines will be drawn. US troops in Iraq will also try, directly and indirectly, to counterbalance Iranian influence. This may lead to friction between Iraqi politicians loyal to Iran, such as Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Islamic Council, and American officials. The fact that the US Embassy will move out from the Green Zone to the new compound in Baghdad -- soon to be home to the largest American Embassy in the world -- means that communication between Iraqi and American officials may be reduced. It was easy, within the Green Zone, from them to visit each other several times a day. That Iraqi security forces will be responsible for the security of the Green Zone as from January 2009 represents a major challenge. Iraqi officials each has his own army of bodyguards. The Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has the Presidential Guard Forces, solely comprised of Pishmerga. Official and non-official bodyguards come from different backgrounds. This strange cocktail of military personnel will be difficult to control, leaving the Green Zone vulnerable to terrorist attack. The Iraq-US security agreement itself begs many questions. First is the reaction of Iran's government. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said the Iraqi people have a "duty" to resist the Americans. Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani has warned of "unpleasant impacts" if Iraq signs the deal. One senior Iranian cleric with ties to Iraq's Shias, Ayatollah Kadhim Al-Husseini Al-Haeri, has pronounced the accord haram, forbidden under Islam. And while Al-Sistani is said to be in favour of the agreement he has no influence over Muqtada Al-Sadr and his followers whereas Kadhim Al-Haeri does. The security pact is welcomed in Iraq by Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim, considered one of the strongest Iranian voices in Iraq. Iranians may be divided over the agreement, but their various reactions in themselves signal potential dilemmas. Has Tehran received assurances that the pact will not be used against any third party and that Iran's interests in Iraq will be considered? Was sending Arab ambassadors to Baghdad prior to signing the agreement part of a deal to encourage Arab countries to normalise relations with Tehran via Baghdad? Will Al-Haeri, and his student Muqtada Al-Sadr, play the role of checking the Americans, acting to maximise Iran's gains in Iraq by exerting continuous pressure on US troops until they leave? Only time will tell. Another question mark must be raised over the future of the Iranian Mujahideen Khalq near the Iraq-Iran borders in Diyala. The Iraqi government has taken a decision to place Ashraf military camp near Baaqouba under its direct control. This will, of course, endanger Iranian resistance fighters who live inside the camp. The American stand is that the Mujahideen Khalq in Iraq is protected by international treaty. Americans and Iraqi officials will have to find a way out of this dilemma, especially given that Iran has mobilised many local tribal leaders, political forces and the Iraqi government, against the Iranian opposition group stationed in Iraq. The last and most important question mark is how much Iraqis will pay for the US troops to stay in Iraq? It has been stated in the draft that US forces will stay in Iraq "at the Iraqis' request" which means that Iraq may be willing to pay for US troops to stay in the country. In politics nothing comes without a price. It has been widely publicised that American troops in Iraq cost the American budget $10 billion a month. So is Iraq to be billed $360 billion for the duration of the agreement? * The writer is chairman of the Arab Organisation for Freedom of the Press and has worked as an adviser to the UN mission to Iraq.
