Having won its greatest electoral battle, Hamas is faced with its greatest political contest, writes Graham Usher in Gaza One week after Hamas's epochal triumph in the Palestinian elections the mood in Gaza is as opaque as the dust. There is little sense of euphoria, even among Hamas supporters, whose celebrations have been restrained to the point of invisible. Apprehension is the stronger trait, fuelled by violent protests by Fatah activists outside and against the Palestinian Authority's parliament building and the Gaza residence of its president Mahmoud Abbas. But the overwhelming feeling is of entering the unknown, as Hamas picks up the mantle of a victory and an Authority that is "bigger than its support base, beyond its capabilities and way in excess of its expectation," says Gaza-based analyst Nasser Aliwar. Three factors caused its triumph. Palestinian disillusionment that peace or a return to meaningful political negotiations with Israel were on the horizon; appreciation of Hamas' reputation for clean and uncorrupted service provision as well as its role in the armed Palestinian resistance, widely seen to be the reason for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza last summer; and, above all, revulsion over a decade of PA misrule by Fatah, capped by its failure to bring political progress, economic recovery, law and order in the aftermath of the Gaza withdrawal. What the Palestinian elections were not was a referendum on political Islam or the peace process, says Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Policy, Survey and Research Centre. On the contrary, "had the issue of peace been the most important consideration in these elections, Fatah would have certainly won. But the peace process was the least important issue for the voters". Where the question of peace was raised, Shikaki's polls show a solid 75 per cent of Palestinians in favour of reconciliation with Israel on the bases of a two-state solution, including 60 per cent who voted Hamas. Other polls show even higher percentages. The question is what will Hamas do with a mandate that dare not speak its name? Its initial reactions have been marked by absolute caution. It is readying to start consultations with Abbas on a "national coalition government made up of all Palestinian forces," including Fatah. But Fatah is opposed, violently so. The Fatah-engineered demonstrations in Gaza and elsewhere are ostensibly a denunciation of a leadership and a structure that grassroots members see as the main cause of their defeat. But they also contain a warning, says Abdel-Hakim Awad, head of Fatah's powerful Shabiba youth movement in Gaza. "Hamas is a general without an army. It can establish the government, appoint Hamas ministers, but the PA has 70,000 men in the security forces, most of them Fatah cadre. And they are not going to submit to a Hamas interior minister." Abbas has tried to assuage this nascent rebellion by reiterating that all PA security forces are answerable to the president rather than the prime minister. But the spectre has been raised of a bloody war between the PA's newly-elected government and Fatah's self-defined role as the irremovable "party of the Authority". For ordinary Palestinians this is the worst of all futures. It could happen, though probably not because Hamas would want such a confrontation. The PA is teetering near bankruptcy, with the prospect of being unable to pay government salaries, including those of the security forces. Should the money run out there could be institutional collapse, domestic disorder and the temptation of "rescue" in the form of a Fatah-inspired coup. Is this what Israel and her allies seek? Acting Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert's, first operational decision about the new PA government was to freeze the transfer of $35 million in Palestinian tax duties. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said America will not send aid to a government that is headed by a "terrorist organisation", while implying that monies could still flow to Palestinian NGOs and the presidency. The Middle East Quartet -- the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia -- has for now reserved judgement on funding until the next PA government is formed. But political conditions of all are the same and identical to those of Olmert. There will be no negotiations with a Hamas-led PA until it disarms the Palestinian resistance, especially its own; recognises Israel; and adheres to all PA-Israel agreements, including those on security coordination. The most coherent response to this massive show of brinkmanship was delivered by Hamas' political leader, Khaled Meshal, on 29 January. "The PA was founded on the basis of the Oslo Accords," he told a Damascus press conference. "We see that this is a reality, and we will deal with it with the utmost realism, but without neglecting our fundamental principles." These include "resistance and adherence to its arms, Jerusalem, the rejection of settlements and the right of return ... As for recognising (Israel) and amending our charter, Hamas is not the kind of movement that succumbs to pressure. The occupation has no legitimacy, and we will not recognise it, no matter how much time passes ... Some people believe it is impossible to combine resistance with politics. We say: as long as we are an occupied people, resistance is our natural right." Since 11 September this is an equation that has been deemed intolerable by the West, and nowhere more than in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The present moves by Israel, the US and European Union are an attempt to inflict an ideological and political defeat on Hamas at the moment of its greatest electoral triumph. The moves of Hamas are to try to defy the charge on the bases of its policies, mandate, constituency and "Arab and Islamic depth". For the foreseeable future, the region is going to be shaken by this enormous contest. Much will depend on it, and not only in Palestine.
