We cannot think of dismantling Islamism until we take a close and reflective look at three characteristics of the phenomenon that need to be taken into account in any assessment of the reasons for its existence, its role, its ideas and its recurrent modes of behaviour. Firstly, the movement that utilises Islam ideologically in order to achieve power and wealth is the most propagative and schismatical of all modern and contemporary socio-political movements. The groups and movements it has spawned probably surpass in number those that fall under the heading of communism and that are permanently prone to fissuring and its crippling effects. Hardly does a new Islamist group emerge than disputes erupt among its ranks due to conflicts over the distribution of benefits or over divergent views on the arguments and opinions concerning Islamic jurisprudence, interpretations of Quranic verses and Prophetic sayings, or assessments of the historical stances of the first generation of Muslims. Alternatively, divisions may arise due to the ability of security agencies to infiltrate the ranks of Islamist groups and to recruit some of their members to sow discord and dissension. Sometimes, too, security agencies succeed in capturing key leaders who hold the group together and whose absence causes it to fall apart. Another common cause of rupture are internal power struggles that arise from some members' ambitions for higher rank or their envy or rancour against those in positions of power. These and other internal strains grow increasingly acute in the context of changes in the socio-political environment that surrounds the groups and organisations and that exerts relentless pressures on them from all sides. Due to all the abovementioned causes, the groups fracture and splinter into smaller ones, some of which disappear rapidly and others of which may lose their efficacy over time. Nevertheless, the splintering process does not obviate the possibility that some of the splinter groups may try to form an alliance, if only temporarily, or the possibility that these groups may mutate, changing their names, some of their ideas and modes of operation, and perhaps some of their leaders, enabling them to recruit new members to their ranks. Secondly, political Islam is like diabetes: there is no cure, but it can be kept under control. Perhaps this is the end that is achievable in any strategy to dismantle the phenomenon or clip its wings and minimise its dangers. Over the course of the history of Muslim societies there have always been people who utilised religion as a device to rally supporters behind ideas and projects — however inconsistent and conflicting — and propel them to carry them out. No period of our history was devoid of individuals or groups of this nature, even if historians failed to chronicle them. The third characteristic we need to bear in mind is that these Islamist groups and organisations depend heavily on the presence of religion in the public sphere and, at the same time, on the cumulative results of their efforts to build their deep community. This is what gives these groups immunity to efforts to dismantle them and empowers the two chief rhetorical weapons they unleash against their adversaries: the charge that all who oppose them are attacking Islam itself and the charge that those adversaries are trying to deprive poor and needy families of the benefits offered by the philanthropical and social services these groups provide. Bearing the foregoing features in mind, the question of dismantling political Islam can be approached from three directions: - Refuting the ideas: This task is not all that difficult if those undertaking it apply the discourse of scientific thought and disseminate it as widely as possible through educational institutions, cultural organisations and the media. The language and reasoning used by religio-political groups contain many flaws and weaknesses. It is inherently a language that appeals to the emotions wherein resides its capacity to arouse crowds and mobilise them quickly. But it does not remain in people's heads for long since is essentially hollow, uncritical or too rigid to face competing rhetorics. It is also a very traditional discourse, often antiquated and pedantic, and relying heavily on an ancient mode of argumentation and substantiation, for which reason it frequently seems incompatible with the realities of our present day lives on many subjects. Moreover, it is frequently inconsistent and contradictory given the divergence between the doctrines and whims of the groups that manufacture it. Even the historical narratives they use to support their views conflict with one another or are manipulated in different ways to suit the various aims and interests of these groups. As a result, it can be deceptive, expressing the opposite of a concealed intent. - Curtailing roles: This process entails closing the gaps through which politicised religious organisations and groups penetrate into grassroots society on the pretext of remedying people's needs. Such gaps have broadened considerably due to the state's withdrawal from supplying public services, the growing gulf between social classes and people's mounting shortages in basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and healthcare. As a consequence, Islamist groups and organisations have exploited the opportunity to use charity and philanthropic societies, bolstered by their abundant financial resources and close social and institutional social networks, to attract large swaths of the poor and lower income sectors of the populace, oblige them to join the groups or organisations and induce them to rally behind their political callings. A number of measures should be brought into play to curtail this phenomenon. One is to promote an effective and comprehensive national project. Any coherent and feasible national project for building a modern civil state should be able to offset and drive back the project of Islamist groups which depends on the absence of any rival or competing projects. A basic ploy of Islamist pundits, from the outset, has been to lead the people to believe that their groups, alone, hold the promise of hope and solutions to society's problems and that they, alone, can succeed where others have failed. Therefore, they argue, those others should step aside and give the Islamists the chance to steer Arab and Muslim societies. A second measure involves the caretaker role. The state, together with a modern civil society, needs to resume/assume the tasks and functions needed to respond to the basic needs of the people, relieving them of the need to depend on Islamist groups. A third measure is to depoliticise philanthropic activities. There is no reason to prohibit Islamic community associations from performing activities intended to serve the public welfare — a calling that is consistent with the religious inclination towards compassion and mutual support — on the condition that they do not use these activities or associated facilities to mobilise people politically. Experience has demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt that the Islamist movement used their schools, clinics, shops and other facilities that people have turned to out of need for the purposes of political indoctrination, mobilisation and drumming up votes in favour of Islamist candidates in elections. The prohibition against using philanthropic activities and facilities for political purposes should be encoded in law. - Launching dialogue: Another lesson from experience is that adherents of the Islamist movement cling to it more tenaciously when they perceive that a war has been declared against them. They believe that they have something precious to defend, so precious to some that they will do battle on its behalf. In addition, they become more dependent on their organisations to protect them, to shelter members on the run and to support the families of imprisoned members. Under such pressures, they grow more inventive and resourceful in the search for ways to promote themselves and their ideas and to evade and outwit those who seek to clip their wings. Dialogue has shown, in some cases, that it has the ability to diffuse such tendencies and to draw adherents away from their organisations after having shaken the absolutism of their certainties and opened their eyes to the fallacies in their thinking and the misguidedness of their leaderships. Nevertheless, dialogue should not be conducted without guidance or organisation. There needs to be a clear plan in accordance with which specialists from all scholastic disciplines can proceed. The process should be granted all necessary resources and it should be inclusive, bringing on board a broad array of representatives from civil society and independent thinkers. It can also engage diverse mechanisms, from face-to-face discussions with representatives of political Islam to more indirect methods, such as books and articles, television programmes and activities conducted in educational and cultural institutions. Political Islam thrived on the failure of others. It benefited from the closure of the public sphere and the decline in the caretaker role of the state and the openings this created for its charities and philanthropic services. These are what enabled it to disseminate its proselytising activities, expand its presence, strengthen its influence and present itself as an alternative and, indeed, saviour. It is essential to dismantle that image or at least diminish its force. Towards this end we need a strategy to prevent it from taking the form in which it has sought and continues to seek to appear. The writer is a novelist and socio-political researcher.
